

June 9, 1965

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the complex world in which we live. But it is far better to have ideals and targets toward which all of us work, rather than to have no idealism at all. We must mix idealism with realism. Many minds must be brought to bear on establishing the goals toward which we work and a program through which to attain them.

An ideology combines a way of life with a way of governing. By truly practicing democracy as a way of life at home, we can insure that our example will advance democracy abroad. By dedicated application of democracy as a way of government, we can further democracy in world affairs through official policy. If democracy by example and policy guides our behavior within America and on the global stage, the promise of liberty and the dignity of man will be within the reach of us all.

WITH WITHDRAWAL OF U.S. MARINES FROM THE DOMINICAN REPUBLIC

Mr. LONG of Louisiana. Mr. President, last Thursday President Johnson announced that he was ordering withdrawal of the remainder of our marines from the Dominican Republic. This Nation and the world owe an everlasting debt of gratitude to those courageous men of the U.S. Marines who moved to evacuate innocent foreign nationals, including citizens of the United States, from the civil warfare that raged in Santo Domingo at the time of President Johnson's decision to send in the marines.

The marines protected many persons who were not citizens of the Dominican Republic, and fears that the United States was aiming a long-range occupation of the island were wholly unjustified.

In no way do I mean to diminish the fine work done by the 82d Airborne Division. These courageous soldiers still are on duty to prevent unnecessary bloodshed and to assure the people of the Dominican Republic that the revolt does not result in another Communist regime like that in Cuba. We are merely there to see that the people of the Dominican Republic are guaranteed free elections and other democratic processes.

Mr. President, at that time there was a great hue and cry from some sources about a return to the earlier days when the United States did, upon some occasions, use the Marines for long-term occupation of certain places in Latin America. It is understandable that the peoples of Latin America might fear such a thing. They were, of course, encouraged in that fear by the Communist propagandists—as they are always encouraged to criticize and malign the United States.

In our own country, however, there was no such excuse, and yet we heard then, and we hear now, voices within our own councils which say much the same thing. I hope that President Johnson's action in withdrawing the marines at the earliest possible moment will tend to still these voices, which are essentially the voices of dissension and division, at a time when the President is facing so many critical and delicate situations throughout the world.

President Johnson is a man of reason and restraint, dealing one after the other

with crises which are thrust upon him, and dealing with them with tolerance, patience, and the judicious use of the great military power and tremendous resources of this mighty Nation.

President Johnson found that this action was necessary to save the lives of the foreign civilians who were there—citizens of this country, and citizens of other countries—who were caught in this sudden and brutal outburst of violence, which was growing rapidly more savage and uncontrolled.

Armed gangs were running through public rooms and corridors of the principal hotel which housed our representatives and those of other countries, firing rifles and submachineguns through the walls and windows. Our Ambassador, and I think he showed great good sense in his action under the circumstances, took the telephone and went underground. He got down under the desk in order to continue reporting to the President and the Secretary of State.

It is indeed surprising that, despite all that was going on then, and all that has gone on since, not one national of another country lost his life. The marines went ashore instantly, established the necessary sanctuaries, protected them, and arranged for the orderly evacuation of those who wished to leave. There was not a single life of a foreign national or visitor lost.

One of those who criticized our actions in sending in the marines was President de Gaulle of France. It is worth noting, however, that this did not prevent the French Ambassador to the Dominican Republic from taking advantage of our protection for French citizens, and, in fact, the protection zone was enlarged to include the French Embassy after the marines had already taken up their positions.

I wish it were possible to say that there were no lives lost, and no injured and wounded, as a result of this necessary action, Mr. President, but unhappily this cannot be said. Eight fine marines have died and 29 have paid in lesser measure for the success of this operation. We should all pay our homage today to these young men, and express our sympathies with their families and friends who now will miss them in the intimate ways that always accompany such tragedies.

While our purpose in entering Santo Domingo was to protect our own citizens and the citizens of other countries, we were certainly very much concerned about the circumstances and conditions prevailing for the people of this island.

At the time the marines landed, the people of the island were caught between the two forces. They were bombed and strafed in the streets of Santo Domingo; they were starving. Many of them were being put up against the wall and shot. The sanitary conditions were the cause of serious concern for the health of the people, and widespread epidemics were feared.

Much of this has now changed. We have brought in food and have assisted in bringing about arrangements which give hope of stabilizing the situation, at least for the helpless noncombatants.

We are providing funds for the necessary governmental services and operation of other vital institutions.

We still have troops in the Dominican Republic, but they are there now in association and cooperation with the majority of the members of the Organization of American States. We are joining, fully in the efforts to reach some political solution of the difficult problems which still exist. Our objective will continue to be to find this solution, and to withdraw the remainder of our forces from the island.

President Johnson has given concrete evidence of the peaceful course he will pursue by withdrawing the marines. There is no doubt whatsoever that President Johnson's future actions will be fully in keeping with his order of last Thursday.

Mr. GRUENING. Mr. President, will the Senator yield?

Mr. LONG of Louisiana. I yield.

Mr. GRUENING. I am happy to say that I heartily approve of the President's policy in the Dominican Republic to date. I feel he had to act as he did. He said so from the very start. He moved first to save American lives and, second, to prevent what he feared might be a Communist takeover—both wholly worthy and commendable objectives.

Third, he moved as rapidly as possible to make the problem a multilateral affair, with the assistance and cooperation of our sister American Republics, by calling on the Organization of American States to come in and help work out the Dominican problem.

If out of this tragic situation in the Dominican Republic we can get a permanent peacekeeping force in the Americas, in which the United States will be merely one of a number of nations cooperating, I feel definitely that we shall have brought about an event of lasting significance and a great turning point in the history of the Americas.

For that reason I believe the President's policy, both on the immediate range and on the long range, are highly commendable. He deserves unqualified praise. I am happy to say this because of the fact that I do not agree with our policy in southeast Asia.

I thank the Senator for yielding to me.

Mr. President, I now should like to speak on my own time for a little more than 3 minutes.

The PRESIDING OFFICER (Mr. COOPER in the chair). How much time does the Senator desire?

Mr. GRUENING. About 10 minutes.

The PRESIDING OFFICER. Without objection, the Senator may proceed.

THE MESS IN VIETNAM XVII: THE STEADILY WIDENING WAR

Mr. GRUENING. Mr. President, in its leading editorial this morning entitled "Ground War in Asia," the New York Times states:

The American people were told by a minor State Department official yesterday that, in effect, they were in a land war on the continent of Asia. This is only one of the extraordinary aspects of the first formal an-

nouncement that a decision has been made to commit American ground forces to open combat in South Vietnam: The Nation is informed about it not by the President, not by a Cabinet member, not even by a sub-Cabinet official, but by a public relations officer.

There is still no explanation offered for a move that fundamentally alters the character of the American involvement in Vietnam. A program of weapons supply, training and combat advice to South Vietnamese, initiated by Presidents Eisenhower and Kennedy, has now been transformed by President Johnson into an American war against Asians.

The editorial continues with the question:

Is it not more likely that political irresponsibility in Saigon will grow, rather than decline, as the main military responsibility for defending South Vietnam is transferred increasingly to American hands?

And concludes:

The country deserves answers to this and many other questions. It has been taken into a ground war by Presidential decision, when there is no emergency that would seem to rule out congressional debate. The duty now is for reassurance from the White House that the Nation will be informed on where it is being led and that Congress will be consulted before another furlous upward whirl is taken on the escalation spiral.

The American people deserve and should get straight answers from the administration as to just where we are going in Vietnam. It deserves more than mislabeling as "advisers" American Armed Forces personnel who have for quite some time now been in the front-line of the fighting in South Vietnam. It deserves more than statements that our marines are in South Vietnam only as defensive troops to protect our bases.

I ask unanimous consent that the editorial from today's New York Times entitled "Ground War in Asia" be printed in the Record at the conclusion of my remarks.

The PRESIDING OFFICER. Without objection, it is so ordered.

(See exhibit 1.)

Mr. GRUENING. This changing character of the war in Vietnam has been noted in recent days by other knowledgeable writers.

Writing from Saigon on June 4, 1965, Malcolm Browne, Associated Press reporter, notes that the Vietnam war is changing in character and is "being transformed into an enormous meat grinder, in which both sides are now making an all-out drive to bleed each other to death. It is a meat grinder in which America for the first time has an active part—on both the giving and receiving end."

These are disturbing words coming from a wholly reliable correspondent who won a Pulitzer Prize for his reporting of events from Vietnam under the most difficult circumstances and who, in an excellent book entitled "The New Face of War" has set forth his trying experiences in attempting to get the truth to the American people.

He is still trying and his words should be heeded, even though they are not entirely unexpected to those of us who have been following the events in Vietnam closely.

Mr. Browne, in his news dispatch, goes on to say:

U.S. officials predict that American casualty tolls will increase from now on as American Marine Corps and Army paratrooper units move deeper into the battle.

U.S. air strikes on North and South Vietnam have increased in recent months to the point that they are now round-the-clock operations.

In the north, strikes have been limited to military installations, roads and waterways well south of Hanoi. There seems no immediate prospect of bombing North Vietnam's cities or civilian industries.

But in the south, huge sectors of the nation have been declared "free bombing zones," in which anything that moves is a legitimate target. Tens of thousands of tons of bombs, rockets, napalm and cannon fire are poured into these vast areas each week. If only by the laws of chance, bloodshed is believed to be heavy in these raids.

In exchange, the Vietcong is exacting its pound of flesh.

In the past week, big Vietcong units prowling through the jungle-covered mountains of central Vietnam have chewed up three government battalions so badly that these units will not be able to fight again for a long time. Government casualties in these ambushes probably have exceeded 1,000 men.

The Vietcong have clearly shifted gears from what they call "guerrilla warfare" to "mobile warfare."

The Communist concept of mobile warfare is essentially guerrilla operation on a vastly expanded scale, in which whole battalions and regiments are used in mounting ambushes. Ambushes remain the key feature of the war.

The Saigon government and its American ally control the air above South Vietnam and some of its roads and waterways. The Vietcong controls much of the rest of the nation.

Government units move mostly by truck, plane, and helicopter. Vietcong units move on foot through the trackless jungle. This means the Communists generally have the advantage in setting up their ambushes.

Roads, particularly those that wind through the mountain passes of central Vietnam, are ideal places for ambushes. Even helicopters must land in clearings, which in the jungle are often only tiny patches of ground.

The Vietcong can and often does set up traps around these clearings, with .50-caliber machineguns trained on the places helicopters will be forced to land.

As the fighting grows hotter it becomes more brutal. Neither side is taking many prisoners any more. Soldiers caught off side now are generally shot on the spot or tortured to death.

Mr. Richard Starnes in the Washington Daily News for June 4, 1965, also comments on the steady escalation of the undeclared war in Vietnam.

Mr. Starnes begins his article, entitled "The Escalating War" with the statement:

The American people are not alone in their blissful ignorance of the coming demands for men to feed the insatiable jungle war in Vietnam. A completely reliable source who was present at a White House briefing tells me this:

"I saw U.S. Senators blanch when Robert McNamara told them that they had to prepare to see 300,000 American men sent to Vietnam."

"I never thought I'd live to see such a thing in the United States, but McNamara told the briefing quite cheerfully that things were looking up in Vietnam because we

were now killing four times as many men as we were losing."

The briefing which was one of dozens that the White House has conducted in an effort to sell its Vietnam policy, concluded with talks by Secretary of State Dean Rusk and "big daddy" himself.

From news stories of troop movements to Vietnam, it is evident that it will not take long to build up to the 300,000 fighting men in Vietnam predicted by Secretary McNamara.

Those of us who have heard the discussions in the cloakrooms of the Senate are quite aware that many of our colleagues are having second thoughts about the southeast Asia resolution passed overwhelmingly on August 7. I voted against that resolution as did the Senator from Oregon [Mr. Morse] and nothing in the events of the past 10 months since that date has caused me to doubt the wisdom of voting against the resolution placing a blank check in the hands of the President to commit our Armed Forces to fighting anywhere in southeast Asia against undeclared enemies.

Mr. Starnes continued in his column:

"Rusk had nothing new to say, but he kept saying it at such great length that finally the President, who was sitting in the front row, started looking ostentatiously at his watch," my informant reports. "But Rusk missed the cue, until at last the President just got up and nudged Rusk away from the lectern."

What the Senators heard then is a thing that has caused something very near to cloakroom consternation. Mr. Johnson sailed into a defense of his escalation of the war in Vietnam, and bluntly told his audience that they had authorized it and, by implication, must share the responsibility for it.

The President said he was frequently asked what his policy in Vietnam was. Then, with the subtlety of a sledgehammer, he told the Senators that the Congress had laid down the policy in a resolution passed last August 7 by a vote of 504 to 2. And, said the President, he was doing his best to carry out that resolution.

The source of this account, who knows the Senate intimately, reported that, in spite of the near unanimity of congressional support for administration Vietnam policy, Senators are still "rankled" over Mr. Johnson's bland assumption that the August 7 resolution authorized escalation of the war in southeast Asia.

The resolution, passed in the fever of indignation that followed reported attacks by North Vietnamese torpedo boats against U.S. fleet units in Tonkin Gulf, comes very close to saying what President Johnson says it says—whether the Senators who voted for it like to admit it or not.

The resolution authorized the President "as Commander in Chief, to take all necessary measures to repel any armed attack against the forces of the United States and to prevent further aggression."

Note well that the resolution was not limited to Vietnam but specifically asserted that the U.S. goal was "assisting the people of southeast Asia" to fight off alleged aggression. That means just what it says—Congress "approves and supports" anything Mr. Johnson deems necessary to prevent further aggression in the area, and it is now somewhat late for whatever second thoughts are occurring in Capitol cloakrooms.

Whatever doubt may have existed as to the intent of the August 7 resolution was dispelled last month, however, when Congress dutifully voted a blank check \$700 million appropriation to finance the expanding war. This time the division was 596 to 10, still a

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sufficiently lopsided vote to assure history that the 89th Congress had supported escalation in the Pacific whether it knew what it was doing or not.

This same growing unrest in the Congress and its questioning of the wisdom of its abdication of a voice in the conduct of our foreign policy is noted by the New York Times in its leading editorial on June 7, 1965, entitled "Congress and Vietnam" which begins:

Signs are growing of congressional interest in ending the leave-it-to-Lyndon era in American foreign policy.

The Founding Fathers intended the framing of our foreign policy to be a partnership between the executive and the legislative branches of the Federal Government with each acting as co-equals.

We are now seeing the harmful effects of treating the formulation of foreign policy as the exclusive prerogative of the executive branch of the Government.

The editorial in the New York Times contains the following observations:

Factors that go beyond the President's limited experience in foreign affairs and the extraordinary vacillations in Dominican policy have set off the present questioning at home and abroad. The reluctance of Secretary of State Rusk to employ the full resources of his Department and give independent advice, the meager use made by the President of nonofficial task forces in the foreign policy field, the overdependence on military and intelligence agencies and the divorce between the administration and the Nation's intellectuals—all point to a need for more vigorous congressional interest.

Nowhere is this more vital than on Vietnam, where grave constitutional questions are raised by the official acknowledgment of an increasing combat role for American troops. During the 18 months of the Johnson administration, the number of American troops in Vietnam has been tripled to about 46,500; a further buildup to more than 60,000 appears imminent. American planes have entered into combat both in South and North Vietnam—in the latter case openly attacking a foreign country with no declaration of war. American warships have bombarded the North Vietnamese coast. And there are indications that American ground troops—first employed as advisers in South Vietnam, then deployed to defend American installations and now directly engaged in patrolling action—will soon take on a full combat role as a tactical reserve aiding South Vietnamese units in trouble.

Yet at no point has there been significant congressional discussion, much less direct authorization of what amounts to a decision to wage war. That is why 28 Democratic Congressmen, on the initiative of Representative ROSENTHAL, of Queens, now have wisely asked the chairman of the House Foreign Affairs Committee to hold public hearings on the administration's Vietnam policy.

American casualties in Vietnam, while still relatively minor, already exceed those of the Spanish-American War. The choices open to the President are exceedingly difficult ones; they should not be his alone, either as a matter of sound policy or of constitutional obligation. If he takes it upon himself to make an American war out of the Vietnamese tragedy, without seeking congressional and national consent, he may open the country to divisions even more dangerous than those that developed out of the Korean conflict.

I ask unanimous consent that the entire editorial from the New York Times

for June 7, 1965, entitled "Congress and Vietnam" be printed at the conclusion of my remarks.

The PRESIDING OFFICER. Without objection, it is so ordered.

(See exhibit 2.)

Mr. GRUENING. How singularly individualistic the war in Vietnam has become was commented on by columnist Drew Pearson in his column in the Washington Post on June 4, 1965, under the heading "President Johnson's Personal War." Mr. Pearson states:

The war in Vietnam has also become a lonely war and to some extent a personal war for one man. * * * It's become personal today, because the President feels it so keenly and directs it so carefully. Every morning at 3 he wakes up and calls the White House security room. Three in the morning is about the time the news is in from Vietnam on the casualties and the hits after each bombing raid.

Mr. Pearson concludes this portion of his article as follows:

The North Vietnamese have been winning. Our bombing raids have not stopped the supply of troops and supplies from going south or the guerrilla raids by the Vietcong.

The Russians, who normally might have acted as intermediaries, were put on the spot by our bombing of the north. The Chinese have chided them with being too friendly to the United States in the past, and with forsaking their alleged former role as the champion of small nations. So it's difficult for them to side with the United States now.

The Chinese are delighted at the predicament of both Moscow and Washington. They don't want the Vietnamese war to end. The longer it lasts, the more the United States and Russia become at swords' points, and the more the smaller nations of southeast Asia pull away from the United States into the Red Chinese camp.

In brief, the military advisers who sold the President on the strategy of bombing North Vietnam failed to understand oriental politics. Though he inherited the Vietnamese problem, they sold him on enlarging it into a mess that could either lead to world war or is almost insoluble without serious loss of face.

I ask unanimous consent that the entire column written by Drew Pearson in the Washington Post for June 7, 1965, entitled "President Johnson's Personal War" be printed in the Record at the conclusion of my remarks.

The PRESIDING OFFICER. Without objection, it is so ordered.

(See exhibit 3.)

Mr. GRUENING. An excellent series of articles on Vietnam recently appeared in the New York Herald Tribune. They were written for the New York Herald Tribune by its special correspondent Beverly Deepe from Saigon.

I ask unanimous consent that Beverly Deepe's articles appearing in the New York Herald Tribune on May 30, May 31, June 1, June 2, June 3, and June 4, 1965, be printed in the Record at the conclusion of my remarks.

The PRESIDING OFFICER. Without objection, it is so ordered.

(See exhibit 4.)

Mr. GRUENING. Communism cannot be fought with nothing.

A strong, capable, noncorrupt government in Saigon has been needed for years to bring about the social and economic reforms so necessary to show

the people of South Vietnam that they can have liberty and economic and social justice.

But Beverly Deepe's articles show why needed reforms were thwarted.

In her fifth article she discusses the long delay in land reform and how the government at Saigon was playing the landlord's game:

"The most important question in the Vietnamese countryside besides security is land reform," an American technician said, "yet virtually nothing has been done about it."

"The Vietcong are gaining a lot of points with the peasants by simply issuing land titles—and it costs them nothing. They take the land from the landowner and give it away. Nothing we give to the peasants—like pigs, insecticides, or fertilizer—is as important as land."

American technicians and provincial officials for the past several years have urged the implementation of an effective land reform program. Two land distribution schemes currently have been written, but neither has been accepted. Higher officials of the American Embassy and in the Agency for International Development believe land reform is not the panacea for Vietnam's problems.

A program for the training of land-reform cadre is under consideration. But the program will not be instituted until the other day—when the Vietcong Communists have been defeated.

WARNING

However, one Vietnamese general recently warned American generals and officials that American-backed efforts to pacify the provinces would fail unless they were linked with land reform.

"When the Vietnamese National Army goes back to pacify areas from the Vietcong, the local landowner goes back with them, offering to serve as intelligence agent," the general explained. "Obviously he wants to collect his back rent. So when the army pacifies the area it pacifies it for the landowner and not for the peasant."

"Of course, 35 percent of the peasants are landless. They become fanatics and will fight for the land given them by the Vietcong because it's as important to them as life."

One U.S. official described as "horror stories" the actions of some landowners to collect back rent, once Government forces had pacified Vietcong areas.

According to reliable sources, in other cases, when the Vietnamese Government Army attempts to pacify the area, the commanders simply ignore the problems of land reform, refusing to collect back rents—but also refusing to confirm the landownership rights.

In Vietcong-controlled areas, if landowners or their agents return to collect back rent the matter is simple. The peasant complains to the Vietcong, and the agent is shot.

"The question of land reform is quite simple," one low-ranking Vietnamese provincial official explained. "The government represents the landowners; the ministers and generals are either landowners or friends of landowners. The Catholic Church owns land. The Buddhist Church owns land. Nobody is interested in fighting for the poor peasant. And the top Americans—well, they talk to only the ministers and rich people so they don't push it either."

Beverly Deepe in her fourth article describes "How the United States Built on the Quicksand of Asian Politics." She says:

Since November 1963, the country has been in a state of political crisis. Sources in Saigon now argue that it would be a mistake to rebuild a counterideology—even if it could be done. They say instead that the Saigon government must reform itself and “out-revolutionize the Communists—but do it 10 times better and 50 times faster than the Communists themselves.”

The dilemma of American policymakers is the schizophrenic nature of the Vietnamese society itself. The governing class is generally urban-based, French-educated with an aristocratic position based on either family background, money or landownership. This elite minority attempts to govern the masses although it knows little about them and is concerned less.

After 10 years of administering the largest U.S. medical aid program in the world, American officials here still have little influence on Vietnamese medical affairs. One American-trained Vietnamese doctor said that a medical degree from an American medical school still is not readily recognized in Vietnam, on the other hand, a “parachute degree”—a degree virtually bought with money from a second-rate medical school in France—is easily acceptable by “the Mafia.”

The two best hospitals in Saigon are French operated. They are also the most expensive. There is no good American hospital in Saigon for the Vietnamese population (although there are two American-operated hospitals in France). Requests by the American-operated Seventh Day Adventist Missionary Hospital to expand their 30-bed clinic have repeatedly been refused.

American officials in Saigon have not effectively pressured the Saigon government to correct “this rot within,” in the words of a Vietnamese anti-Communist. Instead, they have superimposed upon the rot a spectacular medical program in the provinces.

“The Americans think we should fight for democracy,” one young Vietnamese intellectual explained. “But, in fact, the Vietcong fight because of the lack of democracy.”

But her most devastating article is entitled: “Corruption—Hottest Saigon Issue” and shows how corruption on high in Saigon—winked at and ignored by U.S. officials—was and is one of the causes for effective support of the Government at the grassroots—support which is essential.

The article states, in part:

The hottest issue in Saigon is not bombing Hanoi, nor Vietcong terrorism, nor possible negotiations for peace. It is corruption.

Vietnamese sources—generals, majors, captains, ex-ministers, economists—say that corruption has now reached scandalous, unprecedented proportions.

Highly placed sources in Saigon—American, Vietnamese, and Western—urged tighter controls on Vietnamese Government funds and on American aid and goods.

The issue is considered a gift for the Vietcong Communists, who promise the workers and peasants justice and equality. It also has caused friction within the Vietnamese Government and armed forces.

One high-ranking American official in the U.S. Agency for International Development (AID) reportedly estimated that 30 percent of American economic aid was unrecollected or unaccounted for last year. A low-echelon American provincial official says some of the 45 Vietnamese provinces had not submitted vouchers for expenditures during the past 3 years.

The original purpose of American advisers was to train Vietnamese to use the equipment—“and to keep track of the equipment, which sometimes took some doing,” one American captain who worked on the program for 2 years said.

“We brought in air conditioners for hospitals—they ended up in the general’s house. We brought in hospital refrigerators to store vaccines in. The vaccines spoiled and the refrigerators wound up in the general’s house.”

These are the comments and criticisms which the highly placed sources in Saigon made about the commercial import program and sales of farm surplus commodities.

First, according to one Vietnamese economist and ex-minister, economic aid doesn’t aim at an economic target, but is only in support of a military machine. About four-fifths of the U.S.-generated plasters in 1964 were allocated to support the Vietnamese military budget.

CONSPICUOUS WEALTH

Second, the commercial import program has enriched and enlarged the upper middle class elements in Saigon and other cities, but it has also accentuated the extremes between the urban and rural classes. Often you bring in a whole lot of things for the richer middle class with conspicuous consumption, and the Vietcong can play on this, saying it enriches the middle class and bourgeois, one Western ambassador said.

Third, the rural communities, especially earlier in the program, received a relatively small proportion of the commercial import aid. Between 1955 and 1960, when the Vietcong began organizing and recruiting in the countryside, only 4 percent of the direct and indirect American aid was funneled into the rural population, which is an estimated 85 percent of the total population.

Fourth, the commercial import program has not been geared to assist the building of industries which funnel Vietnamese agricultural products into the light industrial sector. During the critical period of Vietcong formation in the countryside, from 1955 to 1960, American economic aid assisted in the establishment of 68 companies. But about 70 percent of these depended on imported raw materials: even the papermills needed to import woodpulp.

The Vietnamese officials have therefore devised an effective system of padding their vouchers and receipts.

“Suppose a wooden bridge costs 1,600 plasters to build,” an American district adviser complained, “the contractor adds another 200 plasters and the district chief adds another 200 plasters. I can practically see the money flow into their pockets, but they give me a receipt for 2,000 plasters. What can I do to disprove them?”

One Vietnamese province chief under the Ngo Dinh Diem regime admitted he ordered a few of his loyal troops to blow up his own bridge that was half constructed so that they could let another construction contract.

Some Vietnamese regional and regular units are known to possess phantom troops—troops that never existed, or were killed or deserted but never reported as lost. Their paychecks slip into the hands of privileged commanders.

“What it boils down to is whether to have a social revolution or not and clean up this government,” a Vietnamese economist explained. If America is too scared to do it—the Communists will, and will win the people. The people want justice. They don’t care if they have a democracy or a dictatorship—if the government comes in with bullets or ballots. But they want justice—even if it is harsh. The Vietcong are harsh, but they are just.

The basic conclusion arrived at in this excellent series is summed up at the beginning of the second article:

U.S. policy in South Vietnam is frozen in a negative posture that concentrates on military victory while failing to produce the sort of dramatic political strategy that would make such victory possible.

This, at least, is the opinion of highly placed sources in Saigon who have watched the American involvement here grow steadily for more than a decade.

In their view, the U.S. attitude is essentially anti-Communist rather than something. The overwhelming impression is that the American policymakers are attempting to stem the tide of Communist aggression or to teach Hanoi a lesson. But this implies a political status quo in a country that is changing in its post-colonial development, and is, indeed, fighting for change.

“Nothing negative has ever prevailed over something positive,” the Western military expert commented. One of the most frequently asked questions by Vietnamese captains and majors on the battlefield is “What are we fighting for?” as they look at the political turmoil in their rear area at Saigon.

I ask unanimous consent that the article by Mr. Richard Starnes and Malcolm W. Browne be printed at the conclusion of my remarks.

The PRESIDING OFFICER. Without objection, it is so ordered.

(See exhibits 5 and 6.)

EXHIBIT 1

[From the New York Times, June 9, 1965]
GROUND WAR IN ASIA

The American people were told by a minor State Department official yesterday that, in effect, they were in a land war on the continent of Asia. This is only one of the extraordinary aspects of the first formal announcement that a decision has been made to commit American ground forces to open combat in South Vietnam. The Nation is informed about it not by the President, not by a Cabinet member, not even by a sub-Cabinet official, but by a public relations officer.

There is still no explanation offered for a move that fundamentally alters the character of the American involvement in Vietnam. A program of weapons supply, training and combat advice to South Vietnamese, initiated by Presidents Eisenhower and Kennedy, has now been transformed by President Johnson into an American war against Asians.

It was the bombing of North Vietnam that led, in turn, to the use of American jet aircraft in South Vietnam and the emplacement of American marines and paratroops to defend American airbases. Now, with American air support hampered by the monsoon rains, American ground troops are to be made available as a tactical reserve to help South Vietnamese units in trouble.

It can all be made to sound like a gradual and inevitable outgrowth of earlier commitments. Yet the whole development has occurred in a 4-month span, just after an election in which the administration campaigned on the issue of its responsibility and restraint in foreign military involvements.

Since March, American forces in Vietnam have been more than doubled to 52,000, as compared to 14,000 when President Johnson took office. Additional troops are moving in and a buildup to 70,000 is indicated. There has been neither confirmation nor denial for reports that a force exceeding 100,000 is planned, including three full Army and Marine divisions. Nor is there any clarification on whether the so-called combat support role now authorized—combat in support of South Vietnamese units—is to be transformed later into offensive clear and hold operations of a kind hitherto carried out only by South Vietnamese forces. Apart from the obvious difficulty American troops would have in distinguishing guerrillas from the surrounding population, such a war ultimately might absorb as many American troops as were employed in Korea.

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A major factor in the original escalation decision—the decision to bomb North Vietnam—was the political crisis in Saigon after eight changes of government in little more than a year. The bombing was urged upon President Johnson as the only way to shore up morale, halt the factional feuding, and prevent a complete political collapse in South Vietnam.

Is it only a coincidence that the decision to enter the ground war has come during another political crisis in Saigon? There may be a need to prop up the government of Premier Phan Huy Quat against the Catholic and southern factions which made a constitutional issue out of his recent Cabinet reshuffle and still seek to bring him down. But is it not more likely that political irresponsibility in Saigon will grow, rather than decline, as the main military responsibility for defending South Vietnam is transferred increasingly to American hands?

The country deserves answers to this and many other questions. It has been taken into a ground war by Presidential decision, when there is no emergency that would seem to rule out congressional debate. The duty now is for reassurance from the White House that the Nation will be informed on where it is being led and that Congress will be consulted before another furious upward whirl is taken on the escalation spiral.

EXHIBIT 2

[From the New York Times, June 7, 1965]

CONGRESS AND VIETNAM

Signs are growing of congressional interest in ending the "leave it to Lyndon" era in American foreign policy.

There is Senator FULBRIGHT's new proposal to give the OAS a major voice in channeling American military assistance to Latin America. There is the provision in the new foreign aid bill for a thoroughgoing congressional investigation and for terminating the aid program in its present form in 1967.

There is the trip to Europe, at their own expense, of four House Republicans to investigate the crisis in NATO. And there are the recent criticisms of administration policy in Vietnam and the Dominican Republic by Senator ROBERT F. KENNEDY, plus his current charge that the United States is neither meeting its aid responsibilities to the underdeveloped countries nor identifying itself with the world revolution underway in those areas.

Factors that go beyond the President's limited experience in foreign affairs and the extraordinary vacillations in Dominican policy have set off the present questioning at home and abroad. The reluctance of Secretary of State Rusk to employ the full resources of his department and give independent advice, the meager use made by the President of nonofficial task forces in the foreign policy field, the overdependence on military and intelligence agencies and the divorce between the administration and the Nation's intellectuals—all point to a need for more vigorous congressional interest.

Nowhere is this more vital than on Vietnam, where grave constitutional questions are raised by the official acknowledgment of an increasing combat role for American troops. During the 18 months of the Johnson administration, the number of American troops in Vietnam has been tripled to about 45,500; a further buildup to more than 60,000 appears imminent. American planes have entered into combat both in South and North Vietnam—in the latter case openly attacking a foreign country with no declaration of war. American warships have bombarded the North Vietnamese coast. And there are indications that American ground troops—first employed as advisers in South Vietnam, then deployed to defend American installations and now directly en-

gaged in patrolling action—will soon take on a full combat role as a tactical reserve aiding South Vietnamese units in trouble.

Yet, at no point has there been significant congressional discussion, much less direct authorization of what amounts to a decision to wage war. That is why 28 Democratic Congressmen, on the initiative of Representative ROSENTHAL, of Queens, now have wisely asked the chairman of the House Foreign Affairs Committee to hold public hearings on the administration's Vietnam policy.

American casualties in Vietnam, while still relatively minor, already exceed those of the Spanish-American War. The choices open to the President are exceedingly difficult ones; they should not be his alone, either as a matter of sound policy or of constitutional obligation. If he takes it upon himself to make an American war out of the Vietnamese tragedy—without seeking congressional and national consent—he may open the country to divisions even more dangerous than those that developed out of the Korean conflict.

EXHIBIT 3

[From the Washington (D.C.) Post, June 4, 1965]

PRESIDENT JOHNSON'S PERSONAL WAR

(By Drew Pearson)

War, no matter what the circumstances, is tragic business. However, the war in Vietnam has also become a lonely war and to some extent a personal war for one man.

This is not because the President began it. It began 18 years ago under the French, was picked up 10 years ago by President Eisenhower, and increased 4 years ago by President Kennedy.

It's become personal today because the President feels it so keenly and directs it so carefully. Every morning at 3 he wakes up and calls the White House Security Room. Three in the morning is about the time the news is in from Vietnam on the casualties and the hits after each bombing raid.

The President worries over these, broods over them, wants to know, no matter what the hour of the night, just what has happened.

One reason for this personal direction is that the President is worried over the possibility of enlarging the war. He knows how easy it is for bomber pilots to make a mistake, or how dangerous it can be to jettison their bombs on their way home.

On the usual wartime bombing raid, a mission will fly over a target, attempt to knock it out; but if the clouds are low or an enemy plane gives trouble, the bombers may drop their payload indiscriminately on the way back, regardless of military targets.

TARGETS OF CONCRETE

Not, however, with the war in Vietnam. Mr. Johnson has given strict orders that only the targets he picks out are to be hit—and these are bridges, ammunition dumps, railroad centers and military installations.

"We're knocking out concrete, we're not hitting women and children," he has frequently told his aides.

In addition to his care to avoid civilian casualties he is concerned over any bombing mission that might stray over the line into China, or give the Communist Chinese the slightest provocation to enlarge the war.

This is why the war in and over Vietnam has been a lonely war, a personal war directed by a man who goes to bed well after midnight, but wakes up automatically at 3 a.m. to check on the military targets he has personally pinpointed.

Under the Constitution, he tells friends, he is charged with the conduct of war. But regardless of the Constitution, he knows that if there are failures, or if the war spreads, he will get the blame. So he is taking the responsibility.

INSOLUBLE MESS

When the President outlined his Baltimore peace proposals they were also personal, especially his plan for a giant series of dams on the Mekong River to benefit all the Indochinese countries, including North Vietnam.

Mr. Johnson had hoped that this, coupled with his offer of unconditional peace talks, plus joint United States-U.S.S.R. aid, might induce the other side to sit down at the conference table. It didn't, for three reasons:

The North Vietnamese have been winning. Our bombing raids have not stopped the supply of troops and supplies from going south or the guerrilla raids by the Vietcong.

The Russians, who normally might have acted as intermediaries, were put on the spot by our bombing of the north. The Chinese have chided them with being too friendly to the United States in the past, and with forsaking their alleged former role as the champion of small nations. So it's difficult for them to side with the United States now.

The Chinese are delighted at the predicament of both Moscow and Washington. They don't want the Vietnamese war to end. The longer it lasts, the more the United States and Russia become at swords' points, and the more the smaller nations of southeast Asia pull away from the United States into the Red Chinese camp.

In brief, the military advisers who sold the President on the strategy of bombing North Vietnam failed to understand oriental politics. Though he inherited the Vietnamese problem, they sold him on enlarging it into a mess that could either lead to world war or is almost insoluble without serious loss of face.

BEHIND THE SCENES

The Central Intelligence Agency is using a mysterious airline that calls itself Air America to drop weapons and supplies to our guerrilla fighters in Communist-held areas of Laos and Vietnam. The CIA is trying to give the Reds a taste of their own guerrilla medicine * * * Senate investigators have discovered that the CIA not only watches suspicious mail, but actually opens the letters as part of its secret intelligence work. However, Senators will protect the CIA, will not reveal this in their probe of Government eavesdropping.

EXHIBIT 4

[From the New York (N.Y.) Herald Tribune, May 30, 1965]

(By Beverly Deepe)

SAIGON.—One of the biggest puzzles of the Vietnam war is what makes the Communist Vietcong guerrillas fight so hard.

"It's fantastic the way the Vietcong lay it on," a Vietnamese-speaking American provincial representative commented.

"Young kids who fought with them explain it by saying the Vietcong create a 'new order and a new reality.'"

According to reliable persons who have talked with Vietcong prisoners and defectors, the Vietcong manpower—composed of 38,000 to 46,000 hard-core fighters and 60,000 to 80,000 part-time guerrillas—falls into two main categories: The older generation troops who fought against the French 15 to 20 years ago and a younger generation recruited in South Vietnam.

Of the first category, more than 70,000 Vietminh—as they were called during the French Indochina War—left their homes in South Vietnam when the country was partitioned in 1954 and went to North Vietnam, where they continued their training and indoctrination.

INFILTRATION

From 1956 onward, they gradually infiltrated back to their native villages. The most significant aspect of their return was a transfusion of political leadership into the south to organize and recruit younger south-

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erners. Simultaneously, the Communists began a massive campaign of assassination of village government officials, virtually obliterating the Government's local leadership.

The older troops had fought the French for one reason: Independence, with its anti-French, anticolonial, antiwhite overtones. They fought and won with guns, but their most effective weapon was hate.

One member of a Vietminh suicide squad wrapped himself in gasoline-soaked cotton, ran into a French ammunition depot in Saigon and burned himself alive to destroy the installation. The story of the cotton boy swept through the countryside.

"My father even wanted me to volunteer to be a cotton boy," a Saigon businessman recently recalled.

Young Vietnamese students read French history books referring to "our ancestors, the Gauls." This example of French acculturation was countered by the Vietminh argument: "Please remember, your ancestors were not the French. You know your ancestors were the dragon and the fairy," a legend commonly accepted by the population.

According to prisoners in the older group, once they returned to South Vietnam in the late 1950's, they were surprised at what they found. They had been told the south must be liberated from its own poverty. One said he was astonished to see the Government troopers wearing boots. (Communist troops often wear rubber-tire sandals.)

Another said he had been told that two-thirds of South Vietnam had been liberated. But when he attacked Government villages the peasants fought his men. They had been told they must liberate the south from the American imperialists, but soon discovered they were fighting Vietnamese.

But few of these veterans defected to the government side. One oldtime propaganda agent captured in the south explained that he listened to the Voice of America and British Broadcasting Corp. to discover the truth. But he listened to the Hanoi radio to find out the correct party line.

He reasoned that if the party lied, there must be a good reason for it. The party knew best.

The younger generation Vietcong troops join the liberation army for different reasons. Some of them are virtually kidnaped. Others have personal grievances or are simply bored with life in the villages. The Vietcong promise them adventure, and a chance to see life and be educated.

There is no sharp overriding national cause which the Vietcong are pushing throughout the country, such as the anti-French campaign. But there are grievances.

Some unmarried males join to get away from their landowners. Some are fired from their jobs and join. Many prefer serving with the Vietcong rather than government forces because they believe they can stay closer to their families.

Some young married men join to get away from the in-laws; the Communists in the village promise to take care of the wife and children. (One Vietcong trooper returned to his village, found his wife and children destitute, picked up a rifle and shot up the Vietcong village committee.) One was talked into joining when a pretty girl promised to marry him if he did; he became disillusioned when he found she had promised to marry six other recruits also.

Some are simply kidnaped at gunpoint. One was led away with a rope around his neck. One was kidnaped only hours after his wedding.

One reliable source estimated that about 10 to 15 percent of the southern-born Vietcong troops were orphans. About 30 percent are farm laborers. About 80 percent came from the rural areas.

In the West, the war in Vietnam is an ideological confrontation with communism. In Vietnam, this is not the way it is regarded by many of the Vietcong.

The Communists operate behind the mask of the National Liberation Front, which exploits nationalism and xenophobia. It disguises its Communist core philosophy by sloganeering about freedom and democracy.

One Western diplomat explained the Communist appeal in these words: "The Communists have swiped the American ideals. The Communists are promising the peasants a New, Fair, Square Deal—land, reform, democratic elections, land courts for justice."

Hence, the appeal of the Communist guerrilla movement is not communism at all. One American official explained that of more than 200 Vietcong prisoners and returnees he interviewed, not one mentioned anything about Marxism-Leninism, atheism, collective farms.

But the Vietcong also have a strong appeal for youth. "The Vietcong promise them fun—that life will be gay," one source said. "Many of those who join believe they get this."

Even if a youth has been forced to join the Vietcong, a highly effective indoctrination session immediately begins to mold him into an enthusiastic, well-disciplined fighter.

Perhaps, this can be seen in their songs. Neil Jamieson, 29, a Vietnamese-speaking provincial representative from Gloucester City, N.J., translated a number of Vietcong songs and talked with incoming Vietcong defectors.

One of the songs goes: "We are peasants in soldier's clothing, waging the struggle for a class oppressed for thousands of years; our suffering is the suffering of the people."

"Many of their songs are centered on victory," Mr. Jamieson said. "They associate the soldiers with the peasants—fighting oppression, not only against the foreigners, but also the upper classes within society."

"The troops accept—in fact, glorify—hardship because it identifies them with the people. It's almost like old Christianity. It's like little kids' Sunday School hymns—the idea of picking up the Cross for Jesus but instead of a cross it's a pack."

He said most of the Vietcong songs were "upbeat, emphasizing the positive in a Norman Vincent Peale manner." Government songs were often sad.

A SPARTAN LIFE

"The young troops lived a very spartan life," Mr. Jamieson continued. They were short of medicine, and all suffered attacks of malaria. Many suffered real hardships. It was cold in the jungle, yet they didn't dare light a big fire.

"I talked with many of the Vietcong about their songs," he said. "After their evening meal, they would break into teams of three and have their self-criticism sessions. Each one would go through his experiences of the day, his life in society, and in his three-man combat team. If one of them was wounded in combat, the two buddies would take care of him."

"After supper they would go through this ritual. They are taught to do this immediately after joining the Vietcong by the older cadre, who told them that sins can be forgiven but to conceal anything is a blow against the group."

"If for example, the young trooper had lost his ammunition or weapon, he'd criticize himself. This psychological aspect is a great Vietcong strength."

"After the self-criticism session, there would be announcements by the cadre and then would sit around and sing to pass their time in the evening. They would sit around a small campfire, if security permitted—just like the Boy Scouts used to do. These youths were uneducated, but the Communists taught them about the sputnik and Castro and Cuba. They didn't understand it well, but they knew Cuba was a tiny country near America and America was a paper tiger when Cuba stood up to us and we were powerless to do anything to them."

"The troops were short of rice, yet each day they put a few grains from each meal in a bamboo tube. When there was enough they'd take it to a tribal village and have a party for the children."

"One youthful trooper was with the Vietcong for 3 years, and was a member of their youth organization, which is the halfway point to becoming a party member. He was recruited at gunpoint, but he didn't hate the Vietcong."

He told me: "If I told you what I thought about out there in the jungle you'd think I was crazy. The Vietcong create a new reality; you feel you are in the world and not out of it."

[From the New York Herald Tribune, May 31, 1965]

OUR GIRL IN VIET—II: AMERICA'S FROZEN POLICY—VITAL POLITICAL POWER UNUSED
(By Beverly Deepe)

SAIGON.—U.S. policy in South Vietnam is frozen in a negative posture that concentrates on military victory while failing to produce the sort of dramatic political strategy that would make such victory possible.

This, at least, is the opinion of highly placed sources in Saigon who have watched the American involvement here grow steadily for more than a decade.

In their view, the U.S. attitude is essentially anti-Communist rather than something. The overwhelming impression is that the American policymakers are attempting to stem the tide of Communist aggression or to teach Hanoi a lesson. But this implies a political status quo in a country that is changing in its postcolonial development and is, indeed, fighting for change.

"Nothing negative has ever prevailed over something positive," the western military expert commented. "One of the most frequently asked questions by Vietnamese captains and majors on the battlefield is, 'What are we fighting for?' as they look at the political turmoil in their rear area at Saigon."

HOLLOW WORDS

While some Americans in Saigon pay lip-service to the principles of freedom and democracy, these are, as one American Government employee noted, "hollow words that mean little in Asia."

A Western diplomat argues that the Western concepts of democracy and freedom have never been simplified and codified as have the Communist ideology. There are no American primers for democracy as there are Communist primers for revolution.

"One cannot understand these American principles unless he has reaped the benefits of them or seen them firsthand," the diplomat explained. Hence, he said, the principles in which Americans believe must be translated, demonstrated, and visualized for the Vietnamese by the Vietnamese Government, and this has yet to be done.

The main political problem during the past decade seems to have been to realize there is a political problem and to act positively.

The American policymakers, however, view the battle in Vietnam as principally, if not solely, a military operation against armed Communist guerrillas. They are operating dramatically on one front while the Communists are operating on six fronts—political, economic, social, cultural, psychological, and military, all integrated into one powerful stream of warfare.

"Suppose you lose your billfold in a dark place," one Vietnamese provincial official explained. "But you insist on looking for it where there is light because it is easier. Well, you are now looking for the Communists in the light place—the military field—but you never, never find them all—they are also where you refuse to look."

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ECONOMIC AID

During the past decade, \$1.1 billion was spent on the U.S. military assistance program for weapons, tanks, and ammunition for the Vietnamese armed forces. In addition, \$2.1 billion was spent in Vietnam from American economic aid funds. But 75 percent of the economic aid was for the purpose of paying expenses of the national army through the commercial import program.

These figures exclude the salaries of American servicemen, and Government officials, and all their operating costs, as well as gasoline, parts, and ammunition for American units.

There is also the fact that the Vietnamese national army was built to counter a conventional invasion instead of a guerrilla war. Once the slow-motion invasion began a year ago, the army was slow in reacting.

There is no grand, dramatic political strategy for winning the political war in South Vietnam comparable to the dramatic military actions.

The bombing raids on North Vietnam have not and cannot win the political war within the South. But without them the war could never have been won—or contained—because of the sustained influx of North Vietnamese troops, weapons, and the much more significant political leadership cadre. If the raids have not won the war, however, they have in effect won time—they have provided the time to act politically.

Sources in Saigon now hope for a dynamic political maneuver to reverse the adverse political tide. They feel the military operations then would not be considered an end in themselves, as is now the case, but the means to an end—an honest, efficient government, a land reform program for the peasants, a smashing medical-educational program that would lift the nation economically and politically into the 20th century.

These sources argue that the elaborate and effective military battle plans have in effect given the nation time to formulate and implement a massive blueprint for the political-economic-social development of Vietnam. Instead of Vietnam being simply a military battleground, it could also become a political showplace, they maintain.

"But we lack any political imagination," one young American Government employee said. "We are fighting against revolution. How can we expect to win? It's like advocating the murder of mother."

One Western ambassador says as an example that it was "politically inadmissible" that 200,000 refugees in the central part of the country—victims of an autumn flood, Communist terror and friendly bombing raids—were not made a symbol of non-Communist revolution by the Vietnamese government. "They are given charity rice and propaganda lectures," he said. "They should be put in factories and apartment houses to show the world the benefits of fleeing the Communist side. Some anti-Communist refugees are not given help by the government, and return to Vietcong areas."

Another source criticized the American officials for not forcing the Diem regime years ago to establish "centers of prosperity" in which the Vietnamese people and the outside world could see the results of the American presence.

WOULD INTRODUCE TV

A high-ranking Western official suggests that television should have been widely introduced in Vietnam to relay government propaganda to the villages, to educate the children and to show adult films on better farming methods.

More than 3 years ago, private Japanese companies made such proposals for this, and the Japanese Government has tentatively offered technical assistance and funds. A television station would cost \$500,000.

But successive Vietnamese governments have postponed a decision on this project

and American authorities appear cool to the idea. Economic planners are more interested in Japan's contribution to a \$9 million bridge for the Mekong River.

The United States has political power in Vietnam, but chooses not to use it. Yet at this time the Saigon regime is too weak to act with political dynamism and effectiveness.

"We have the power to take names and to punish," one American explained. "But we don't do it. We are still timorous about interfering in a nation's internal affairs."

A Western ambassador agreed. "The first basic fault in the system," he said, "is you are too respectful of Vietnamese independence, so you do not interfere in making decisions on great issues—and in my opinion you should—while instead you are very particular, you pester them on small things of almost no importance. This creates the wrong impression and does not get the results. Your instructions should be more articulate but fewer."

American generals, colonels and captains admit they do not talk politics with their Vietnamese military counterparts; and no other American agency has been given the responsibility of cementing all the fighting Vietnamese political factions together.

This is in contrast to the Vietcong and the Communist apparatus—a guerrilla is first and foremost a political cadre, and after that a soldier. The Communist political cadre—perhaps with only the rank of sergeant—decides what villages will be attacked and the military commander, with a rank of major, follows his orders.

COMMUNISM FIRST

The Vietcong military apparatus is of a secondary, supporting nature to the Communist political machine. Hence American efforts to defeat the guerrillas still have not defeated the political subversive. American advisers in the provinces admit that even when the Communist guerrillas are defeated militarily, the Communist political cell system in the village is rarely destroyed.

The appearance of new French faces on the main street of Saigon, the arrival of increasing number of proneutralist Vietnamese from Paris, and the release of thousands of proneutralist and pro-Communist Vietnamese from prison within the last 18 months is more important in the subversive field than the introduction of American combat marines and paratroopers in the counter-guerrilla military field.

"With the amount of money you are spending in the military field," one Vietnamese major said, "you could buy all the land from the landowners and give it to the peasants. You could pave Vietnam with gold."

A 155-mm. howitzer shell costs \$70; a 500-pound general purpose bomb costs \$180—and tons of them are expended daily and nightly in Vietnam.

[From the New York Herald Tribune, June 1, 1965]

OUR GIRL IN VIET—III: CORRUPTION—HOTTEST SAIGON ISSUE
(By Beverly Deepe)

SAIGON.—The hottest issue in Saigon is not bombing Hanoi, nor Vietcong terrorism, nor possible negotiations for peace. It is corruption.

Vietnamese sources—generals, majors, captains, ex-ministers, economists—say that corruption has now reached scandalous, unprecedented proportions.

Highly placed sources in Saigon—American, Vietnamese, and Western—urged tighter controls on Vietnamese Government funds and on American aid and goods.

The issue is considered a gift for the Vietcong Communists, who promise the workers and peasants justice and equality. It also has caused friction within the Vietnamese Government and armed forces.

Several weeks ago a low-ranking Vietnamese civil servant was fired after he spat on the Minister of Economics because of differing views on the issue. A Vietnamese general and an admiral have been suspended on charges of corruption.

One high-ranking American official in the U.S. Agency for International Development (AID) reportedly estimated that 30 percent of American economic aid was unrecipited or unaccounted for last year. A low-echelon American provincial official says some of the 45 Vietnamese provinces had not submitted vouchers for expenditures during the past 3 years.

Another official said that outright corruption—American funds ending up in the pockets of the rich—was probably limited to 10 percent. Last year, this would have been \$233,000.

One high-ranking Western official angrily commented: "This is a major American scandal. The way American-generated funds flow out of this country to Paris—or back to America itself—well, it makes your hair curl."

"There are millions and millions of piasters that go to France or go to Hong Kong—and these piasters are generated by American aid funds. The French have a saying in Saigon that every time America increases its aid funds there's a new hotel on the Champs Elysee."

FRENCH GIGGLE

The ambassador of another Western embassy lamented, "The French stand by, look at what you're doing, and giggle."

American aid falls into two broad categories—military and economic. During the past decade \$1.1 billion was given to Vietnam through the U.S. military assistance program. This program gives guns, ammunition, bombs, and other equipment to the Vietnamese armed forces.

The original purpose of American advisers was to train Vietnamese to use the equipment—"and to keep track of the equipment, which sometimes took some doing," one American captain who worked on the program for 2 years said.

"We brought in air conditioners for hospitals—they ended up in the general's house. We brought in hospital refrigerators to store vaccines in. The vaccines spoiled and the refrigerators wound up in the general's house."

The second broad category totaling \$2.1 billion during the past decade is the economic aid program administered through the AID.

However, of the 10-year economic aid program, 75 percent has been channeled into the commercial import program and sales under the food-for-peace program. It is this program, copied from the Marshall plan for Europe after World War II, that highly placed sources in Saigon believe should be reappraised.

SPECIAL KITTY

The commercial import program, plus selling of American farm surplus goods, calls for the importing of goods from America or U.S.-authorized countries. The American Government pays the exporter in dollars for the goods. The Vietnamese importer in Saigon pays the Vietnamese in piasters.

These American-generated piasters are then put in a special kitty belonging to the Vietnamese Government. This counterpart fund primarily is used to pay the operating expenses of the Vietnamese national armed forces and to supplement Vietnam's other revenues.

The total amount of piasters budgeted by the Vietnamese Government in 1964 was 37.1 billion, but only 31.5 was actually spent which created the impression in Saigon, even among Vietnamese economists, that "there's too much money in Saigon. We cannot absorb it all."

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More than 19 of the 37 billion budgeted was spent in the military budget. U.S.-generated piasters through the counterpart fund accounted for 10.4 billion—or about one-third—of Vietnam's expenditures.

The 1965 Vietnamese budget, still under discussion, is expected to total more than 45 billion piasters. At the free market rate \$1 is worth 73 piasters.

These are the comments and criticisms which the highly placed sources in Saigon made about the commercial import program and sales of farm surplus commodities.

First, according to one Vietnamese economist and ex-minister, "economic aid doesn't aim at an economic target, but is only in support of a military machine." About four-fifths of the U.S.-generated piasters in 1964 were allocated to support the Vietnamese military budget.

CONSPICUOUS WEALTH

Second, the commercial import program has enriched and enlarged the upper-middle-class elements in Saigon and other cities, but it has also accentuated the extremes between the urban and rural classes. "Often you bring in a whole lot of things for the richer middle class with conspicuous consumption, and the Vietcong can play on this, saying it enriches the middle class and bourgeois," one Western ambassador said.

Third, the rural communities, especially earlier in the program, received a relatively small proportion of the commercial import aid. Between 1955 and 1960, when the Vietcong began organizing and recruiting in the countryside, only 4 percent of the direct and indirect American aid was funneled into the rural population, which is an estimated 85 percent of the total population.

Fourth, the commercial import program has not been geared to assist the building of industries which funnel Vietnamese agricultural products into the light industrial sector. During the critical period of Vietcong formation in the countryside, from 1955 to 1960, American economic aid assisted in the establishment of 58 companies. But about 70 percent of these depended on imported raw materials; even the paper mills needed to import wood pulp.

After 10 years in Vietnam, Americans still allow rubber as one of the most important exports in the country—most of it going to France—but no substantial rubber production factories have been established in Vietnam.

Fifth, the Vietnamese officials recognize two kinds of corruption; there's "dirty dishonest corruption"—i.e., taking Vietnamese Government funds—but also "clean honest corruption"—getting access to American-generated funds or soaking Vietnamese citizens for money for rendering government services, from the issuance of birth certificates to fixing of taxi meters to meet government specifications.

The Vietnamese officials have therefore devised an effective system of padding their vouchers and receipts.

"Suppose a wooden bridge costs 1,600 piasters to build," an American district adviser complained. "The contractor adds another 200 piasters and the district chief adds another 200 piasters. I can practically see the money flow into their pockets, but they give me a receipt for 2,000 piasters. What can I do to disprove them?"

One Vietnamese province chief under the Ngo Dinh Diem regime admitted he ordered a few of his loyal troops to blow up his own bridge that was half-constructed so that they could let another construction contract.

Some Vietnamese regional and regular units are known to possess "phantom troops"—troops that never existed, or were killed or deserted but never reported as lost. Their paychecks slip into the hands of privileged commanders.

Last week, leaflets were printed to encourage Vietcong troops to return to the government side. Printing cost 79,000 piasters, but

250,000 piasters had been allocated for the job. The government official explained the remaining two-thirds had to be divided with messenger boys up to high-ranking civil servants.

Sixth, the Vietnamese administrative section of the commercial import program has at times been corrupted. One former Vietnamese minister who worked with American foreign aid said that Vietnamese importers pay 4 to 5 piasters per American dollar for the import license.

Every time there's a coup or government shakeup, Vietnamese businessmen complain they will have to pay off a new minister to get their import licenses.

Vietnamese importers are legally allowed 5 percent of the import license to be deposited abroad in a foreign account. However, as an inducement to sell his products, the foreign exporter regularly offers an additional illegal 4-5 percent listed as promotion fees or discount to be deposited in hard currency outside of Vietnam.

Hence, the program has allowed the Vietnamese to build up foreign accounts of hard currency. In addition, Vietnamese and Western sources complain that many profits are being sent abroad, either physically or in paper transfers, instead of being invested in local industries in Vietnam.

PIASTERS IN SUITCASE

Some sources believe that high-ranking officials simply carry piasters to Hong Kong in a suitcase (four American enlisted men were once arrested for doing this for a Chinese). In other cases a paper transfer is made in which piasters are paid in Saigon and American or Hong Kong dollars or French francs are deposited in a foreign account.

Seventh, instead of selling goods to the Vietnamese consumer at the lowest possible cost to keep the products moving, some businessmen—principally Chinese—corner the market, establish a monopoly, and sell at inflated prices, causing a rise in the cost of living. During a 10-day shortage period, the price of sugar or cement, for example, would double.

Eighth, the commercial import program has prevented large-scale deficit spending, runaway inflation, paid the national army, and assisted in the establishment of more than 700 local industries. But it has also allowed the Vietnamese Government to use their own foreign exchange for other consumer demands—and too much of this has been channeled into the luxury class.

The shops along the main street of Saigon are filled with imported cheeses, French perfume, Japanese radios, French costume jewelry, and foreign-made cars. None of these items can be bought by the rural peasants.

IN SCHOOLS, TOO

These problems have been accentuated by day-to-day corruption in the Vietnamese system of life. A child in a French school in Saigon—where sons of ministers and generals go if they are not in France—easily can pass an exam with a 10,000 piasters deposit under the table, "and if you don't think so, just look at how many French teachers leave Vietnam and invest in hotels on the French Riviera," an anti-Communist source remarked.

Transfers for Vietnamese battalion commanders from the remote provinces to Saigon cost 50,000 piasters.

For 50,000 piasters, a young man can obtain a certificate that he's involved in undercover work for the Ministry of Interior—and is thus exempt from the army draft. The Ministry has signed 1,300 of these certificates in recent weeks.

Up to 5,000 piasters is siphoned off the allotments for war widows, "and to survive she has to become a prostitute before the first payment arrives—which takes up to 10 months," one Vietnamese observer said. "Why should her husband want to die un-

known in the jungles—so his wife can be a prostitute?"

"What it boils down to is whether to have a social revolution or not and clean up this government," a Vietnamese economist explained. "If America is too scared to do it—the Communists will, and will win the people. The people want justice. They don't care if they have a democracy or a dictatorship—if the government comes in with bullets or ballots. But they want justice—even if it is harsh. The Vietcong are harsh, but they are just."

[From the New York Herald Tribune,
June 2, 1965]

OUR GIRL IN VIET—IV: How the U.S. Built
ON THE QUICKSAND OF ASIAN POLITICS
(By Beverly Deepe)

SAIGON.—In 1962, when American advisers and helicopters began arriving in large numbers in Vietnam, President Ngo Dinh Diem was told by a close American friend that unless he radically reformed his government, he undoubtedly would be overthrown in a coup d'etat. The American had taken a poll of Diem's former supporters and found that only 30 out of 150 were sticking with the chubby little mandarin.

"But Diem wouldn't listen and the Americans weren't interested in hearing it," the friend lamented. "More American troops and helicopters came, but reform did not. The Americans built a beautiful war machine and placed it on political quicksand."

Despite the American military buildup, the failure of President Diem to institute reforms provided the political fuel on which Vietcong strength grew.

A year later, President Diem was overthrown and killed.

President Diem had built a political maginot line for political warfare with the Communists. On one side was the Communist ideology, the National Liberation Front and behind it, the Communist Party, calling itself the People's Revolutionary Party.

President Diem had built his own counterideology, a vague concept called personalism. His National Revolutionary Movement corresponded to the National Liberation Front; his brothers' secret party, the Can Lao, corresponded to the Communist Party.

When President Diem was ousted, his counterideology and countermachines were washed away. Since then, no single person has been in total command of the anti-Communist forces long enough to build a similar machine or ideology.

Since November 1963, the country has been in a state of political crisis. Sources in Saigon now argue that it would be a mistake to rebuild a counterideology—even if it could be done. They say instead that the Saigon government must reform itself and "outrevolutionize the Communists—but do it 10 times better and 50 times faster than the Communists themselves."

The last time the American-backed Saigon government seized the political initiative involved the strategic hamlet program. The concept of fortified hamlets, with dramatic economic and social advantages, was officially launched by President Diem in April 1962.

ECONOMIC DISASTER

But it was doomed. One American, fluent in Vietnamese, visited a pilot project in Cuchi, 20 miles from Saigon, and was told by peasants that the hamlet program was an economic disaster.

The peasants said the Government forced them to construct hamlets instead of farm their cash crop of tobacco. As a result, they could produce only 10 percent of what normally was raised.

The dilemma of American policymakers is the schizophrenic nature of the Vietnamese society itself. The governing class is generally urban based, French educated with an aristocratic position based on either family

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background, money, or land ownership. This elite minority attempts to govern the masses although it knows little about them and is concerned less.

The elite's lack of concern and compassion was illustrated in an incident related by the wife of a Western embassy official. The wives of embassy officials had voluntarily presented furniture, clothing, and toys to a local orphanage.

"Several days after we handed over the goods, one of the embassy wives returned to the orphanage," the lady explained. "We were astonished to find the officials had even taken the toys out of the hands of little orphans. The toys were nowhere to be found."

In contrast, cadre wanting to join the Communist Party are sent to live with the rural masses and practice "three togetherness": eating, living, and working with the peasants. Cadre are invited to join the Communist Party—which has an exclusive, and not mass membership—when they are prepared to govern.

"The Americans had to play with the cards that were dealt out and they weren't very good cards," one Western diplomat explained. "In Vietnam, nationalism went the Communist way. We saw a lot of Vietnamese in the South who are the political forces in the country . . . they are the bourgeois, the landowners, the Catholics. They believe in the same ideas as we do; we support these people and they support us. But these people in an Asian country in the throes of political-social upheaval—they are not in the mainstream."

The diplomat continued:

"They're on the edges—we're supporting them and the mainstream is elsewhere—in the nationalist movement of the Communists. The mainstream elements got into the hands of Ho Chi Minh in North Vietnam and Mao Tse-tung in China. Chiang Kai-shek didn't have the nationalist issue; he was helped by the United States—and this in turn made it more likely he'd lose."

MANDARIN SYSTEM

The lack of justice and equal opportunity is perhaps best reflected in the medical profession in Vietnam, which one American-educated Vietnamese doctor called "the medical mafia." Two elite groups of doctors—the faculty of medicine at University of Saigon and a private organization called the Medical Syndicate—decide which doctors will be licensed for private practice. Virtually all the members of these groups come from Hanoi and favor licensing only northerners.

"These seven older-generation men in the faculty of medicine are capable and dedicated," one American official working in medical field said. "They just happen to be partisan. They represent the old mandarin system; they choose, select—and limit the leaders of the future. It's the tradition in the East for more than 1,000 years that leaders of the next generation are always chosen by those in power. This gives rise to the mandarin system and an undue amount of nepotism."

After 10 years of administering the largest U.S. medical aid program in the world—American officials here still have little influence on Vietnamese medical affairs. One American-trained Vietnamese doctor said that a medical degree from an American medical school still is not readily recognized in Vietnam, on the other hand, a parachute degree—a degree virtually bought with money from a second-rate medical school in France—is easily acceptable by the "the mafia."

The two best hospitals in Saigon are French-operated. They are also the most expensive. There is no good American hospital in Saigon for the Vietnamese popula-

tion (although there are two American-operated hospitals in France). Requests by the American-operated Seventh-day Adventist Missionary Hospital to expand their 30-bed clinic have repeatedly been refused.

American officials in Saigon have not effectively pressured the Saigon government to correct "this rot within," in the words of a Vietnamese anti-Communist. Instead they have superimposed upon "the rot" a spectacular medical program in the provinces.

"The Americans think we should fight for democracy," one young Vietnamese intellectual explained. "But in fact, the Vietcong fight because of the lack of democracy."

[From the New York Herald-Tribune, June 3, 1965]

OUR GIRL IN VIET—V: LAND REFORM—THE LONG DELAY

(By Beverly Deepe)

SAIGON.—"The most important question in the Vietnamese countryside besides security is land reform," an American technician said. "Yet virtually nothing has been done about it."

"The Vietcong are gaining a lot of points with the peasants by simply issuing land titles—and it costs them nothing. They take the land from the landowner and give it away. Nothing we give to the peasants—like pigs, insecticides, or fertilizer—is as important as land."

American technicians and provincial officials for the past several years have urged the implementation of an effective land reform program. Two land distribution schemes currently have been written, but neither has been accepted. Higher officials in the American Embassy and in the Agency for International Development believe "land reform is not the panacea for Vietnam's problems."

A program for the training of land-reform cadre is under consideration. But the program will not be instituted until "the other day"—when the Vietcong Communists have been defeated.

WARNING

However, one Vietnamese general recently warned American generals and officials that American-backed efforts to pacify the provinces would fail unless they were linked with land reform.

"When the Vietnamese National Army goes back to pacify areas from the Vietcong, the local landowner goes back with them, offering to serve as intelligence agent," the general explained. "Obviously he wants to collect his back rent. So when the army pacifies the area it pacifies it for the landowner and not for the peasant."

"Of course, 35 percent of the peasants are landless. They become fanatics and will fight for the land given them by the Vietcong because it's as important to them as life."

One U.S. official described as "horror stories" the actions of some landowners to collect back rent, once government forces had pacified Vietcong areas.

According to reliable sources, in other cases, when the Vietnamese Government Army attempts to pacify the area, the commanders simply ignore the problems of land reform, refusing to collect back rents—but also refusing to confirm the land ownership rights.

In Vietcong-controlled areas, if landowners or their agents return to collect back rent the matter is simple. The peasant complains to the Vietcong, and the agent is shot.

RECRUITING

American officials who have talked with large numbers of Vietcong prisoners and returnees believe the Vietcong recruits within South Vietnam are almost entirely from the rural population, probably indicating

not the strength of the Vietcong appeal so much as the accessibility to rural masses for Communist recruiting.

Furthermore, an estimated 30 percent of the Vietcong strength recruited in the South are considered to belong to the "farm labor class," the lowest in the semi-Confucianistic rigidly stratified rural society.

The five rural classes in Vietnamese countryside area are: the landowners (who lease out all the land they own); the rich peasants (who own more land than they till, and lease out some of it); the middle-class peasants (who own all they till); the tenant farmers (who rent all their lands), and the farm laborers (who cannot rent land, but are seasonally hired for planting and harvesting).

"The question of land reform is quite simple," one low-ranking Vietnamese provincial official explained. "The government represents the landowners; the ministers and generals are either landowners or friends of landowners. The Catholic Church owns land. The Buddhist Church owns land. Nobody is interested in fighting for the poor peasant. And the top Americans—well, they talk to only the ministers and rich people so they don't push it either."

LANDOWNERS

One Vietnamese general recalled that during the war with the Communists against the French in the early fifties, he was ordered by imperial decree to have landowners in his security district in North Vietnam divide up the land with the peasants. There were two large landowners in the area, he recalled, one of them a Roman Catholic bishop and the second a relative of the then Finance Minister.

"The Catholic bishop refused to divide the land because he said he had to support 2,500 seminary students with the rent money, and the big landowner also refused," the general explained. "I warned them both if they didn't give the land to the peasants the Communists would take over not only the land, but also the seminary and the landowner's house. But they wouldn't listen. The big landowner told the Finance Minister what I was doing. I was quickly transferred to another place—and 3 years later the Communists took over."

The land-reform issue in Vietnam—involving not only issuing of land titles, but also law enforcement on land rents, land security for tenants and fixed rates on the interest of borrowing of money—is not considered as acute as in other parts of Asia. The Japanese say, for example, that a peasant without land is like a man without a soul. The victory of Chinese Communists in taking over mainland China was achieved not so much by armed guerrillas as by the promise of land to the poverty-stricken, landless peasantry.

"The land for the landless" campaign in the Philippines virtually broke the back of the Hukbalahap insurrection in the fifties.

According to reliable sources, the Vietcong guerrillas in Vietnam have a haphazard, inconsistent land-reform program which varies from area to area in sections of the country they control. However, the current government has virtually no program at all. One American provincial official estimated that the Vietcong had issued land titles to 50 percent of the peasant families in his province; the government had issued none.

In some areas, the Vietcong take some of the land from the rich peasants and give it to the landless tenant—who still pays rent, to the Vietcong.

So far, the Vietcong have not killed or harassed the rich peasants as they did before their seizure of power in North Vietnam.

In some cases, the Vietcong program in the rural areas is considered self-defeating. They

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have made a definite push for higher rents as they move toward the mobile warfare phase.

In some areas, Vietcong taxes and indirect taxes in rice have doubled over that of last year. In other areas, the Vietcong are known to have redistributed the land, increased the land tax from 100 to 900 piastres and increased the rice tax from 50 to 300 piastres.

In the countryside outside Hue, which has lately fallen under their control, the Vietcong are attempting to collect 10-15 percent of what the peasants had raised during the past decade, when they lived in peace. The peasants are said to be discontented about that. In isolated cases, peasants have burned their own crops rather than pay Vietcong taxes.

In the fifties, President Ngo Dinh Diem attempted to correct the injustices in the countryside. But his effectiveness was limited. A U.S. Government bulletin published in January this year explained:

"Under the ordinances approved in 1955, a program was being carried out to regularize tenancy agreements through written contracts. The contracts established minimum and maximum rents of 15 and 25 percent, respectively, chargeable by the landlord against the tenant's main crop. While a start has been made in land reform, real progress has been negligible and a review of the entire program needs to be undertaken."

[From the New York Herald Tribune, June 4, 1965]

OUR GIRL IN VIET—CONCLUSION: THE PROGRAM THE REDS CAN'T FIGHT

(By Beverly Deepe)

SAIGON.—This is the story of the three little pigs of Vietnam.

It is one of the most visibly effective American-sponsored programs in rural Vietnam against which the Communist Vietcong guerrillas have many arguments but no real answer.

In early 1962, American provincial representatives of the Agency for International Development (AID) began distributing improved white pigs from the Mekong Delta throughout the entire countryside.

The program called for a package deal in which eight bags of cement would be given to build a combination pig sty-compost pit, while three improved pigs and American surplus corn would be lent to the farmer.

One of the pigs would later be marketed, which would repay the entire \$50 cost of the venture; the others would be kept for breeding.

"The pigs had a fantastic impact," one American agricultural technician explained. "The farmers followed the old Chinese custom and washed their pigs daily. Some of them put red ribbons around the ears of the pigs. Almost all the pigs became pets for the children."

BUT WHY CEMENT?

"Of course, we had a few problems. Some of the Vietnamese farmers had never even seen cement before and they didn't understand why they should have a cement-floored pig sty and compost pit when for centuries they had moved the pig waste out on the ground.

"Some of the farmers moved their cots into the compost pit. Some of them put the pigs in their houses and moved their families into the pig sty. After all, it was better than their dirt-floored houses.

"Some of the farmers put tiled roofs on the pig sty with curlicues like ancient Chinese temples. They became the new status symbols in the villages. We never could understand why they made them so elaborate.

"Then, of course, the most profitable time to sell the pig is when he's about 1 year old," he continued. "But the Vietnamese let the pigs get fatter and fatter and sell

them only when they need the money. They use the piggy as a living bank."

He explained that at first the richer village families got the pigs, or the friends of the local Vietnamese Government agricultural technicians. Now—3 years and 40,000 pigs later—"the pigs have seeped into all levels of the villages," he said.

"The neighbors buy little pigs from the first family to have them. In one northern city, 2 years ago you wouldn't see one improved pig a day come through the slaughterhouse. Now about one-third of a day's production is the improved breed."

REPAYMENTS

He explained that the Vietcong political cadre attempted to sabotage the program by telling the farmers that it was a "giveaway program" rather than a loan, so that the farmers would not make repayment to the Government. So far, the rate of repayment has been low, but in most cases the 18-month deadline for repayment has not been reached.

"The pig program doesn't make the farmer pro-Government or pro-Vietcong," the technician explained. "But it does expose him to the Government cadre, to the Government administration and to an American veterinarian. Maybe this is the first time in the farmer's life that the Government has done something to help him. So gradually, it creates a better feeling for the Government."

"The Vietcong do not steal the pigs, and we have lost very few of our pig hamlets to the Vietcong."

In addition to the pig program, Vietnamese agricultural technicians, assisted by Americans, have also started programs to improve ducks, chickens, and cattle and to promote a wider distribution of water buffaloes, which are used to pull the farmers' plows.

Other technicians have established experimental stations for improving rice seed (which some Vietnamese prefer to eat rather than use for seeding).

Recently, Vietnamese agricultural agents conducted 3-day courses on improved farming techniques for farmers during the slack season. Twenty plasters (30 cents) was given the farmers for lunches "and that really had an impact," one American agricultural expert explained. "It was part of our pacification program. But the Vietcong even welcomed the agents into their areas to help their farmers."

FERTILIZER ON CREDIT

In another instance, Vietnamese Government administrators have implemented a credit-loan system whereby farmers can buy fertilizer before the rice planting and repay the loan after harvest. Production has more than doubled in some areas. In other areas small irrigation pumps have been bought on loan, making possible two or three crops of rice a year instead of only one.

The Vietcong retort that the fertilizer will destroy the soil; that in the first year of using fertilizer, production will increase but in future years it will drop; that the government will double the prices when it comes to paying the loan, or that the government will make the farmers dependent on the fertilizer year after year and then skyrocket the prices.

"The poor Vietnamese farmer, who has a lot of superstition and no knowledge of chemicals, is in the dark," an American technician said. "The Vietcong play on the farmer's past lack of faith in the government."

American-supported rural economic aid is scattered in the secure "oil spots" in each of Vietnam's 45 provinces, which at times undercuts the impact that it has had nationwide.

The Communist-initiated war has produced an economic deterioration and social upheaval in the countryside. Young farmers are drafted instead of planting rice. Large

tracts of land are abandoned because of Vietcong pressure, and other large tracts, now uncultivated, could be developed into excellent farming land.

Despite this, the standard of living has improved during the last 10 years. Ten years ago, a bicycle was a status symbol; now motor scooters, bicycles, and buses are regularly seen in the countryside.

The nationwide statistics on education are also impressive. In 1955, 329,000 pupils attended elementary public schools. In 1964, the number had increased to 1.5 million.

In 1964 alone, 900 new rural schools were built and 1,000 elementary education teachers were trained. A total of 4,000 rural schools was built in the decade.

In 1955, there were 2,900 university students in Vietnam. By 1964, the number had increased to 20,000, with a new university established in the northern provinces. More than 2,500 Vietnamese students and technicians have been sent to America through AID programs for advanced degrees.

However, the population growth is 2.8 percent yearly.

In the rural health field, Vietnamese villagers often find it difficult to understand what has been prevented—such as cholera epidemics or malaria. During the last 6 years, however, the American-backed \$12 million malaria-eradication program, part of a worldwide effort, has dropped known malaria cases from 7.22 percent to less than 1 percent.

SPRAYING OF HOMES

More than 1 million Vietnamese farm homes are being sprayed twice a year. More than 6 million persons have been directly affected by the spraying. The Vietcong propagandists told the villagers the spray would cause their thatched roofs to crumble or would kill their cats and chickens.

"The Vietcong say the farmers don't have enough cats to eat all the rats," one American medical expert explained, "and the rats eat rice. They use this argument when there's a poor crop of rice and a good crop of rats—and it's very effective with the peasants."

The malaria rate has dropped to the extent that medical experts simply keep tabs on it by collecting blood samples.

"The Vietcong spread the word that the Americans were collecting Vietnamese blood to give to the wounded Americans," the medical expert continued. "This even happened on the outskirts of Saigon. One American educational lecturer started to give a lecture on the taking of these blood samples for malaria control; suddenly all the mamas and little kids started throwing rocks at him."

"The police had to escort him out—all because of that outlandish Vietcong propaganda. But Vietnamese people don't like to give blood; they are superstitious about that and it's very strange to them."

More than 8,000 rural health workers are currently operating in the Vietnamese countryside. Nine gleaming white surgical suites, costing \$500,000 each, have been established throughout the country and are staffed by Americans, Filipinos, New Zealanders, Australians, and Italians.

EXHIBIT 5

[From the Washington (D.C.) News, June 4, 1965]

THE ESCALATING WAR

(By Richard Starnes)

The American people are not alone in their blissful ignorance of the coming demands for men to feed the insatiable jungle war in Vietnam. A completely reliable source who was present at a White House briefing tells me this:

"I saw U.S. Senators blanch when Robert McNamara told them that they had to prepare to see 300,000 American men sent to Vietnam."

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"I never thought I would live to see such a thing in the United States, but McNamara told the briefing quite cheerfully that things were looking up in Vietnam because we were now killing four times as many men as we were losing."

The briefing, which was one of dozens that the White House has conducted in an effort to sell its Vietnam policy, concluded with talks by Secretary of State Dean Rusk and "Big Daddy" himself.

"Rusk had nothing new to say, but he kept saying it at such great length that finally the President, who was sitting in the front row, started looking ostentatiously at his watch," my informant reports. "But Rusk missed the cue, until at last the President just got up and nudged Rusk away from the lectern."

What the Senators heard then is a thing that has caused something very near to cloakroom consternation. Mr. Johnson sailed into a defense of his escalation of the war in Vietnam, and bluntly told his audience that they had authorized it and, by implication, must share the responsibility for it.

The President said he was frequently asked what his policy in Vietnam was. Then, with the subtlety of a sledgehammer, he told the Senators that the Congress had laid down the policy in a resolution passed last August 7 by a vote of 504 to 2. And, said the President, he was doing his best to carry out that resolution.

The source of this account, who knows the Senate intimately, reported that, in spite of the near unanimity of congressional support for administration Vietnam policy, Senators are still "rankled" over Mr. Johnson's bland assumption that the August 7 resolution authorized escalation of the war in southeast Asia.

The resolution, passed in the fever of indignation that followed reported attacks by North Vietnamese torpedo boats against U.S. Fleet units in Tonkin Gulf, comes very close to saying what President Johnson says it says—whether the Senators who voted for it like to admit it or not.

The resolution authorized the President "as Commander in Chief, to take all necessary measures to repel any armed attack against the forces of the United States and to prevent further aggression."

Note well that the resolution was not limited to Vietnam but specifically asserted that the U.S. goal was "assisting the people of southeast Asia" to fight off alleged aggression. That means just what it says—Congress "approves and supports" anything Mr. Johnson deems necessary "to prevent further aggression" in the area, and it is now somewhat late for whatever second thoughts are occurring in Capitol cloakrooms.

Whatever doubt may have existed as to the intent of the August 7 resolution was dispelled last month, however, when Congress dutifully voted a blank check \$700 million appropriation to finance the expanding war. This time the division was 596 to 10, still a sufficiently lopsided vote to assure history that the 89th Congress had supported escalation in the Pacific whether it knew what it was doing or not.

EXHIBIT 6

[From the New York Herald Tribune, June 6, 1965]

Vietnam War Alters Character
(By Malcolm W. Browne)

SAIGON, VIETNAM, June 4.—The war in Vietnam has been transformed into an enormous meat grinder, in which both sides are now making an all-out drive to bleed each other to death.

It is a meat grinder in which America for the first time has an active part—on both the giving and receiving end.

U.S. officials predict that American casualty tolls will increase from now on as American Marine Corps and Army paratrooper units move deeper into the battle.

U.S. air strikes on North and South Vietnam have increased in recent months to the point that they are now round-the-clock operations.

In the north, strikes have been limited to military installations, roads, and waterways well south of Hanoi. There seems no immediate prospect of bombing North Vietnam's cities or civilian industries.

But in the south, huge sectors of the nation have been declared "free bombing zones," in which anything that moves is a legitimate target. Tens of thousands of tons of bombs, rockets, napalm, and cannon fire are poured into these vast areas each week. If only by the laws of chance, bloodshed is believed to be heavy in these raids.

In exchange, the Vietcong is exacting its pound of flesh.

In the past week, big Vietcong units prowling through the jungle-covered mountains of central Vietnam have chewed up three Government battalions so badly that these units will not be able to fight again for a long time. Government casualties in these ambushes probably have exceeded 1,000 men.

The Vietcong have clearly shifted gears from what they call guerrilla warfare to mobile warfare.

The Communist concept of mobile warfare is essentially guerrilla operation on a vastly expanded scale, in which whole battalions and regiments are used in mounting ambushes. Ambushes remain the key feature of the war.

The Saigon Government and its American ally control the air above South Vietnam and some of its roads and waterways. The Vietcong controls much of the rest of the nation.

Government units move mostly by truck, plane, and helicopter. Vietcong units move on foot through the trackless jungle. This means the Communists generally have the advantage in setting up their ambushes.

Roads, particularly those that wind through the mountain passes of central Vietnam, are ideal places for ambushes. Even helicopters must land in clearings, which in the jungle are often only tiny patches of ground.

The Vietcong can and often does set up traps around these clearings, with 50-caliber machineguns trained on the places helicopters will be forced to land.

As the fighting grows hotter it becomes more brutal. Neither side is taking many prisoners any more. Soldiers caught off side now are generally shot on the spot or tortured to death.

CHILEAN DEMOCRACY
WORKING WELL

Mr. PROXMIRE. Mr. President, in the news—in newspapers, on television, and radio—we hear a great deal more about Vietnam and the Dominican Republic, about coups and revolutions, and about the setbacks in the world. Unfortunately, the quiet progress that is being made in many countries has been neglected because it does not make news.

For example, the current Atlantic Monthly carries an excellent, concise report on the impressively favorable developments in Chile under the leadership of Eduardo Frei. The excellent article points out that under Mr. Frei there has been great improvement in education. I read briefly from the article:

It is a shocking fact that in this country of 8.5 million people of largely European extraction there were approximately 200,000

children with no school to go to. In a crash program initiated immediately on taking office in November, at the beginning of the Chilean summer, Frei organized an intensive course to train new teachers, asked existing ones voluntarily to accept longer hours, and undertook the construction of thousands of schoolrooms, as well as lodgings for teachers in remote areas.

President Frei has also been busily engaged in an excellent land reform program which in the next few years will provide for an additional 100,000 independent farmers in Chile.

Everyone who has studied the Communist movement knows that the greatest bulwark against communism is the individual farmer who has his own plot of ground and his own farm to defend.

In addition, under Mr. Frei tax reforms in Chile have made progress. There have been jail sentences for tax evaders and that is almost unheard of in South America. Most significant of all is the excellent cooperation between the Chilean Government and American corporations—Anaconda Copper and Kennecott Copper—both of which have huge holdings in Chile. Chile has worked out a system of ownership and participation in the profits of those corporations that have been agreed to by the corporations. Chile has avoided the expropriation which the Marxists have called for. Confiscatory taxes have been avoided. Both Anaconda and Kennecott are proceeding profitably from their standpoint, and also sharing their gains with the Chileans and with the Chilean Government.

There is a very serious problem, as there is in most of those countries, with inflation. But even in that field Mr. Frei is making progress.

The PRESIDING OFFICER. The time of the Senator has expired.

Mr. PROXMIRE. Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent that I may proceed for 3 additional minutes.

The PRESIDING OFFICER. Without objection, it is so ordered.

Mr. PROXMIRE. The remarkable thing to me is that Mr. Frei has been able to put into effect a system of slowing down inflation which has at the same time permitted wage earners to earn significantly more money. It has permitted farmers to obtain better prices for their crops, while simultaneously keeping inflation from preventing the kind of firm and solid economic progress which is most essential.

Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent that this fine, short article on Chile, published in the Atlantic Monthly, be printed at this point in the Record.

There being no objection, the article was ordered to be printed in the Record, as follows:

THE ATLANTIC REPORT—CHILE

Chileans are accustomed to earthquakes, but the recent upheaval in their politics is so unusual that historians peer back to 1841 to find a parallel. Christian Democrat Eduardo Frei is the first President since then, under Chile's multiparty system, to be elected by an absolute majority and to have a congress to do his bidding.

His victory by 56 percent in the presidential elections of September 1964 was startling enough, but it might have been considered

the wages of fear: the Marxist left was running so strong—and did, indeed, chalk up a hefty 39 percent—that the right and center voted for him as a lesser evil, in spite of his revolutionary program. In the congressional elections 6 months later, however, the old alignments were back in force; the right and center, Chile's traditional governing parties, fully expected to return a congress able to block untoward presidential initiative. Instead, Frei's party all but swept them away, while the far left slightly improved its position.

The result is not only a green light for Frei's Revolution With Liberty, which aims at transforming Chile's social structure, but also an unexpected revolution in its politics. The era of compromise, mutual back scratching—or sheer deadlock—is over, at least for the time being. Indeed, it is likely that disgust with political infighting played its part, as it does in Gaullist France, in this sudden emergence of a majority party. Like De Gaulle, Frei, before the landslide, had asked for a constitutional amendment permitting him to go to the people should congress become too obstructionist.

PEACEFUL REVOLUTION

The program which is now the approved blueprint for Chile's future follows closely the outlines for peaceful revolution drawn up at the Punta del Este conference as the basis for the Alliance for Progress. Emphasis is placed on achieving a social impact where it will be most immediately and dramatically evident in Chile: among the landless farm laborers and among the unorganized proletariat that swarms in city slums.

Chilean agriculture has been for some years a major reason for the imbalance of the economy. Once a net exporter of agricultural products, Chile now imports more than \$140 million worth, two-thirds of which could be produced locally. In Chile's inflationary rat race, agricultural prices have lagged behind industrial ones because of Government attempts to control the cost of the urban "market basket"; worse still, these controls have been erratic, thus discouraging rational development.

While these economic considerations are important, it is the social aspects which most concern the Christian Democrats. They point out that one-third of the population lives on the land, 60 percent is illiterate, and the death rate of infants in rural areas is 129 per thousand, shocking figures for one of the most advanced countries in Latin America. The Government goal is not, thus, just an increase in production—which they will encourage by allowing food prices to rise faster this year than those of industry—but a profound agrarian reform.

Frei has promised to distribute land to 100,000 new farmers during his 6-year term, and to provide, through cooperatives, the necessary technical and financial assistance to make the venture efficient. In this respect, his government has a valuable heritage from his predecessor, conservative president Jorge Alessandri, who got a well-articulated if somewhat mild agrarian reform law through congress in 1962. Under this law 6,000 plots have already been distributed. The present government plans to amend the law, to speed up the process of expropriation, and to allow for deferred payment of indemnities instead of cash on the line.

THE URBAN SLUMS

The program for the urban slums, which have been rebaptized "marginal neighborhoods," goes under the name Popular Promotion, a hodgepodge package aimed at bringing them into the mainstream of national life. Here, too, the Alessandri heritage gives Frei a headstart, since Alessandri built more low-cost housing than any previous President. Frei hopes to build still more, and in the existing slums to install water systems, pave the streets, put in electricity,

with labor furnished largely by the inhabitants themselves.

He is most enthusiastic about the creation of neighborhood organizations: sewing circles, teams for various sports, parent-teacher associations, and local self-government councils, which are to have the right to federate with similar councils throughout the country in order to form effective pressure groups. Frei promises that none of these activities will be linked with politics, but some of his critics wonder how it is humanly possible to keep them separate.

In neighboring Peru, President Belaúnde's similar and successful Popular Cooperation has been accused of being primarily a device for building grassroots support for his party. In any case, only 10 percent of Chile's working class is organized, in unions largely Communist-controlled, at least at the top. Organizing people "where they live as well as where they work" is thus an interesting new approach to the problem of giving civic representation to the submerged proletariat.

A third area where Frei has already achieved dramatic social impact is education. It is a shocking fact that in this country of 8½ million people of largely European extraction there were approximately 200,000 children with no school to go to. In a crash program initiated immediately on taking office in November, at the beginning of the Chilean summer, Frei organized an intensive course to train new teachers, asked existing ones voluntarily to accept longer hours, and undertook the construction of thousands of schoolrooms, as well as lodgings for teachers in remote areas.

He mobilized the good will and enthusiasm of various groups: villagers gave land and their labor and sometimes local materials; the armed forces sent their troops and equipment; 1,500 university students spent their holidays mixing mortar and laying bricks. This year, for the first time, no Chilean child will be denied the pleasures of the three R's.

Agrarian reform, public housing, and education cost money, and Chile is already overextended in the matter of foreign credit; it has received more dollars per capita in Alliance for Progress aid than any other Latin-American country. However, Frei also inherited from Alessandri an economy which, while certainly not brilliant, is still in relatively good shape. The balance of payments in 1964 showed a slight credit, thanks largely to the high price of copper and restricted imports. The growth rate was 4 percent, not too far below the Alliance goal of 5 percent.

The budget is approximately in balance, owing to a tax reform that is just beginning to show its benefits—among which Chileans count not only increased collections but a jail sentence actually enforced for a tax evader, an unheard-of phenomenon in Latin America.

THE COST OF LIVING

However, on Chile's main problem, endemic inflation, the Alessandri government, after an encouraging start, made no headway. The cost of living rose 38 percent in 1964; since 1960 it has nearly tripled. Previous attempts to stop the runaway in its tracks having failed, Frei is proposing to apply the brakes slowly. He aims for a rise of only 25 percent in 1965, with lesser rises in succeeding years until stability is reached, hopefully by 1968. However, this year he is proposing that the rise be fully compensated by wage increases, with agricultural prices and wages to be overcompensated to redress previous injustices.

In order to maintain the overall increase within the 25-percent limit, he is, therefore, insisting that industrial prices rise no more than 19 percent. In this framework, only a sharp rise in production can maintain previous profit levels. Stringent controls, more

effective than any yet devised, will be necessary to hold the line.

Financing social programs in so tight an economy thus requires some maneuvering and a high level of competence, but Frei has attracted a team of young economists from the various universities—particularly the Institute of Economics, organized some years ago by Prof. Joseph Grunwald, of Columbia—and from the United Nations Economic Commission for Latin America (ECLA), whose headquarters are in Santiago. Chileans like to call them the Brain Trust.

Service on the foreign debt, which would have absorbed more than half the export returns of the next few years, has been successfully renegotiated to provide a breathing spell. The United States has extended loans of various types for \$120 million. And Chileans themselves have been asked to make a sacrifice: a capital levy on personal property of 1.5 to 3 percent annually for a period of 5 years.

This proposal has naturally aroused the ire of the propertied classes—and not only because of the money involved. Frei was careful to cite such precedents as France's similar levy just after the war and to point to its present glowing prosperity as the result. What really upsets many Chileans is the declaration of their possessions which is implied in the levy. Income tax evasion would thereby become much more difficult. (At present, in spite of tax reform, the salaried class bears most of the burden; only 11,000 people have declared a taxable income of over \$5,000 a year.)

NEW DEAL IN COPPER

Redressing social injustice, however admirable, is nevertheless no sure cure for inflation and economic stagnation. To get the country moving, Frei has tackled the problem at its very center—copper. This metal dominates the Chilean economy; it provides more than 50 percent of foreign exchange and \$85 million annually in taxes. But five-sixths of the copper is extracted by two American companies, Anaconda and Kennecott. Although these companies pay the highest wages in the country, and the highest mining taxes in the world, the presence of two foreign colossi at the heart of the economy is a constant irritant to national pride, particularly since a good deal of the copper is refined abroad and its marketing is beyond the control of Chile.

The Marxist left has been campaigning for some time in favor of outright expropriation. The American companies have hesitated to invest in the face of this threat and the concomitant one of confiscatory taxes. Kennecott even announced a few years ago that it was not planning any further expansion in Chile and would spend its money in developing its American properties.

Frei, for his part, proposed an intermediary solution which he called the Chileanization of copper. Immediately after the election, he sent a commission to the United States to see how the new word could be defined.

The definition has turned out to be not only dramatic but eminently satisfactory to everyone concerned—except, of course, Chile's diehard Marxists. What it amounts to is a business association between the Chilean Government and the mining companies, a new departure, on a scale like this, in the whole concept of "how to do business abroad."

In two cases, that of Anaconda and the Cerro Corp.—new to Chile but already operating in Peru—Chile has acquired a 25-percent equity in new companies formed to exploit new ore beds. In the most startling agreement, that with Kennecott, Chile has bought outright 51 percent of a new company to exploit the rich El Teniente mine, whose production, with the aid of Kennecott, will be vastly expanded. The companies will benefit by tax reductions and guarantees,

THE WHITE HOUSE,
Washington, May 11, 1965.

Pollution of the air threatens the health and welfare of our citizens, diminishes the economic vitality of our Nation, and mutes and obscures the beauty of our cities, parks, and open spaces.

It is, therefore, important that we give high priority to efforts to achieve and maintain control of the many sources of air contamination. Neglect of this need today will only mean a more serious problem tomorrow.

Under the Clean Air Act of 1963, the Federal Government is helping our cities and States meet their responsibility for developing air pollution control programs capable of dealing with this problem. In order to make full use of the Clean Air Act, however, cities and States need public understanding and support.

Cleaner Air Week focuses attention on the national air pollution problems and means for combating it, and I commend the Air Pollution Control Association for its continuing sponsorship of this worthwhile event.

LYNDON B. JOHNSON.

(Mr. BROWN of California (at the request of Mr. KRESS) was granted permission to extend his remarks at this point in the Record and to include extraneous matter.)

[Mr. BROWN of California's remarks will appear hereafter in the Appendix.]

(Mr. GONZALEZ (at the request of Mr. KRESS) was granted permission to extend his remarks at this point in the Record and to include extraneous matter.)

[Mr. GONZALEZ' remarks will appear hereafter in the Appendix.]

(Mr. GONZALEZ (at the request of Mr. KRESS) was granted permission to extend his remarks at this point in the Record and to include extraneous matter.)

[Mr. GONZALEZ' remarks will appear hereafter in the Appendix.]

PROPOSED CONGRESSIONAL COMMISSION ON THE ROLE OF CONGRESS IN FOREIGN POLICY AND INTELLIGENCE ACTIVITIES

(Mr. SCHEUER (at the request of Mr. KRESS) was granted permission to extend his remarks at this point in the Record and to include extraneous matter.)

Mr. SCHEUER. Mr. Speaker, it is clearly evident that Congress constitutional warmaking prerogative exists today only on paper. In any major nuclear holocaust all of the buttons will have been pushed before Congress would have a chance to meet.

We can hardly expect any President seriously to attempt to go before Congress when nuclear missiles are on their way toward us.

It is also fairly evident that today's cold war brings with it hot actions in the form of half wars, undeclared wars, police actions, and limited hostilities. There was never a declaration of war in

Korea, and we have turned from advice to battle missions in South Vietnam, launched unofficial attacks in the Bay of Pigs, and progressively became more heavily involved in the Dominican Republic publicly as we were secretly in Guatemala, some years ago—all without prior congressional action, or consideration.

Perhaps all of these military and paramilitary actions were proper, could not have been avoided, and, indeed, had to be commenced promptly, to protect our national interest. But it is certain that the Congress had little knowledge and little to say before or after these military actions were taken. Careful study is needed to determine whether and when Congress is entitled to prior knowledge, and the degree and manner of its participation in the decisionmaking process on military involvement abroad.

The conduct of foreign policy is and must be in the hands of the President of the United States and his Secretary of State. But the basic philosophy of our system is one of checks and balances. In the most important area of that policy—the questions of war and peace—the basic system had been dangerously vitiated.

The Central Intelligence Agency has vast powers that, in and of themselves, may create a fait accompli involving us in hostilities abroad. Yet there is little, if any, congressional check or even knowledge of the activities of this Agency.

I have therefore introduced this resolution which would provide for 16 leading Americans and an expert staff to study this whole question for an extended period of time, to hold hearings, and report to the Congress and the President on their findings.

I would hope this Commission would include former Members of Congress, former official of the State Department, and leading experts in the field of constitutional and foreign affairs without regard to partisan background.

It may be that the study will prove that the national security would demand that the present system stay in force. I believe, however, that we in Congress would benefit from the proposed study.

H. CON. RES. 434

Concurrent resolution establishing a Congressional Commission on the role of Congress in foreign policy and intelligence activities

Resolved by the House of Representatives (the Senate concurring).

CREATION OF COMMISSION

SECTION 1. There is hereby created a Congressional Commission on the Role of Congress in Foreign Policy and Intelligence Activities (hereinafter referred to as the "Commission").

DUTIES OF COMMISSION

SEC. 2. The Commission shall make a full and complete investigation and study of the role of Congress in the formulation and implementation of foreign policy and in all aspects of the intelligence activities of this Nation. In making its investigation and study the Commission shall give special attention (1) to the extent and methods by which Congress should influence foreign policy and intelligence activities and (2) to an examination of the erosion of the power of Congress to declare war.

MEMBERSHIP AND ORGANIZATION OF COMMISSION

SEC. 3. (a) The Commission shall be composed of sixteen members. Eight members shall be appointed by the President pro tempore of the Senate and eight members by the Speaker of the House of Representatives. Members shall be appointed from among those persons who formerly served in Congress, or in positions in the executive branch of the Government directly relating to foreign policy or intelligence activities, and from among scholars in the field of government organization.

(b) Any vacancy in the Commission shall not affect its powers but shall be filled in the same manner in which the original appointment was made.

(c) The Commission shall elect a chairman and a vice chairman from among its members and shall determine the number of members necessary to constitute a quorum for the transaction of business.

COMPENSATION OF MEMBERS AND EMPLOYEES OF THE COMMISSION

SEC. 4. (a) Members of the Commission shall receive \$— per diem while engaged in the actual performance of duties vested in the Commission plus reimbursement for travel, subsistence, and other expenses incurred by them in the performance of their duties.

(b) The Commission shall have power to appoint and fix the compensation of such personnel as it deems advisable, without regard to the provisions of the civil service laws and the Classification Act of 1949. The Commission may procure, without regard to the civil service laws and the Classification Act of 1949, temporary and intermittent services to the same extent as is authorized for the departments by section 15 of the Administrative Expenses Act of 1946, but at rates not to exceed \$— per diem for individuals.

REPORT OF COMMISSION

SEC. 5. On or before the last day of the Eighty-ninth Congress, the Commission shall make a report of its findings and recommendations to the Congress.

POWERS OF THE COMMISSION

SEC. 6. The Commission or, on the authorization of the Commission, any subcommittee or member thereof, may, for the purpose of carrying out this concurrent resolution, hold such hearings and sit and act at such times and places within and outside the United States, administer such oaths, and require, by subpoena or otherwise, the attendance and testimony of such witnesses and the production of such books, records, correspondence, memorandums, papers, and documents as the Commission or such subcommittee or member may deem advisable. Subpoenas may be issued under the signature of the chairman of the Commission, of such subcommittee, or any duly designated member, and may be served by any person designated by such chairman or member. The provisions of sections 102 to 104, inclusive, of the Revised Statutes of the United States (U.S.C., title 2, secs. 192-194), shall apply in the case of any failure of any witness to comply with any subpoena or to testify when summoned under authority of this section.

COOPERATION OF OTHER AGENCIES

SEC. 7. The Commission is authorized to secure directly from any executive department, bureau, agency, board, commission, office, independent establishment, or instrumentality information, suggestions, estimates, and statistics for the purpose of studies conducted under this concurrent resolution; and each such department, bureau, agency, board, commission, office, establishment, or instrumentality is requested to furnish such information, suggestions, estimates, and statistics directly to the Com-

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the complex world in which we live. But it is far better to have ideals and targets toward which all of us work, rather than to have no idealism at all. We must mix idealism with realism. Many minds must be brought to bear on establishing the goals toward which we work and a program through which to attain them.

An ideology combines a way of life with a way of governing. By truly practicing democracy as a way of life at home, we can insure that our example will advance democracy abroad. By dedicated application of democracy as a way of government, we can further democracy in world affairs through official policy. If democracy by example and policy guides our behavior within America and on the global stage, the promise of liberty and the dignity of man will be within the reach of us all.

WITH WITHDRAWAL OF U.S. MARINES FROM THE DOMINICAN REPUBLIC

Mr. LONG of Louisiana. Mr. President, last Thursday President Johnson announced that he was ordering withdrawal of the remainder of our marines from the Dominican Republic. This Nation and the world owe an everlasting debt of gratitude to those courageous men of the U.S. Marines who moved to evacuate innocent foreign nationals, including citizens of the United States, from the civil warfare that raged in Santo Domingo at the time of President Johnson's decision to send in the marines.

The marines protected many persons who were not citizens of the Dominican Republic, and fears that the United States was aiming a long-range occupation of the island were wholly unjustified.

In no way do I mean to diminish the fine work done by the 82d Airborne Division. These courageous soldiers still are on duty to prevent unnecessary bloodshed and to assure the people of the Dominican Republic that the revolt does not result in another Communist regime like that in Cuba. We are merely there to see that the people of the Dominican Republic are guaranteed free elections and other democratic processes.

Mr. President, at that time there was a great hue and cry from some sources about a return to the earlier days when the United States did, upon some occasions, use the Marines for long-term occupation of certain places in Latin America. It is understandable that the peoples of Latin America might fear such a thing. They were, of course, encouraged in that fear by the Communist propagandists—as they are always encouraged to criticize and malign the United States.

In our own country, however, there was no such excuse, and yet we heard then, and we hear now, voices within our own councils which say much the same thing. I hope that President Johnson's action in withdrawing the marines at the earliest possible moment will tend to still these voices, which are essentially the voices of dissension and division, at a time when the President is facing so many critical and delicate situations throughout the world.

President Johnson is a man of reason and restraint, dealing one after the other

with crises which are thrust upon him, and dealing with them with tolerance, patience, and the judicious use of the great military power and tremendous resources of this mighty Nation.

President Johnson found that this action was necessary to save the lives of the foreign civilians who were there—citizens of this country, and citizens of other countries—who were caught in this sudden and brutal outburst of violence, which was growing rapidly more savage and uncontrolled.

Armed gangs were running through public rooms and corridors of the principal hotel which housed our representatives and those of other countries, firing rifles and submachineguns through the walls and windows. Our Ambassador, and I think he showed great good sense in his action under the circumstances, took the telephone and went underground. He got down under the desk in order to continue reporting to the President and the Secretary of State.

It is indeed surprising that, despite all that was going on then, and all that has gone on since, not one national of another country lost his life. The marines went ashore instantly, established the necessary sanctuaries, protected them, and arranged for the orderly evacuation of those who wished to leave. There was not a single life of a foreign national or visitor lost.

One of those who criticized our actions in sending in the marines was President de Gaulle of France. It is worth noting, however, that this did not prevent the French Ambassador to the Dominican Republic from taking advantage of our protection for French citizens, and, in fact, the protection zone was enlarged to include the French Embassy after the marines had already taken up their positions.

I wish it were possible to say that there were no lives lost, and no injured and wounded, as a result of this necessary action, Mr. President, but unhappily this cannot be said. Eight fine marines have died and 29 have paid in lesser measure for the success of this operation. We should all pay our homage today to these young men, and express our sympathies with their families and friends who now will miss them in the intimate ways that always accompany such tragedies.

While our purpose in entering Santo Domingo was to protect our own citizens and the citizens of other countries, we were certainly very much concerned about the circumstances and conditions prevailing for the people of this island.

At the time the marines landed, the people of the island were caught between the two forces. They were bombed and strafed in the streets of Santo Domingo; they were starving. Many of them were being put up against the wall and shot. The sanitary conditions were the cause of serious concern for the health of the people, and widespread epidemics were feared.

Much of this has now changed. We have brought in food and have assisted in bringing about arrangements which give hope of stabilizing the situation, at least for the helpless noncombatants.

We are providing funds for the necessary governmental services and operation of other vital institutions.

We still have troops in the Dominican Republic, but they are there now in association and cooperation with the majority of the members of the Organization of American States. We are joining fully in the efforts to reach some political solution of the difficult problems which still exist. Our objective will continue to be to find this solution, and to withdraw the remainder of our forces from the island.

President Johnson has given concrete evidence of the peaceful course he will pursue by withdrawing the marines. There is no doubt whatsoever that President Johnson's future actions will be fully in keeping with his order of last Thursday.

Mr. GRUENING. Mr. President, will the Senator yield?

Mr. LONG of Louisiana. I yield.

Mr. GRUENING. I am happy to say that I heartily approve of the President's policy in the Dominican Republic to date. I feel he had to act as he did. He said so from the very start. He moved first to save American lives and, second, to prevent what he feared might be a Communist takeover—both wholly worthy and commendable objectives.

Third, he moved as rapidly as possible to make the problem a multilateral affair, with the assistance and cooperation of our sister American Republics, by calling on the Organization of American States to come in and help work out the Dominican problem.

If out of this tragic situation in the Dominican Republic we can get a permanent peacekeeping force in the Americas, in which the United States will be merely one of a number of nations cooperating, I feel definitely that we shall have brought about an event of lasting significance and a great turning point in the history of the Americas.

For that reason I believe the President's policy, both on the immediate range and on the long range, are highly commendable. He deserves unqualified praise. I am happy to say this because of the fact that I do not agree with our policy in southeast Asia.

I thank the Senator for yielding to me.

Mr. President, I now should like to speak on my own time for a little more than 3 minutes.

The PRESIDING OFFICER (Mr. COOPER in the chair). How much time does the Senator desire?

Mr. GRUENING. About 10 minutes.

The PRESIDING OFFICER. Without objection, the Senator may proceed.

THE MESS IN VIETNAM XVII: THE STEADILY WIDENING WAR

Mr. GRUENING. Mr. President, in its leading editorial this morning entitled "Ground War in Asia," the New York Times states:

The American people were told by a minor State Department official yesterday that, in effect, they were in a land war on the continent of Asia. This is only one of the extraordinary aspects of the first formal an-

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nouncement that a decision has been made to commit American ground forces to open combat in South Vietnam: The Nation is informed about it not by the President, not by a Cabinet member, not even by a sub-Cabinet official, but by a public relations officer.

There is still no explanation offered for a move that fundamentally alters the character of the American involvement in Vietnam. A program of weapons supply, training and combat advice to South Vietnamese, initiated by Presidents Eisenhower and Kennedy, has now been transformed by President Johnson into an American war against Asians.

The editorial continues with the question:

Is it not more likely that political irresponsibility in Saigon will grow, rather than decline, as the main military responsibility for defending South Vietnam is transferred increasingly to American hands?

And concludes:

The country deserves answers to this and many other questions. It has been taken into a ground war by Presidential decision, when there is no emergency that would seem to rule out congressional debate. The duty now is for reassurance from the White House that the Nation will be informed on where it is being led and that Congress will be consulted before another furious upward whirl is taken on the escalation spiral.

The American people deserve and should get straight answers from the administration as to just where we are going in Vietnam. It deserves more than mislabeling as "advisers" American Armed Forces personnel who have for quite some time now been in the front-line of the fighting in South Vietnam. It deserves more than statements that our marines are in South Vietnam only as defensive troops to protect our bases.

I ask unanimous consent that the editorial from today's New York Times entitled "Ground War in Asia" be printed in the Record at the conclusion of my remarks.

The PRESIDING OFFICER. Without objection, it is so ordered.

(See exhibit 1.)

Mr. GRUENING. This changing character of the war in Vietnam has been noted in recent days by other knowledgeable writers.

Writing from Saigon on June 4, 1965, Malcolm Browne, Associated Press reporter, notes that the Vietnam war is changing in character and is "being transformed into an enormous meat grinder, in which both sides are now making an all-out drive to bleed each other to death. It is a meat grinder in which America for the first time has an active part—on both the giving and receiving end."

These are disturbing words coming from a wholly reliable correspondent who won a Pulitzer Prize for his reporting of events from Vietnam under the most difficult circumstances and who, in an excellent book entitled "The New Face of War" has set forth his trying experiences in attempting to get the truth to the American people.

He is still trying and his words should be heeded, even though they are not entirely unexpected to those of us who have been following the events in Vietnam closely.

Mr. Browne, in his news dispatch, goes on to say:

U.S. officials predict that American casualty tolls will increase from now on as American Marine Corps and Army paratrooper units move deeper into the battle.

U.S. air strikes on North and South Vietnam have increased in recent months to the point that they are now round-the-clock operations.

In the north, strikes have been limited to military installations, roads and waterways well south of Hanoi. There seems no immediate prospect of bombing North Vietnam's cities or civilian industries.

But in the south, huge sectors of the nation have been declared "free bombing zones," in which anything that moves is a legitimate target. Tens of thousands of tons of bombs, rockets, napalm and cannon fire are poured into these vast areas each week. If only by the laws of chance, bloodshed is believed to be heavy in these raids.

In exchange, the Vietcong is exacting its pound of flesh.

In the past week, big Vietcong units prowling through the jungle-covered mountains of central Vietnam have chewed up three government battalions so badly that these units will not be able to fight again for a long time. Government casualties in these ambushes probably have exceeded 1,000 men.

The Vietcong have clearly shifted gears from what they call "guerrilla warfare" to "mobile warfare."

The Communist concept of mobile warfare is essentially guerrilla operation on a vastly expanded scale, in which whole battalions and regiments are used in mounting ambushes. Ambushes remain the key feature of the war.

The Saigon government and its American ally control the air above South Vietnam and some of its roads and waterways. The Vietcong controls much of the rest of the nation.

Government units move mostly by truck, plane, and helicopter. Vietcong units move on foot through the trackless jungle. This means the Communists generally have the advantage in setting up their ambushes.

Roads, particularly those that wind through the mountain passes of central Vietnam, are ideal places for ambushes. Even helicopters must land in clearings, which in the jungle are often only tiny patches of ground.

The Vietcong can and often does set up traps around these clearings, with .50-caliber machineguns trained on the places helicopters will be forced to land.

As the fighting grows hotter it becomes more brutal. Neither side is taking many prisoners any more. Soldiers caught off side now are generally shot on the spot or tortured to death.

Mr. Richard Starnes in the Washington Daily News for June 4, 1965, also comments on the steady escalation of the undeclared war in Vietnam.

Mr. Starnes begins his article, entitled "The Escalating War" with the statement:

The American people are not alone in their blissful ignorance of the coming demands for men to feed the insatiable jungle war in Vietnam. A completely reliable source who was present at a White House briefing tells me this:

"I saw U.S. Senators blanch when Robert McNamara told them that they had to prepare to see 300,000 American men sent to Vietnam."

"I never thought I'd live to see such a thing in the United States, but McNamara told the briefing quite cheerfully that things were looking up in Vietnam because we

were now killing four times as many men as we were losing."

The briefing which was one of dozens that the White House has conducted in an effort to sell its Vietnam policy, concluded with talks by Secretary of State Dean Rusk and "big daddy" himself.

From news stories of troop movements to Vietnam, it is evident that it will not take long to build up to the 300,000 fighting men in Vietnam predicted by Secretary McNamara.

Those of us who have heard the discussions in the cloakrooms of the Senate are quite aware that many of our colleagues are having second thoughts about the southeast Asia resolution passed overwhelmingly on August 7. I voted against that resolution as did the Senator from Oregon [Mr. Morse] and nothing in the events of the past 10 months since that date has caused me to doubt the wisdom of voting against the resolution placing a blank check in the hands of the President to commit our Armed Forces to fighting anywhere in southeast Asia against undeclared enemies.

Mr. Starnes continued in his column:

"Rusk had nothing new to say, but he kept saying it at such great length that finally the President, who was sitting in the front row, started looking ostentatiously at his watch," my informant reports. "But Rusk missed the cue, until at last the President just got up and nudged Rusk away from the lectern."

What the Senators heard then is a thing that has caused something very near to cloakroom consternation. Mr. Johnson sailed into a defense of his escalation of the war in Vietnam, and bluntly told his audience that they had authorized it and, by implication, must share the responsibility for it.

The President said he was frequently asked what his policy in Vietnam was. Then, with the subtlety of a sledgehammer, he told the Senators that the Congress had laid down the policy in a resolution passed last August 7 by a vote of 504 to 2. And, said the President, he was doing his best to carry out that resolution.

The source of this account, who knows the Senate intimately, reported that, in spite of the near unanimity of congressional support for administration Vietnam policy, Senators are still "rankled" over Mr. Johnson's bland assumption that the August 7 resolution authorized escalation of the war in southeast Asia.

The resolution, passed in the fever of indignation that followed reported attacks by North Vietnamese torpedo boats against U.S. fleet units in Tonkin Gulf, comes very close to saying what President Johnson says it says—whether the Senators who voted for it like to admit it or not.

The resolution authorized the President "as Commander in Chief, to take all necessary measures to repeal any armed attack against the forces of the United States and to prevent further aggression."

Note well that the resolution was not limited to Vietnam but specifically asserted that the U.S. goal was "assisting the people of southeast Asia" to fight off alleged aggression. That means just what it says—Congress "approves and supports" anything Mr. Johnson deems necessary to prevent further aggression in the area, and it is now somewhat late for whatever second thoughts are occurring in Capitol cloakrooms.

Whatever doubt may have existed as to the intent of the August 7 resolution was dispelled last month, however, when Congress dutifully voted a blank check \$700 million appropriation to finance the expanding war. This time the division was 596 to 10, still a

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sufficiently lopsided vote to assure history that the 89th Congress had supported escalation in the Pacific whether it knew what it was doing or not.

This same growing unrest in the Congress and its questioning of the wisdom of its abdication of a voice in the conduct of our foreign policy is noted by the New York Times in its leading editorial on June 7, 1965, entitled "Congress and Vietnam" which begins:

Signs are growing of congressional interest in ending the leave-it-to-Lyndon era in American foreign policy.

The Founding Fathers intended the framing of our foreign policy to be a partnership between the executive and the legislative branches of the Federal Government with each acting as co-equals.

We are now seeing the harmful effects of treating the formulation of foreign policy as the exclusive prerogative of the executive branch of the Government.

The editorial in the New York Times contains the following observations:

Factors that go beyond the President's limited experience in foreign affairs and the extraordinary vacillations in Dominican policy have set off the present questioning at home and abroad. The reluctance of Secretary of State Rusk to employ the full resources of his Department and give independent advice, the meager use made by the President of nonofficial task forces in the foreign policy field, the overdependence on military and intelligence agencies and the divorce between the administration and the Nation's intellectuals—all point to a need for more vigorous congressional interest.

Nowhere is this more vital than on Vietnam, where grave constitutional questions are raised by the official acknowledgment of an increasing combat role for American troops. During the 18 months of the Johnson administration, the number of American troops in Vietnam has been tripled to about 46,500; a further buildup to more than 60,000 appears imminent. American planes have entered into combat both in South and North Vietnam—in the latter case openly attacking a foreign country with no declaration of war. American warships have bombarded the North Vietnamese coast. And there are indications that American ground troops—first employed as advisers in South Vietnam, then deployed to defend American installations and now directly engaged in patrolling action—will soon take on a full combat role as a tactical reserve aiding South Vietnamese units in trouble.

Yet at no point has there been significant congressional discussion, much less direct authorization of what amounts to a decision to wage war. That is why 28 Democratic Congressmen, on the initiative of Representative ROSENTHAL, of Queens, now have wisely asked the chairman of the House Foreign Affairs Committee to hold public hearings on the administration's Vietnam policy.

American casualties in Vietnam, while still relatively minor, already exceed those of the Spanish-American War. The choices open to the President are exceedingly difficult ones; they should not be his alone, either as a matter of sound policy or of constitutional obligation. If he takes it upon himself to make an American war out of the Vietnamese tragedy, without seeking congressional and national consent, he may open the country to divisions even more dangerous than those that developed out of the Korean conflict.

I ask unanimous consent that the entire editorial from the New York Times

for June 7, 1965, entitled "Congress and Vietnam" be printed at the conclusion of my remarks.

The PRESIDING OFFICER. Without objection, it is so ordered. (See exhibit 2.)

Mr. GRUENING. How singularly individualistic the war in Vietnam has become was commented on by columnist Drew Pearson in his column in the Washington Post on June 4, 1965, under the heading "President Johnson's Personal War." Mr. Pearson states:

The war in Vietnam has also become a lonely war and to some extent a personal war for one man. * * * It's become personal today, because the President feels it so keenly and directs it so carefully. Every morning at 3 he wakes up and calls the White House security room. Three in the morning is about the time the news is in from Vietnam on the casualties and the hits after each bombing raid.

Mr. Pearson concludes this portion of his article as follows:

The North Vietnamese have been winning. Our bombing raids have not stopped the supply of troops and supplies from going south or the guerrilla raids by the Vietcong.

The Russians, who normally might have acted as intermediaries, were put on the spot by our bombing of the north. The Chinese have chided them with being too friendly to the United States in the past, and with forsaking their alleged former role as the champion of small nations. So it's difficult for them to side with the United States now.

The Chinese are delighted at the predicament of both Moscow and Washington. They don't want the Vietnamese war to end. The longer it lasts, the more the United States and Russia become at swords' points, and the more the smaller nations of southeast Asia pull away from the United States into the Red Chinese camp.

In brief, the military advisers who sold the President on the strategy of bombing North Vietnam failed to understand oriental politics. Though he inherited the Vietnamese problem, they sold him on enlarging it into a mess that could either lead to world war or is almost insoluble without serious loss of face.

I ask unanimous consent that the entire column written by Drew Pearson in the Washington Post for June 7, 1965, entitled "President Johnson's Personal War" be printed in the RECORD at the conclusion of my remarks.

The PRESIDING OFFICER. Without objection, it is so ordered. (See exhibit 3.)

Mr. GRUENING. An excellent series of articles on Vietnam recently appeared in the New York Herald Tribune. They were written for the New York Herald Tribune by its special correspondent Beverly Deepe from Saigon.

I ask unanimous consent that Beverly Deepe's articles appearing in the New York Herald Tribune on May 30, May 31, June 1, June 2, June 3, and June 4, 1965, be printed in the RECORD at the conclusion of my remarks.

The PRESIDING OFFICER. Without objection, it is so ordered. (See exhibit 4.)

Mr. GRUENING. Communism cannot be fought with nothing.

A strong, capable, noncorrupt government in Saigon has been needed for years to bring about the social and economic reforms so necessary to show

the people of South Vietnam that they can have liberty and economic and social justice.

But Beverly Deepe's articles show why needed reforms were thwarted.

In her fifth article she discusses the long delay in land reform and how the government at Saigon was playing the landlord's game:

"The most important question in the Vietnamese countryside besides security is land reform," an American technician said, "yet virtually nothing has been done about it."

"The Vietcong are gaining a lot of points with the peasants by simply issuing land titles—and it costs them nothing. They take the land from the landowner and give it away. Nothing we give to the peasants—like pigs, insecticides, or fertilizer—is as important as land."

American technicians and provincial officials for the past several years have urged the implementation of an effective land reform program. Two land distribution schemes currently have been written, but neither has been accepted. Higher officials of the American Embassy and in the Agency for International Development believe land reform is not the panacea for Vietnam's problems.

A program for the training of land-reform cadre is under consideration. But the program will not be instituted until the other day—when the Vietcong Communists have been defeated.

WARNING

However, one Vietnamese general recently warned American generals and officials that American-backed efforts to pacify the provinces would fail unless they were linked with land reform.

"When the Vietnamese National Army goes back to pacify areas from the Vietcong, the local landowner goes back with them, offering to serve as intelligence agent," the general explained. "Obviously he wants to collect his back rent. So when the army pacifies the area it pacifies it for the landowner and not for the peasant."

"Of course, 35 percent of the peasants are landless. They become fanatics and will fight for the land given them by the Vietcong because it's as important to them as life."

One U.S. official described as "horror stories" the actions of some landowners to collect back rent, once Government forces had pacified Vietcong areas.

According to reliable sources, in other cases, when the Vietnamese Government Army attempts to pacify the area, the commanders simply ignore the problems of land reform, refusing to collect back rents—but also refusing to confirm the landownership rights.

In Vietcong-controlled areas, if landowners or their agents return to collect back rent the matter is simple. The peasant complains to the Vietcong, and the agent is shot.

"The question of land reform is quite simple," one low-ranking Vietnamese provincial official explained. "The government represents the landowners; the ministers and generals are either landowners or friends of landowners. The Catholic Church owns land. The Buddhist Church owns land. Nobody is interested in fighting for the poor peasant. And the top Americans—well, they talk to only the ministers and rich people so they don't push it either."

Beverly Deepe in her fourth article describes "How the United States Built on the Quicksand of Asian Politics." She says:

Since November 1963, the country has been in a state of political crisis. Sources in Saigon now argue that it would be a mistake to rebuild a counterideology—even if it could be done. They say instead that the Saigon government must reform itself and “out-revolutionize the Communists—but do it 10 times better and 50 times faster than the Communists themselves.”

The dilemma of American policymakers is the schizophrenic nature of the Vietnamese society itself. The governing class is generally urban-based, French-educated with an aristocratic position based on either family background, money or landownership. This elite minority attempts to govern the masses although it knows little about them and is concerned less.

After 10 years of administering the largest U.S. medical aid program in the world, American officials here still have little influence on Vietnamese medical affairs. One American-trained Vietnamese doctor said that a medical degree from an American medical school still is not readily recognized in Vietnam, on the other hand, a “parachute degree”—a degree virtually bought with money from a second-rate medical school in France—is easily acceptable by “the Mafia.”

The two best hospitals in Saigon are French operated. They are also the most expensive. There is no good American hospital in Saigon for the Vietnamese population (although there are two American-operated hospitals in France). Requests by the American-operated Seventh Day Adventist Missionary Hospital to expand their 30-bed clinic have repeatedly been refused.

American officials in Saigon have not effectively pressured the Saigon government to correct “this rot within,” in the words of a Vietnamese anti-Communist. Instead, they have superimposed upon the rot a spectacular medical program in the provinces.

“The Americans think we should fight for democracy,” one young Vietnamese intellectual explained. “But, in fact, the Vietcong fight because of the lack of democracy.”

But her most devastating article is entitled: “Corruption—Hottest Saigon Issue” and shows how corruption on high in Saigon—winked at and ignored by U.S. officials—was and is one of the causes for effective support of the Government at the grassroots—support which is essential.

The article states, in part:

The hottest issue in Saigon is not bombing Hanoi, nor Vietcong terrorism, nor possible negotiations for peace. It is corruption.

Vietnamese sources—generals, majors, captains, ex-ministers, economists—say that corruption has now reached scandalous, unprecedented proportions.

Highly placed sources in Saigon—American, Vietnamese, and Western—urged tighter controls on Vietnamese Government funds and on American aid and goods.

The issue is considered a gift for the Vietcong Communists, who promise the workers and peasants justice and equality. It also has caused friction within the Vietnamese Government and armed forces.

One high-ranking American official in the U.S. Agency for International Development (AID) reportedly estimated that 30 percent of American economic aid was unrecepted or unaccounted for last year. A low-echelon American provincial official says some of the 45 Vietnamese provinces had not submitted vouchers for expenditures during the past 3 years.

The original purpose of American advisers was to train Vietnamese to use the equipment—and to keep track of the equipment, which sometimes took some doing,” one American captain who worked on the program for 2 years said.

“We brought in air conditioners for hospitals—they ended up in the general’s house. We brought in hospital refrigerators to store vaccines in. The vaccines spoiled and the refrigerators wound up in the general’s house.”

These are the comments and criticisms which the highly placed sources in Saigon made about the commercial import program and sales of farm surplus commodities.

First, according to one Vietnamese economist and ex-minister, economic aid doesn’t aim at an economic target, but is only in support of a military machine. About four-fifths of the U.S.-generated plasters in 1964 were allocated to support the Vietnamese military budget.

CONSPICUOUS WEALTH

Second, the commercial import program has enriched and enlarged the upper middle class elements in Saigon and other cities, but it has also accentuated the extremes between the urban and rural classes. Often you bring in a whole lot of things for the richer middle class with conspicuous consumption, and the Vietcong can play on this, saying it enriches the middle class and bourgeois, one Western ambassador said.

Third, the rural communities, especially earlier in the program, received a relatively small proportion of the commercial import aid. Between 1955 and 1960, when the Vietcong began organizing and recruiting in the countryside, only 4 percent of the direct and indirect American aid was funneled into the rural population, which is an estimated 85 percent of the total population.

Fourth, the commercial import program has not been geared to assist the building of industries which funnel Vietnamese agricultural products into the light industrial sector. During the critical period of Vietcong formation in the countryside, from 1955 to 1960, American economic aid assisted in the establishment of 58 companies. But about 70 percent of these depended on imported raw materials: even the papermills needed to import woodpulp.

The Vietnamese officials have therefore devised an effective system of padding their vouchers and receipts.

“Suppose a wooden bridge costs 1,600 plasters to build,” an American district adviser complained, “the contractor adds another 200 plasters and the district chief adds another 200 plasters. I can practically see the money flow into their pockets, but they give me a receipt for 2,000 plasters. What can I do to disprove them?”

One Vietnamese province chief under the Ngo Dinh Diem regime admitted he ordered a few of his loyal troops to blow up his own bridge that was half constructed so that they could let another construction contract.

Some Vietnamese regional and regular units are known to possess phantom troops—troops that never existed, or were killed or deserted but never reported as lost. Their paychecks slip into the hands of privileged commanders.

“What it boils down to is whether to have a social revolution or not and clean up this government,” a Vietnamese economist explained. If America is too scared to do it—the Communists will, and will win the people. The people want justice. They don’t care if they have a democracy or a dictatorship—if the government comes in with bullets or ballots. But they want justice—even if it is harsh. The Vietcong are harsh, but they are just.

The basic conclusion arrived at in this excellent series is summed up at the beginning of the second article:

U.S. policy in South Vietnam is frozen in a negative posture that concentrates on military victory while failing to produce the sort of dramatic political strategy that would make such victory possible.

This, at least, is the opinion of highly placed sources in Saigon who have watched the American involvement here grow steadily for more than a decade.

In their view, the U.S. attitude is essentially anti-Communist rather than something. The overwhelming impression is that the American policymakers are attempting to stem the tide of Communist aggression or to teach Hanoi a lesson. But this implies a political status quo in a country that is changing in its post-colonial development, and is, indeed, fighting for change.

“Nothing negative has ever prevailed over something positive,” the Western military expert commented. One of the most frequently asked questions by Vietnamese captains and majors on the battlefield is “What are we fighting for?” as they look at the political turmoil in their rear area at Saigon.

I ask unanimous consent that the article by Mr. Richard Starnes and Malcolm W. Browne be printed at the conclusion of my remarks.

The PRESIDING OFFICER. Without objection, it is so ordered.

(See exhibits 5 and 6.)

EXHIBIT 1

[From the New York Times, June 9, 1965]

GROUND WAR IN ASIA

The American people were told by a minor State Department official yesterday that, in effect, they were in a land war on the continent of Asia. This is only one of the extraordinary aspects of the first formal announcement that a decision has been made to commit American ground forces to open combat in South Vietnam. The Nation is informed about it not by the President, not by a Cabinet member, not even by a sub-Cabinet official, but by a public relations officer.

There is still no explanation offered for a move that fundamentally alters the character of the American involvement in Vietnam. A program of weapons supply, training and combat advice to South Vietnamese, initiated by Presidents Eisenhower and Kennedy, has now been transformed by President Johnson into an American war against Asians.

It was the bombing of North Vietnam that led, in turn, to the use of American jet aircraft in South Vietnam and the emplacement of American marines and paratroops to defend American airbases. Now, with American air support hampered by the monsoon rains, American ground troops are to be made available as a tactical reserve to help South Vietnamese units in trouble.

It can all be made to sound like a gradual and inevitable outgrowth of earlier commitments. Yet the whole development has occurred in a 4-month span, just after an election in which the administration campaigned on the issue of its responsibility and restraint in foreign military involvements.

Since March, American forces in Vietnam have been more than doubled to 52,000, as compared to 14,000 when President Johnson took office. Additional troops are moving in and a buildup to 70,000 is indicated. There has been neither confirmation nor denial for reports that a force exceeding 100,000 is planned, including three full Army and Marine divisions. Nor is there any clarification on whether the so-called combat support role now authorized—combat in support of South Vietnamese units—is to be transformed later into offensive clear and hold operations of a kind hitherto carried out only by South Vietnamese forces. Apart from the obvious difficulty American troops would have in distinguishing guerrillas from the surrounding population, such a war ultimately might absorb as many American troops as were employed in Korea.

June 9, 1965

CONGRESSIONAL RECORD — SENATE

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A major factor in the original escalation decision—the decision to bomb North Vietnam—was the political crisis in Saigon after eight changes of government in little more than a year. The bombing was urged upon President Johnson as the only way to shore up morale, halt the factional feuding, and prevent a complete political collapse in South Vietnam.

Is it only a coincidence that the decision to enter the ground war has come during another political crisis in Saigon? There may be a need to prop up the government of Premier Phan Huy Quat against the Catholic and southern factions which made a constitutional issue out of his recent Cabinet reshuffle and still seek to bring him down. But is it not more likely that political irresponsibility in Saigon will grow, rather than decline, as the main military responsibility for defending South Vietnam is transferred increasingly to American hands?

The country deserves answers to this and many other questions. It has been taken into a ground war by Presidential decision, when there is no emergency that would seem to rule out congressional debate. The duty now is for reassurance from the White House that the Nation will be informed on where it is being led and that Congress will be consulted before another furious upward whirl is taken on the escalation spiral.

EXHIBIT 2

[From the New York Times, June 7, 1965]
CONGRESS AND VIETNAM

Signs are growing of congressional interest in ending the "leave it to Lyndon" era in American foreign policy.

There is Senator FULBRIGHT's new proposal to give the OAS a major voice in channeling American military assistance to Latin America. There is the provision in the new foreign aid bill for a thoroughgoing congressional investigation and for terminating the aid program in its present form in 1967.

There is the trip to Europe, at their own expense, of four House Republicans to investigate the crisis in NATO. And there are the recent criticisms of administration policy in Vietnam and the Dominican Republic by Senator ROBERT F. KENNEDY, plus his current charge that the United States is neither meeting its aid responsibilities to the underdeveloped countries nor identifying itself with the world revolution underway in those areas.

Factors that go beyond the President's limited experience in foreign affairs and the extraordinary vacillations in Dominican policy have set off the present questioning at home and abroad. The reluctance of Secretary of State Rusk to employ the full resources of his department and give independent advice, the meager use made by the President of nonofficial task forces in the foreign policy field, the overdependence on military and intelligence agencies and the divorce between the administration and the Nation's intellectuals—all point to a need for more vigorous congressional interest.

Nowhere is this more vital than on Vietnam, where grave constitutional questions are raised by the official acknowledgment of an increasing combat role for American troops. During the 18 months of the Johnson administration, the number of American troops in Vietnam has been tripled to about 46,500; a further buildup to more than 60,000 appears imminent. American planes have entered into combat both in South and North Vietnam—in the latter case openly attacking a foreign country with no declaration of war. American warships have bombarded the North Vietnamese coast. And there are indications that American ground troops—first employed as advisers in South Vietnam, then deployed to defend American installations and now directly en-

gaged in patrolling action—will soon take on a full combat role as a tactical reserve aiding South Vietnamese units in trouble.

Yet, at no point has there been significant congressional discussion, much less direct authorization of what amounts to a decision to wage war. That is why 28 Democratic Congressmen, on the initiative of Representative ROSENTHAL, of Queens, now have wisely asked the chairman of the House Foreign Affairs Committee to hold public hearings on the administration's Vietnam policy.

American casualties in Vietnam, while still relatively minor, already exceed those of the Spanish-American War. The choices open to the President are exceedingly difficult ones: they should not be his alone, either as a matter of sound policy or of constitutional obligation. If he takes it upon himself to make an American war out of the Vietnamese tragedy—without seeking congressional and national consent—he may open the country to divisions even more dangerous than those that developed out of the Korean conflict.

EXHIBIT 3

[From the Washington (D.C.) Post, June 4, 1965]

PRESIDENT JOHNSON'S PERSONAL WAR
(By Drew Pearson)

War, no matter what the circumstances, is tragic business. However, the war in Vietnam has also become a lonely war and to some extent a personal war for one man.

This is not because the President began it. It began 18 years ago under the French, was picked up 10 years ago by President Eisenhower, and increased 4 years ago by President Kennedy.

It's become personal today because the President feels it so keenly and directs it so carefully. Every morning at 3 he wakes up and calls the White House Security Room. Three in the morning is about the time the news is in from Vietnam on the casualties and the hits after each bombing raid.

The President worries over these, broods over them, wants to know, no matter what the hour of the night, just what has happened.

One reason for this personal direction is that the President is worried over the possibility of enlarging the war. He knows how easy it is for bomber pilots to make a mistake, or how dangerous it can be to jettison their bombs on their way home.

On the usual wartime bombing raid, a mission will fly over a target, attempt to knock it out; but if the clouds are low or an enemy plane gives trouble, the bombers may drop their payload indiscriminately on the way back, regardless of military targets.

TARGETS OF CONCRETE

Not, however, with the war in Vietnam. Mr. Johnson has given strict orders that only the targets he picks out are to be hit—and these are bridges, ammunition dumps, railroad centers and military installations.

"We're knocking out concrete, we're not hitting women and children," he has frequently told his aides.

In addition to his care to avoid civilian casualties he is concerned over any bombing mission that might stray over the line into China, or give the Communist Chinese the slightest provocation to enlarge the war.

This is why the war in and over Vietnam has been a lonely war, a personal war directed by a man who goes to bed well after midnight, but wakes up automatically at 3 a.m. to check on the military targets he has personally pinpointed.

Under the Constitution, he tells friends, he is charged with the conduct of war. But regardless of the Constitution, he knows that if there are failures, or if the war spreads, he will get the blame. So he is taking the responsibility.

INSOLUBLE MESS

When the President outlined his Baltimore peace proposals they were also personal, especially his plan for a giant series of dams on the Mekong River to benefit all the Indochinese countries, including North Vietnam.

Mr. Johnson had hoped that this, coupled with his offer of unconditional peace talks, plus joint United States-U.S.S.R. aid, might induce the other side to sit down at the conference table. It didn't, for three reasons:

The North Vietnamese have been winning. Our bombing raids have not stopped the supply of troops and supplies from going south or the guerrilla raids by the Vietcong.

The Russians, who normally might have acted as intermediaries, were put on the spot by our bombing of the north. The Chinese have chided them with being too friendly to the United States in the past, and with forsaking their alleged former role as the champion of small nations. So it's difficult for them to side with the United States now.

The Chinese are delighted at the predicament of both Moscow and Washington. They don't want the Vietnamese war to end. The longer it lasts, the more the United States and Russia become at swords' points, and the more the smaller nations of southeast Asia pull away from the United States into the Red Chinese camp.

In brief, the military advisers who sold the President on the strategy of bombing North Vietnam failed to understand oriental politics. Though he inherited the Vietnamese problem, they sold him on enlarging it into a mess that could either lead to world war or is almost insoluble without serious loss of face.

BEHIND THE SCENES

The Central Intelligence Agency is using a mysterious airline that calls itself Air America to drop weapons and supplies to our guerrilla fighters in Communist-held areas of Laos and Vietnam. The CIA is trying to give the Reds a taste of their own guerrilla medicine * * * Senate investigators have discovered that the CIA not only watches suspicious mail, but actually opens the letters as part of its secret intelligence work. However, Senators will protect the CIA, will not reveal this in their probe of Government eavesdropping.

EXHIBIT 4

[From the New York (N.Y.) Herald Tribune, May 30, 1965]

(By Beverly Deepe)

SAIGON.—One of the biggest puzzles of the Vietnam war is what makes the Communist Vietcong guerrillas fight so hard.

"It's fantastic the way the Vietcong lay it on," a Vietnamese-speaking American provincial representative commented.

"Young kids who fought with them explain it by saying the Vietcong create a 'new order and a new reality.'"

According to reliable persons who have talked with Vietcong prisoners and defectors, the Vietcong manpower—composed of 38,000 to 46,000 hard-core fighters and 60,000 to 80,000 part-time guerrillas—falls into two main categories: The older generation troops who fought against the French 15 to 20 years ago and a younger generation recruited in South Vietnam.

Of the first category, more than 70,000 Vietminh—as they were called during the French Indochina War—left their homes in South Vietnam when the country was partitioned in 1954 and went to North Vietnam, where they continued their training and indoctrination.

INFILTRATION

From 1956 onward, they gradually infiltrated back to their native villages. The most significant aspect of their return was a transfusion of political leadership into the south to organize and recruit younger south-

erners. Simultaneously, the Communists began a massive campaign of assassination of village government officials, virtually obliterating the Government's local leadership.

The older troops had fought the French for one reason: Independence, with its anti-French, anticolonial, antiwhite overtones. They fought and won with guns, but their most effective weapon was hate.

One member of a Vietminh suicide squad wrapped himself in gasoline-soaked cotton, ran into a French ammunition depot in Saigon and burned himself alive to destroy the installation. The story of the cotton boy swept through the countryside.

"My father even wanted me to volunteer to be a cotton boy," a Saigon businessman recently recalled.

Young Vietnamese students read French history books referring to "our ancestors, the Gauls." This example of French acculturation was countered by the Vietminh argument: "Please remember, your ancestors were not the French. You know your ancestors were the dragon and the fairy," a legend commonly accepted by the population.

According to prisoners in the older group, once they returned to South Vietnam in the late 1950's, they were surprised at what they found. They had been told the south must be liberated from its own poverty. One said he was astonished to see the Government troops wearing boots. (Communist troops often wear rubber-tire sandals.)

Another said he had been told that two-thirds of South Vietnam had been liberated. But when he attacked Government villages the peasants fought his men. They had been told they must liberate the south from the American imperialists, but soon discovered they were fighting Vietnamese.

But few of these veterans defected to the government side. One oldtime propaganda agent captured in the south explained that he listened to the Voice of America and British Broadcasting Corp. to discover the truth. But he listened to the Hanoi radio to find out the correct party line.

He reasoned that if the party lied, there must be a good reason for it. The party knew best.

The younger generation Vietcong troops join the liberation army for different reasons. Some of them are virtually kidnaped. Others have personal grievances or are simply bored with life in the villages. The Vietcong promise them adventure, and a chance to see life and be educated.

There is no sharp overriding national cause which the Vietcong are pushing throughout the country, such as the anti-French campaign. But there are grievances.

Some unmarried males join to get away from their landowners. Some are fired from their jobs and join. Many prefer serving with the Vietcong rather than government forces because they believe they can stay closer to their families.

Some young married men join to get away from the in-laws; the Communists in the village promise to take care of the wife and children. (One Vietcong trooper returned to his village, found his wife and children destitute, picked up a rifle and shot up the Vietcong village committee.) One was talked into joining when a pretty girl promised to marry him if he did; he became disillusioned when he found she had promised to marry six other recruits also.

Some are simply kidnaped at gunpoint. One was led away with a rope around his neck. One was kidnaped only hours after his wedding.

One reliable source estimated that about 10 to 15 percent of the southern-born Vietcong troops were orphans. About 30 percent are farm laborers. About 80 percent came from the rural areas.

In the West, the war in Vietnam is an ideological confrontation with communism. In Vietnam, this is not the way it is regarded by many of the Vietcong.

The Communists operate behind the mask of the National Liberation Front, which exploits nationalism and xenophobia. It disguises its Communist core philosophy by sloganeering about freedom and democracy.

One Western diplomat explained the Communist appeal in these words: "The Communists have swiped the American ideals. The Communists are promising the peasants a New, Fair, Square Deal—land, reform, democratic elections, land courts for justice."

Hence, the appeal of the Communist guerrilla movement is not communism at all. One American official explained that of more than 200 Vietcong prisoners and returnees he interviewed, not one mentioned anything about Marxism-Leninism, atheism, collective farms.

But the Vietcong also have a strong appeal for youth. "The Vietcong promise them fun—that life will be gay," one source said. "Many of those who join believe they get this."

Even if a youth has been forced to join the Vietcong, a highly effective indoctrination session immediately begins to mold him into an enthusiastic, well-disciplined fighter.

Perhaps, this can be seen in their songs.

Neil Jamieson, 29, a Vietnamese-speaking provincial representative from Gloucester City, N.J., translated a number of Vietcong songs and talked with incoming Vietcong defectors.

One of the songs goes:

"We are peasants in soldier's clothing, waging the struggle for a class oppressed for thousands of years; our suffering is the suffering of the people."

"Many of their songs are centered on victory," Mr. Jamieson said. "They associate the soldiers with the peasants—fighting oppression, not only against the foreigners, but also the upper classes within society."

"The troops accept—in fact, glorify—hardship because it identifies them with the people. It's almost like old Christianity. It's like little kids' Sunday School hymns—the idea of picking up the Cross for Jesus but instead of a cross it's a pack."

He said most of the Vietcong songs were "upbeat, emphasizing the positive in a Norman Vincent Peale manner." Government songs were often sad.

A SPARTAN LIFE

"The young troops lived a very spartan life," Mr. Jamieson continued. They were short of medicine, and all suffered attacks of malaria. Many suffered real hardships. It was cold in the jungle, yet they didn't dare light a big fire.

"I talked with many of the Vietcong about their songs," he said. "After their evening meal, they would break into teams of three and have their self-criticism sessions. Each one would go through his experiences of the day, his life in society, and in his three-man combat team. If one of them was wounded in combat, the two buddies would take care of him."

"After supper they would go through this ritual. They are taught to do this immediately after joining the Vietcong by the older cadre, who told them that sins can be forgiven but to conceal anything is a blow against the group."

"If for example, the young trooper had lost his ammunition or weapon, he'd criticize himself. This psychological aspect is a great Vietcong strength."

"After the self-criticism session, there would be announcements by the cadre and then would sit around and sing to pass their time in the evening. They would sit around a small campfire, if security permitted—just like the Boy Scouts used to do. These youths were uneducated, but the Communists taught them about the sputnik and Castro and Cuba. They didn't understand it well, but they knew Cuba was a tiny country near America and America was a paper tiger when Cuba stood up to us and we were powerless to do anything to them."

"The troops were short of rice, yet each day they put a few grains from each meal in a bamboo tube. When there was enough they'd take it to a tribal village and have a party for the children."

"One youthful trooper was with the Vietcong for 3 years, and was a member of their youth organization, which is the halfway point to becoming a party member. He was recruited at gunpoint, but he didn't hate the Vietcong."

He told me: "If I told you what I thought about out there in the jungle you'd think I was crazy. The Vietcong create a new reality; you feel you are in the world and not out of it."

[From the New York Herald Tribune, May 31, 1965]

OUR GIRL IN VIET—II: AMERICA'S FROZEN POLICY—VITAL POLITICAL POWER UNUSED (By Beverly Deepe)

SAIGON.—U.S. policy in South Vietnam is frozen in a negative posture that concentrates on military victory while failing to produce the sort of dramatic political strategy that would make such victory possible.

This, at least, is the opinion of highly placed sources in Saigon who have watched the American involvement here grow steadily for more than a decade.

In their view, the U.S. attitude is essentially anti-Communist rather than pro-something. The overwhelming impression is that the American policymakers are attempting to stem the tide of Communist aggression or to teach Hanoi a lesson. But this implies a political status quo in a country that is changing in its postcolonial development and is, indeed, fighting for change.

"Nothing negative has ever prevailed over something positive," the western military expert commented. "One of the most frequently asked questions by Vietnamese captains and majors on the battlefield is, 'What are we fighting for?' as they look at the political turmoil in their rear area at Saigon."

HOLLOW WORDS

While some Americans in Saigon pay lip-service to the principles of freedom and democracy, these are, as one American Government employee noted, "hollow words that mean little in Asia."

A Western diplomat argues that the Western concepts of democracy and freedom have never been simplified and codified as have the Communist ideology. There are no American primers for democracy as there are Communist primers for revolution.

"One cannot understand these American principles unless he has reaped the benefits of them or seen them firsthand," the diplomat explained. Hence, he said, the principles in which Americans believe must be translated, demonstrated, and visualized for the Vietnamese by the Vietnamese Government, and this has yet to be done.

The main political problem during the past decade seems to have been to realize there is a political problem and to act positively.

The American policymakers, however, view the battle in Vietnam as principally, if not solely, a military operation against armed Communist guerrillas. They are operating dramatically on one front while the Communists are operating on six fronts—political, economic, social, cultural, psychological, and military, all integrated into one powerful stream of warfare.

"Suppose you lose your billfold in a dark place," one Vietnamese provincial official explained. "But you insist on looking for it where there is light because it is easier. Well, you are now looking for the Communists in the light place—the military field—but you never, never find them all—they are also where you refuse to look."

ECONOMIC AID

During the past decade, \$1.1 billion was spent on the U.S. military assistance program for weapons, tanks, and ammunition for the Vietnamese armed forces. In addition, \$2.1 billion was spent in Vietnam from American economic aid funds. But 75 percent of the economic aid was for the purpose of paying expenses of the national army through the commercial import program.

These figures exclude the salaries of American servicemen and Government officials, and all their operating costs, as well as gasoline, parts, and ammunition for American units.

There is also the fact that the Vietnamese national army was built to counter a conventional invasion instead of a guerrilla war. Once the slow-motion invasion began a year ago, the army was slow in reacting.

There is no grand, dramatic political strategy for winning the political war in South Vietnam comparable to the dramatic military actions.

The bombing raids on North Vietnam have not and cannot win the political war within the South. But without them the war could never have been won—or contained—because of the sustained influx of North Vietnamese troops, weapons, and the much more significant political leadership cadre. If the raids have not won the war, however, they have in effect won time—they have provided the time to act politically.

Sources in Saigon now hope for a dynamic political maneuver to reverse the adverse political tide. They feel the military operations then would not be considered an end in themselves, as is now the case, but the means to an end—an honest, efficient government, a land reform program for the peasants, a smashing medical-educational program that would lift the nation economically and politically into the 20th century.

These sources argue that the elaborate and effective military battle plans have in effect given the nation time to formulate and implement a massive blueprint for the political-economic-social development of Vietnam. Instead of Vietnam being simply a military battleground, it could also become a political showplace, they maintain.

"But we lack any political imagination," one young American Government employee said. "We are fighting against revolution. How can we expect to win? It's like advocating the murder of mother."

One Western ambassador says as an example that it was "politically inadmissible" that 200,000 refugees in the central part of the country—victims of an autumn flood, Communist terror and friendly bombing raids—were not made a symbol of non-Communist revolution by the Vietnamese government. "They are given charity rice and propaganda lectures," he said. "They should be put in factories and apartment houses to show the world the benefits of fleeing the Communist side. Some anti-Communist refugees are not given help by the government, and return to Vietcong areas."

Another source criticized the American officials for not forcing the Diem regime years ago to establish "centers of prosperity" in which the Vietnamese people and the outside world could see the results of the American presence.

WOULD INTRODUCE TV

A high-ranking Western official suggests that television should have been widely introduced in Vietnam to relay government propaganda to the villages, to educate the children and to show adult films on better farming methods.

More than 3 years ago, private Japanese companies made such proposals for this, and the Japanese Government has tentatively offered technical assistance and funds. A television station would cost \$500,000.

But successive Vietnamese governments have postponed a decision on this project

and American authorities appear cool to the idea. Economic planners are more interested in Japan's contribution to a \$9 million bridge for the Mekong River.

The United States has political power in Vietnam, but chooses not to use it. Yet at this time the Saigon regime is too weak to act with political dynamism and effectiveness.

"We have the power to take names and to punish," one American explained. "But we don't do it. We are still timorous about interfering in a nation's internal affairs."

A Western ambassador agreed. "The first basic fault in the system," he said, "is you are too respectful of Vietnamese independence, so you do not interfere in making decisions on great issues—and in my opinion you should—while instead you are very particular, you pester them on small things of almost no importance. This creates the wrong impression and does not get the results. Your instructions should be more articulate but fewer."

American generals, colonels and captains admit they do not talk politics with their Vietnamese military counterparts; and no other American agency has been given the responsibility of cementing all the fighting Vietnamese political factions together.

This is in contrast to the Vietcong and the Communist apparatus—a guerrilla is first and foremost a political cadre, and after that a soldier. The Communist political cadre—perhaps with only the rank of sergeant—decides what villages will be attacked and the military commander, with a rank of major, follows his orders.

COMMUNISM FIRST

The Vietcong military apparatus is of a secondary, supporting nature to the Communist political machine. Hence American efforts to defeat the guerrillas still have not defeated the political subversive. American advisers in the provinces admit that even when the Communist guerrillas are defeated militarily, the Communist political cell system in the village is rarely destroyed.

The appearance of new French faces on the main street of Saigon, the arrival of increasing number of pro-neutralist Vietnamese from Paris, and the release of thousands of pro-neutralist and pro-Communist Vietnamese from prison within the last 18 months is more important in the subversive field than the introduction of American combat marines and paratroopers in the counter-guerrilla military field.

"With the amount of money you are spending in the military field," one Vietnamese major said, "you could buy all the land from the landowners and give it to the peasants. You could pave Vietnam with gold."

A 155-mm. howitzer shell costs \$70; a 500-pound general purpose bomb costs \$180—and tons of them are expended daily and nightly in Vietnam.

[From the New York Herald Tribune, June 1, 1965]

OUR GIRL IN VIET—III: CORRUPTION—HOTTEST SAIGON ISSUE

(By Beverly Deepe)

SAIGON.—The hottest issue in Saigon is not bombing Hanoi, nor Vietcong terrorism, nor possible negotiations for peace. It is corruption.

Vietnamese sources—generals, majors, captains, ex-ministers, economists—say that corruption has now reached scandalous, unprecedented proportions.

Highly placed sources in Saigon—American, Vietnamese, and Western—urged tighter controls on Vietnamese Government funds and on American aid and goods.

The issue is considered a gift for the Vietcong Communists, who promise the workers and peasants justice and equality. It also has caused friction within the Vietnamese Government and armed forces.

Several weeks ago a low-ranking Vietnamese civil servant was fired after he spat on the Minister of Economics because of differing views on the issue. A Vietnamese general and an admiral have been suspended on charges of corruption.

One high-ranking American official in the U.S. Agency for International Development (AID) reportedly estimated that 30 percent of American economic aid was unrecouped or unaccounted for last year. A low-echelon American provincial official says some of the 45 Vietnamese provinces had not submitted vouchers for expenditures during the past 3 years.

Another official said that outright corruption—American funds ending up in the pockets of the rich—was probably limited to 10 percent. Last year, this would have been \$233,000.

One high-ranking Western official angrily commented: "This is a major American scandal. The way American-generated funds flow out of this country to Paris—or back to America itself—well, it makes your hair curl."

"There are millions and millions of plasters that go to France or go to Hong Kong—and these plasters are generated by American aid funds. The French have a saying in Saigon that every time America increases its aid funds there's a new hotel on the Champs Elysee."

FRENCH GIGGLE

The ambassador of another Western embassy lamented, "The French stand by, look at what you're doing, and giggle."

American aid falls into two broad categories—military and economic. During the past decade \$1.1 billion was given to Vietnam through the U.S. military assistance program. This program gives guns, ammunition, bombs, and other equipment to the Vietnamese armed forces.

The original purpose of American advisers was to train Vietnamese to use the equipment—"and to keep track of the equipment, which sometimes took some doing," one American captain who worked on the program for 2 years said.

"We brought in air conditioners for hospitals—they ended up in the general's house. We brought in hospital refrigerators to store vaccines in. The vaccines spoiled and the refrigerators wound up in the general's house."

The second broad category totaling \$2.1 billion during the past decade is the economic aid program administered through the AID.

However, of the 10-year economic aid program, 75 percent has been channeled into the commercial import program and sales under the food-for-peace program. It is this program, copied from the Marshall plan for Europe after World War II, that highly placed sources in Saigon believe should be reappraised.

SPECIAL KITTY

The commercial import program, plus selling of American farm surplus goods, calls for the importing of goods from America or U.S.-authorized countries. The American Government pays the exporter in dollars for the goods. The Vietnamese importer in Saigon pays the Vietnamese in plasters.

These American-generated plasters are then put in a special kitty belonging to the Vietnamese Government. This counterpart fund primarily is used to pay the operating expenses of the Vietnamese national armed forces and to supplement Vietnam's other revenues.

The total amount of plasters budgeted by the Vietnamese Government in 1964 was 37.1 billion, but only 31.5 was actually spent which created the impression in Saigon, even among Vietnamese economists, that "there's too much money in Saigon. We cannot absorb it all."

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More than 19 of the 37 billion budgeted was spent in the military budget. U.S.-generated piasters through the counterpart fund accounted for 10.4 billion—or about one-third—of Vietnam's expenditures.

The 1965 Vietnamese budget, still under discussion, is expected to total more than 45 billion piasters. At the free market rate \$1 is worth 73 piasters.

These are the comments and criticisms which the highly placed sources in Saigon made about the commercial import program and sales of farm surplus commodities.

First, according to one Vietnamese economist and ex-minister, "economic aid doesn't aim at an economic target, but is only in support of a military machine." About four-fifths of the U.S.-generated piasters in 1964 were allocated to support the Vietnamese military budget.

CONSPICUOUS WEALTH

Second, the commercial import program has enriched and enlarged the upper-middle-class elements in Saigon and other cities, but it has also accentuated the extremes between the urban and rural classes. "Often you bring in a whole lot of things for the richer middle class with conspicuous consumption, and the Vietcong can play on this, saying it enriches the middle class and bourgeois," one Western ambassador said.

Third, the rural communities, especially earlier in the program, received a relatively small proportion of the commercial import aid. Between 1955 and 1960, when the Vietcong began organizing and recruiting in the countryside, only 4 percent of the direct and indirect American aid was funneled into the rural population, which is an estimated 85 percent of the total population.

Fourth, the commercial import program has not been geared to assist the building of industries which funnel Vietnamese agricultural products into the light industrial sector. During the critical period of Vietcong formation in the countryside, from 1955 to 1960, American economic aid assisted in the establishment of 58 companies. But about 70 percent of these depended on imported raw materials; even the paper mills needed to import wood pulp.

After 10 years in Vietnam, Americans still allow rubber as one of the most important exports in the country—most of it going to France—but no substantial rubber production factories have been established in Vietnam.

Fifth, the Vietnamese officials recognize two kinds of corruption; there's "dirty dishonest corruption"—i.e., "taking Vietnamese Government funds—but also "clean honest corruption"—getting access to American-generated funds or soaking Vietnamese citizens for money for rendering government services, from the issuance of birth certificates to fixing of taxi meters to meet government specifications.

The Vietnamese officials have therefore devised an effective system of padding their vouchers and receipts.

"Suppose a wooden bridge costs 1,600 piasters to build," an American district adviser complained. "The contractor adds another 200 piasters and the district chief adds another 200 piasters. I can practically see the money flow into their pockets, but they give me a receipt for 2,000 piasters. What can I do to disprove them?"

One Vietnamese province chief under the Ngo Dinh Diem regime admitted he ordered a few of his loyal troops to blow up his own bridge that was half-constructed so that they could let another construction contract.

Some Vietnamese regional and regular units are known to possess "phantom troops"—troops that never existed, or were killed or deserted but never reported as lost. Their paychecks slip into the hands of privileged commanders.

Last week, leaflets were printed to encourage Vietcong troops to return to the government side. Printing cost 79,000 piasters, but

250,000 piasters had been allocated for the job. The government official explained the remaining two-thirds had to be divided with messenger boys up to high-ranking civil servants.

Sixth, the Vietnamese administrative section of the commercial import program has at times been corrupted. One former Vietnamese minister who worked with American foreign aid said that Vietnamese importers pay 4 to 5 piasters per American dollar for the import license.

Every time there's a coup or government shakeup, Vietnamese businessmen complain they will have to pay off a new minister to get their import licenses.

Vietnamese importers are legally allowed 5 percent of the import license to be deposited abroad in a foreign account. However, as an inducement to sell his products, the foreign exporter regularly offers an additional illegal 4-5 percent listed as promotion fees or discount to be deposited in hard currency outside of Vietnam.

Hence, the program has allowed the Vietnamese to build up foreign accounts of hard currency. In addition, Vietnamese and Western sources complain that many profits are being sent abroad, either physically or in paper transfers, instead of being invested in local industries in Vietnam.

PIASTERS IN SUITCASE

Some sources believe that high-ranking officials simply carry piasters to Hong Kong in a suitcase (four American enlisted men were once arrested for doing this for a Chinese). In other cases a paper transfer is made in which piasters are paid in Saigon and American or Hong Kong dollars or French francs are deposited in a foreign account.

Seventh, instead of selling goods to the Vietnamese consumer at the lowest possible cost to keep the products moving, some businessmen—principally Chinese—corner the market, establish a monopoly, and sell at inflated prices, causing a rise in the cost of living. During a 10-day shortage period, the price of sugar or cement, for example, would double.

Eighth, the commercial import program has prevented large-scale deficit spending, runaway inflation, paid the national army, and assisted in the establishment of more than 700 local industries. But it has also allowed the Vietnamese Government to use their own foreign exchange for other consumer demands—and too much of this has been channeled into the luxury class.

The shops along the main street of Saigon are filled with imported cheeses, French perfume, Japanese radios, French costume jewelry, and foreign-made cars. None of these items can be bought by the rural peasants.

IN SCHOOLS, TOO

These problems have been accentuated by day-to-day corruption in the Vietnamese system of life. A child in a French school in Saigon—where sons of ministers and generals go if they are not in France—easily can pass an exam with a 10,000 piasters deposit under the table, "and if you don't think so, just look at how many French teachers leave Vietnam and invest in hotels on the French Riviera," an anti-Communist source remarked.

Transfers for Vietnamese battalion commanders from the remote provinces to Saigon cost 50,000 piasters.

For 50,000 piasters, a young man can obtain a certificate that he's involved in undercover work for the Ministry of Interior—and is thus exempt from the army draft. The Ministry has signed 1,300 of these certificates in recent weeks.

Up to 5,000 piasters is siphoned off the allotments for war widows, "and to survive she has to become a prostitute before the first payment arrives—which takes up to 10 months," one Vietnamese observer said. "Why should her husband want to die un-

known in the jungles—so his wife can be a prostitute?"

"What it boils down to is whether to have a social revolution or not and clean up this government," a Vietnamese economist explained. "If America is too scared to do it—the Communists will, and will win the people. The people want justice. They don't care if they have a democracy or a dictatorship—if the government comes in with bullets or ballots. But they want justice—even if it is harsh. The Vietcong are harsh, but they are just."

[From the New York Herald Tribune, June 2, 1965]

OUR GIRL IN VIET—IV: HOW THE U.S. BUILT ON THE QUICKSAND OF ASIAN POLITICS

(By Beverly Deepe)

SAIGON.—In 1962, when American advisers and helicopters began arriving in large numbers in Vietnam, President Ngo Dinh Diem was told by a close American friend that unless he radically reformed his government, he undoubtedly would be overthrown in a coup d'etat. The American had taken a poll of Diem's former supporters and found that only 30 out of 150 were sticking with the chubby little mandarin.

"But Diem wouldn't listen and the Americans weren't interested in hearing it," the friend lamented. "More American troops and helicopters came, but reform did not. The Americans built a beautiful war machine and placed it on political quicksand."

Despite the American military buildup, the failure of President Diem to institute reforms provided the political fuel on which Vietcong strength grew.

A year later, President Diem was overthrown and killed.

President Diem had built a political magnet line for political warfare with the Communists. On one side was the Communist ideology, the National Liberation Front and behind it, the Communist Party, calling itself the People's Revolutionary Party.

President Diem had built his own counter-ideology, a vague concept called personalism. His National Revolutionary Movement corresponded to the National Liberation Front; his brothers' secret party, the Can Lao, corresponded to the Communist Party.

When President Diem was ousted, his counterideology and counter-machines were washed away. Since then, no single person has been in total command of the anti-Communist forces long enough to build a similar machine or ideology.

Since November 1963, the country has been in a state of political crisis. Sources in Saigon now argue that it would be a mistake to rebuild a counterideology—even if it could be done. They say instead that the Saigon government must reform itself and "outrevolutionize the Communists—but do it 10 times better and 50 times faster than the Communists themselves."

The last time the American-backed Saigon government seized the political initiative involved the strategic hamlet program. The concept of fortified hamlets, with dramatic economic and social advantages, was officially launched by President Diem in April 1962.

ECONOMIC DISASTER

But it was doomed. One American, fluent in Vietnamese, visited a pilot project in Cuchi, 20 miles from Saigon, and was told by peasants that the hamlet program was an economic disaster.

The peasants said the Government forced them to construct hamlets instead of farm their cash crop of tobacco. As a result, they could produce only 10 percent of what normally was raised.

The dilemma of American policymakers is the schizophrenic nature of the Vietnamese society itself. The governing class is generally urban based, French educated with an aristocratic position based on either family

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background, money, or land ownership. This elite minority attempts to govern the masses although it knows little about them and is concerned less.

The elite's lack of concern and compassion was illustrated in an incident related by the wife of a Western embassy official. The wives of embassy officials had voluntarily presented furniture, clothing, and toys to a local orphanage.

"Several days after we handed over the goods, one of the embassy wives returned to the orphanage," the lady explained. "We were astonished to find the officials had even taken the toys out of the hands of little orphans. The toys were nowhere to be found."

In contrast, cadre wanting to join the Communist Party are sent to live with the rural masses and practice "three togetherness"; eating, living, and working with the peasants. Cadre are invited to join the Communist Party—which has an exclusive, and not mass membership—when they are prepared to govern.

"The Americans had to play with the cards that were dealt out and they weren't very good cards," one Western diplomat explained. "In Vietnam, nationalism went the Communist way. We saw a lot of Vietnamese in the South who are the political forces in the country * * * they are the bourgeois, the landowners, the Catholics. They believe in the same ideas as we do; we support these people and they support us. But these people in an Asian country in the throes of political-social upheaval—they are not in the mainstream."

The diplomat continued:

"They're on the edges—we're supporting them and the mainstream is elsewhere—in the nationalist movement of the Communists. The mainstream elements got into the hands of Ho Chi Minh in North Vietnam and Mao Tse-tung in China. Chiang Kai-shek didn't have the nationalist issue; he was helped by the United States—and this in turn made it more likely he'd lose."

MANDARIN SYSTEM

The lack of justice and equal opportunity is perhaps best reflected in the medical profession in Vietnam, which one American-educated Vietnamese doctor called "the medical mafia." Two elite groups of doctors—the faculty of medicine at University of Saigon and a private organization called the Medical Syndicate—decide which doctors will be licensed for private practice. Virtually all the members of these groups come from Hanoi and favor licensing only northerners.

"These seven older-generation men in the faculty of medicine are capable and dedicated," one American official working in medical field said. "They just happen to be partisan. They represent the old mandarin system; they choose, select—and limit the leaders of the future. It's the tradition in the East for more than 1,000 years that leaders of the next generation are always chosen by those in power. This gives rise to the mandarin system and an undue amount of nepotism."

After 10 years of administering the largest U.S. medical aid program in the world—American officials here still have little influence on Vietnamese medical affairs. One American-trained Vietnamese doctor said that a medical degree from an American medical school still is not readily recognized in Vietnam, on the other hand, a parachute degree—a degree virtually bought with money from a second-rate medical school in France—is easily acceptable by the "the mafia."

The two best hospitals in Saigon are French-operated. They are also the most expensive. There is no good American hospital in Saigon for the Vietnamese popula-

tion (although there are two American-operated hospitals in France). Requests by the American-operated Seventh-day Adventist Missionary Hospital to expand their 30-bed clinic have repeatedly been refused.

American officials in Saigon have not effectively pressured the Saigon government to correct "this rot within," in the words of a Vietnamese anti-Communist. Instead they have superimposed upon "the rot" a spectacular medical program in the provinces.

"The Americans think we should fight for democracy," one young Vietnamese intellectual explained. "But in fact, the Vietcong fight because of the lack of democracy."

[From the New York Herald-Tribune, June 3, 1965]

OUR GIRL IN VIET—V: LAND REFORM—THE LONG DELAY

(By Beverly Deepe)

SAIGON.—"The most important question in the Vietnamese countryside besides security is land reform," an American technician said. "Yet virtually nothing has been done about it."

"The Vietcong are gaining a lot of points with the peasants by simply issuing land titles—and it costs them nothing. They take the land from the landowner and give it away. Nothing we give to the peasants—like pigs, insecticides, or fertilizer—is as important as land."

American technicians and provincial officials for the past several years have urged the implementation of an effective land reform program. Two land distribution schemes currently have been written, but neither has been accepted. Higher officials in the American Embassy and in the Agency for International Development believe "land reform is not the panacea for Vietnam's problems."

A program for the training of land-reform cadre is under consideration. But the program will not be instituted until "the other day"—when the Vietcong Communists have been defeated.

WARNING

However, one Vietnamese general recently warned American generals and officials that American-backed efforts to pacify the provinces would fail unless they were linked with land reform.

"When the Vietnamese National Army goes back to pacify areas from the Vietcong, the local landowner goes back with them, offering to serve as intelligence agent," the general explained. "Obviously he wants to collect his back rent. So when the army pacifies the area it pacifies it for the landowner and not for the peasant."

"Of course, 35 percent of the peasants are landless. They become fanatics and will fight for the land given them by the Vietcong because it's as important to them as life."

One U.S. official described as "horror stories" the actions of some landowners to collect back rent, once government forces had pacified Vietcong areas.

According to reliable sources, in other cases, when the Vietnamese Government Army attempts to pacify the area, the commanders simply ignore the problems of land reform, refusing to collect back rents—but also refusing to confirm the land ownership rights.

In Vietcong-controlled areas, if landowners or their agents return to collect back rent the matter is simple. The peasant complains to the Vietcong, and the agent is shot.

RECRUITING

American officials who have talked with large numbers of Vietcong prisoners and returnees believe the Vietcong recruits within South Vietnam are almost entirely from the rural population, probably indicating

not the strength of the Vietcong appeal so much as the accessibility to rural masses for Communist recruiting.

Furthermore, an estimated 30 percent of the Vietcong strength recruited in the South are considered to belong to the "farm labor class," the lowest in the semi-Confucianistic rigidly stratified rural society.

The five rural classes in Vietnamese countryside area are: the landowners (who lease out all the land they own); the rich peasants (who own more land than they till, and lease out some of it); the middle-class peasants (who own all they till); the tenant farmers (who rent all their lands), and the farm laborers (who cannot rent land, but are seasonally hired for planting and harvesting).

"The question of land reform is quite simple," one low-ranking Vietnamese provincial official explained. "The government represents the landowners; the ministers and generals are either landowners or friends of landowners. The Catholic Church owns land. The Buddhist Church owns land. Nobody is interested in fighting for the poor peasant. And the top Americans—well, they talk to only the ministers and rich people so they don't push it either."

LANDOWNERS

One Vietnamese general recalled that during the war with the Communists against the French in the early fifties, he was ordered by imperial decree to have landowners in his security district in North Vietnam divide up the land with the peasants. There were two large landowners in the area, he recalled, one of them a Roman Catholic bishop and the second a relative of the then Finance Minister.

"The Catholic bishop refused to divide the land because he said he had to support 2,500 seminary students with the rent money, and the big landowner also refused," the general explained. "I warned them both if they didn't give the land to the peasants the Communists would take over not only the land, but also the seminary and the landowner's house. But they wouldn't listen. The big landowner told the Finance Minister what I was doing. I was quickly transferred to another place—and 3 years later the Communists took over."

The land-reform issue in Vietnam—involving not only issuing of land titles, but also law enforcement on land rents, land security for tenants and fixed rates on the interest of borrowing of money—is not considered as acute as in other parts of Asia. The Japanese say, for example, that a peasant without land is like a man without a soul. The victory of Chinese Communists in taking over mainland China was achieved not so much by armed guerrillas as by the promise of land to the poverty-stricken, landless peasantry.

"The land for the landless" campaign in the Philippines virtually broke the back of the Hukbalahap insurrection in the fifties.

According to reliable sources, the Vietcong guerrillas in Vietnam have a haphazard, inconsistent land-reform program which varies from area to area in sections of the country they control. However, the current government has virtually no program at all. One American provincial official estimated that the Vietcong had issued land titles to 50 percent of the peasant families in his province; the government had issued none.

In some areas, the Vietcong take some of the land from the rich peasants and give it to the landless tenant—who still pays rent, to the Vietcong.

So far, the Vietcong have not killed or harassed the rich peasants as they did before their seizure of power in North Vietnam.

In some cases, the Vietcong program in the rural areas is considered self-defeating. They

have made a definite push for higher rents as they move toward the mobile warfare phase.

In some areas, Vietcong taxes and indirect taxes in rice have doubled over that of last year. In other areas, the Vietcong are known to have redistributed the land, increased the land tax from 100 to 900 piastres and increased the rice tax from 50 to 300 piastres.

In the countryside outside Hue, which has lately fallen under their control, the Vietcong are attempting to collect 10-15 percent of what the peasants had raised during the past decade, when they lived in peace. The peasants are said to be discontented about that. In isolated cases, peasants have burned their own crops rather than pay Vietcong taxes.

In the fifties, President Ngo Dinh Diem attempted to correct the injustices in the countryside. But his effectiveness was limited. A U.S. Government bulletin published in January this year explained:

"Under the ordinances approved in 1955, a program was being carried out to regularize tenancy agreements through written contracts. The contracts established minimum and maximum rents of 15 and 25 percent, respectively, chargeable by the landlord against the tenant's main crop. While a start has been made in land reform, real progress has been negligible and a review of the entire program needs to be undertaken."

[From the New York Herald Tribune, June 4, 1965]

OUR GIRL IN VIET—CONCLUSION: THE PROGRAM THE REDS CAN'T FIGHT

(By Beverly Deepe)

SAIGON.—This is the story of the three little pigs of Vietnam.

It is one of the most visibly effective American-sponsored programs in rural Vietnam against which the Communist Vietcong guerrillas have many arguments but no real answer.

In early 1962, American provincial representatives of the Agency for International Development (AID) began distributing improved white pigs from the Mekong Delta throughout the entire countryside.

The program called for a package deal in which eight bags of cement would be given to build a combination pig sty-compost pit, while three improved pigs and American surplus corn would be lent to the farmer.

One of the pigs would later be marketed, which would repay the entire \$50 cost of the venture; the others would be kept for breeding.

"The pigs had a fantastic impact," one American agricultural technician explained. "The farmers followed the old Chinese custom and washed their pigs daily. Some of them put red ribbons around the ears of the pigs. Almost all the pigs became pets for the children."

BUT WHY CEMENT?

"Of course, we had a few problems. Some of the Vietnamese farmers had never even seen cement before and they didn't understand why they should have a cement-floored pig sty and compost pit when for centuries they had moved the pig waste out on the ground.

"Some of the farmers moved their cots into the compost pit. Some of them put the pigs in their houses and moved their families into the pig sty. After all, it was better than their dirt-floored houses.

"Some of the farmers put tiled roofs on the pig sty with curlicues like ancient Chinese temples. They became the new status symbols in the villages. We never could understand why they made them so elaborate.

"Then, of course, the most profitable time to sell the pig is when he's about 1 year old," he continued. "But the Vietnamese let the pigs get fatter and fatter and sell

them only when they need the money. They use the piggy as a living bank."

He explained that at first the richer village families got the pigs, or the friends of the local Vietnamese Government agricultural technicians. Now—3 years and 40,000 pigs later—"the pigs have seeped into all levels of the villages," he said.

"The neighbors buy little pigs from the first family to have them. In one northern city, 2 years ago you wouldn't see one improved pig a day come through the slaughterhouse. Now about one-third of a day's production is the improved breed."

REPAYMENTS

He explained that the Vietcong political cadre attempted to sabotage the program by telling the farmers that it was a "giveaway program" rather than a loan, so that the farmers would not make repayment to the Government. So far, the rate of repayment has been low, but in most cases the 18-month deadline for repayment has not been reached.

"The pig program doesn't make the farmer pro-Government or pro-Vietcong," the technician explained. "But it does expose him to the Government cadre, to the Government administration and to an American veterinarian. Maybe this is the first time in the farmer's life that the Government has done something to help him. So gradually, it creates a better feeling for the Government."

"The Vietcong do not steal the pigs, and we have lost very few of our pig hamlets to the Vietcong."

In addition to the pig program, Vietnamese agricultural technicians, assisted by Americans, have also started programs to improve ducks, chickens, and cattle and to promote a wider distribution of water buffaloes, which are used to pull the farmers' plows.

Other technicians have established experimental stations for improving rice seed (which some Vietnamese prefer to eat rather than use for seeding).

Recently, Vietnamese agricultural agents conducted 3-day courses on improved farming techniques for farmers during the slack season. Twenty piasters (30 cents) was given the farmers for lunches "and that really had an impact," one American agricultural expert explained. "It was part of our pacification program. But the Vietcong even welcomed the agents into their areas to help their farmers."

FERTILIZER ON CREDIT

In another instance, Vietnamese Government administrators have implemented a credit-loan system whereby farmers can buy fertilizer before the rice planting and repay the loan after harvest. Production has more than doubled in some areas. In other areas small irrigation pumps have been bought on loan, making possible two or three crops of rice a year instead of only one.

The Vietcong retort that the fertilizer will destroy the soil; that in the first year of using fertilizer, production will increase but in future years it will drop; that the government will double the prices when it comes to paying the loan, or that the government will make the farmers dependent on the fertilizer year after year and then skyrocket the prices.

"The poor Vietnamese farmer, who has a lot of superstition and no knowledge of chemicals, is in the dark," an American technician said. "The Vietcong play on the farmer's past lack of faith in the government."

American-supported rural economic aid is scattered in the secure "oil spots" in each of Vietnam's 45 provinces, which at times undercuts the impact that it has had nationwide.

The Communist-initiated war has produced an economic deterioration and social upheaval in the countryside. Young farmers are drafted instead of planting rice. Large

tracts of land are abandoned because of Vietcong pressure, and other large tracts, now uncultivated, could be developed into excellent farming land.

Despite this, the standard of living has improved during the last 10 years. Ten years ago, a bicycle was a status symbol; now motor scooters, bicycles, and buses are regularly seen in the countryside.

The nationwide statistics on education are also impressive. In 1955, 329,000 pupils attended elementary public schools. In 1964, the number had increased to 1.5 million.

In 1964 alone, 900 new rural schools were built and 1,000 elementary education teachers were trained. A total of 4,000 rural schools was built in the decade.

In 1955, there were 2,900 university students in Vietnam. By 1964, the number had increased to 20,000, with a new university established in the northern provinces. More than 2,500 Vietnamese students and technicians have been sent to America through AID programs for advanced degrees.

However, the population growth is 2.8 percent yearly.

In the rural health field, Vietnamese villagers often find it difficult to understand what has been prevented—such as cholera epidemics or malaria. During the last 6 years, however, the American-backed \$12 million malaria-eradication program, part of a worldwide effort, has dropped known malaria cases from 7.22 percent to less than 1 percent.

SPRAYING OF HOMES

More than 1 million Vietnamese farm homes are being sprayed twice a year. More than 6 million persons have been directly affected by the spraying. The Vietcong propagandists told the villagers the spray would cause their thatched roofs to crumble or would kill their cats and chickens.

"The Vietcong say the farmers don't have enough cats to eat all the rats," one American medical expert explained, "and the rats eat rice. They use this argument when there's a poor crop of rice and a good crop of rats—and it's very effective with the peasants."

The malaria rate has dropped to the extent that medical experts simply keep tabs on it by collecting blood samples.

"The Vietcong spread the word that the Americans were collecting Vietnamese blood to give to the wounded Americans," the medical expert continued. "This even happened on the outskirts of Saigon. One American educational lecturer started to give a lecture on the taking of these blood samples for malaria control; suddenly all the mamas and little kids started throwing rocks at him."

"The police had to escort him out—all because of that outlandish Vietcong propaganda. But Vietnamese people don't like to give blood; they are superstitious about that and it's very strange to them."

More than 8,000 rural health workers are currently operating in the Vietnamese countryside. Nine gleaming white surgical suites costing \$500,000 each, have been established throughout the country and are staffed by Americans, Filipinos, New Zealanders, Australians, and Italians.

EXHIBIT 5

[From the Washington (D.C.) News, June 4, 1965]

THE ESCALATING WAR

(By Richard Starnes)

The American people are not alone in their blissful ignorance of the coming demands for men to feed the insatiable jungle war in Vietnam. A completely reliable source who was present at a White House briefing tells me this:

"I saw U.S. Senators blanch when Robert McNamara told them that they had to prepare to see 300,000 American men sent to Vietnam."

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"I never thought I would live to see such a thing in the United States, but McNamara told the briefing quite cheerfully that things were looking up in Vietnam because we were now killing four times as many men as we were losing."

The briefing, which was one of dozens that the White House has conducted in an effort to sell its Vietnam policy, concluded with talks by Secretary of State Dean Rusk and "Big Daddy" himself.

"Rusk had nothing new to say, but he kept saying it at such great length that finally the President, who was sitting in the front row, started looking ostentatiously at his watch," my informant reports. "But Rusk missed the cue, until at last the President just got up and nudged Rusk away from the lectern."

What the Senators heard then is a thing that has caused something very near to cloakroom consternation. Mr. Johnson sailed into a defense of his escalation of the war in Vietnam, and bluntly told his audience that they had authorized it and, by implication, must share the responsibility for it.

The President said he was frequently asked what his policy in Vietnam was. Then, with the subtlety of a sledgehammer, he told the Senators that the Congress had laid down the policy in a resolution passed last August 7 by a vote of 504 to 2. And, said the President, he was doing his best to carry out that resolution.

The source of this account, who knows the Senate intimately, reported that, in spite of the near unanimity of congressional support for administration Vietnam policy, Senators are still "rankled" over Mr. Johnson's bland assumption that the August 7 resolution authorized escalation of the war in southeast Asia.

The resolution, passed in the fever of indignation that followed reported attacks by North Vietnamese torpedo boats against U.S. Fleet units in Tonkin Gulf, comes very close to saying what President Johnson says it says—whether the Senators who voted for it like to admit it or not.

The resolution authorized the President "as Commander in Chief, to take all necessary measures to repel any armed attack against the forces of the United States and to prevent further aggression."

Note well that the resolution was not limited to Vietnam but specifically asserted that the U.S. goal was "assisting the people of southeast Asia" to fight off alleged aggression. That means just what it says—Congress "approves and supports" anything Mr. Johnson deems necessary "to prevent further aggression" in the area, and it is now somewhat late for whatever second thoughts are occurring in Capitol cloakrooms.

Whatever doubt may have existed as to the intent of the August 7 resolution was dispelled last month, however, when Congress dutifully voted a blank check \$700 million appropriation to finance the expanding war. This time the division was 596 to 10, still a sufficiently lopsided vote to assure history that the 89th Congress had supported escalation in the Pacific whether it knew what it was doing or not.

EXHIBIT 6

[From the New York Herald Tribune, June 6, 1965]

VIETNAM WAR ALTERS CHARACTER

(By Malcolm W. Browne)

SAIGON, VIETNAM, June 4.—The war in Vietnam has been transformed into an enormous meat grinder, in which both sides are now making an all-out drive to bleed each other to death.

It is a meat grinder in which America for the first time has an active part—on both the giving and receiving end.

U.S. officials predict that American casualty tolls will increase from now on as American Marine Corps and Army paratrooper units move deeper into the battle.

U.S. air strikes on North and South Vietnam have increased in recent months to the point that they are now round-the-clock operations.

In the north, strikes have been limited to military installations, roads, and waterways well south of Hanoi. There seems no immediate prospect of bombing North Vietnam's cities or civilian industries.

But in the south, huge sectors of the nation have been declared "free bombing zones," in which anything that moves is a legitimate target. Tens of thousands of tons of bombs, rockets, napalm, and cannon fire are poured into these vast areas each week. If only by the laws of chance, bloodshed is believed to be heavy in these raids.

In exchange, the Vietcong is exacting its pound of flesh.

In the past week, big Vietcong units prowling through the jungle-covered mountains of central Vietnam have chewed up three Government battalions so badly that these units will not be able to fight again for a long time. Government casualties in these ambushes probably have exceeded 1,000 men.

The Vietcong have clearly shifted gears from what they call guerrilla warfare to mobile warfare.

The Communist concept of mobile warfare is essentially guerrilla operation on a vastly expanded scale, in which whole battalions and regiments are used in mounting ambushes. Ambushes remain the key feature of the war.

The Saigon Government and its American ally control the air above South Vietnam and some of its roads and waterways. The Vietcong controls much of the rest of the nation.

Government units move mostly by truck, plane, and helicopter. Vietcong units move on foot through the trackless jungle. This means the Communists generally have the advantage in setting up their ambushes.

Roads, particularly those that wind through the mountain passes of central Vietnam, are ideal places for ambushes. Even helicopters must land in clearings, which in the jungle are often only tiny patches of ground.

The Vietcong can and often does set up traps around these clearings, with 50-caliber machineguns trained on the places helicopters will be forced to land.

As the fighting grows hotter it becomes more brutal. Neither side is taking many prisoners any more. Soldiers caught off side now are generally shot on the spot or tortured to death.

CHILEAN DEMOCRACY
WORKING WELL

Mr. PROXMIRE. Mr. President, in the news—in newspapers, on television, and radio—we hear a great deal more about Vietnam and the Dominican Republic, about coups and revolutions, and about the setbacks in the world. Unfortunately, the quiet progress that is being made in many countries has been neglected because it does not make news.

For example, the current Atlantic Monthly carries an excellent, concise report on the impressively favorable developments in Chile under the leadership of Eduardo Frei. The excellent article points out that under Mr. Frei there has been great improvement in education. I read briefly from the article:

It is a shocking fact that in this country of 8.5 million people of largely European extraction there were approximately 200,000

children with no school to go to. In a crash program initiated immediately on taking office in November, at the beginning of the Chilean summer, Frei organized an intensive course to train new teachers, asked existing ones voluntarily to accept longer hours, and undertook the construction of thousands of schoolrooms, as well as lodgings for teachers in remote areas.

President Frei has also been busily engaged in an excellent land reform program which in the next few years will provide for an additional 100,000 independent farmers in Chile.

Everyone who has studied the Communist movement knows that the greatest bulwark against communism is the individual farmer who has his own plot of ground and his own farm to defend.

In addition, under Mr. Frei tax reforms in Chile have made progress. There have been jail sentences for tax evaders and that is almost unheard of in South America. Most significant of all is the excellent cooperation between the Chilean Government and American corporations—Anaconda Copper and Kennecott Copper—both of which have huge holdings in Chile. Chile has worked out a system of ownership and participation in the profits of those corporations that have been agreed to by the corporations. Chile has avoided the expropriation which the Marxists have called for. Confiscatory taxes have been avoided. Both Anaconda and Kennecott are proceeding profitably from their standpoint, and also sharing their gains with the Chileans and with the Chilean Government.

There is a very serious problem, as there is in most of those countries, with inflation. But even in that field Mr. Frei is making progress.

The PRESIDING OFFICER. The time of the Senator has expired.

Mr. PROXMIRE. Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent that I may proceed for 3 additional minutes.

The PRESIDING OFFICER. Without objection, it is so ordered.

Mr. PROXMIRE. The remarkable thing to me is that Mr. Frei has been able to put into effect a system of slowing down inflation which has at the same time permitted wage earners to earn significantly more money. It has permitted farmers to obtain better prices for their crops, while simultaneously keeping inflation from preventing the kind of firm and solid economic progress which is most essential.

Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent that this fine, short article on Chile, published in the Atlantic Monthly, be printed at this point in the RECORD.

There being no objection, the article was ordered to be printed in the RECORD, as follows:

THE ATLANTIC REPORT—CHILE

Chileans are accustomed to earthquakes, but the recent upheaval in their politics is so unusual that historians peer back to 1841 to find a parallel. Christian Democrat Eduardo Frei is the first President since then, under Chile's multiparty system, to be elected by an absolute majority and to have a congress to do his bidding.

His victory by 56 percent in the presidential elections of September 1964 was startling enough, but it might have been considered

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the wages of fear: the Marxist left was running so strong—and did, indeed, chalk up a hefty 39 percent—that the right and center voted for him as a lesser evil, in spite of his revolutionary program. In the congressional elections 6 months later, however, the old alignments were back in force; the right and center, Chile's traditional governing parties, fully expected to return a congress able to block untoward presidential initiative. Instead, Frei's party all but swept them away, while the far left slightly improved its position.

The result is not only a green light for Frei's Revolution With Liberty, which aims at transforming Chile's social structure, but also an unexpected revolution in its politics. The era of compromise, mutual back scratching—or sheer deadlock—is over, at least for the time being. Indeed, it is likely that disgust with political infighting played its part, as it does in Gaullist France, in this sudden emergence of a majority party. Like De Gaulle, Frei, before the landslide, had asked for a constitutional amendment permitting him to go to the people should congress become too obstructionist.

PEACEFUL REVOLUTION

The program which is now the approved blueprint for Chile's future follows closely the outlines for peaceful revolution drawn up at the Punta del Este conference as the basis for the Alliance for Progress. Emphasis is placed on achieving a social impact where it will be most immediately and dramatically evident in Chile: among the landless farm laborers and among the unorganized proletariat that swarms in city slums.

Chilean agriculture has been for some years a major reason for the imbalance of the economy. Once a net exporter of agricultural products, Chile now imports more than \$140 million worth, two-thirds of which could be produced locally. In Chile's inflationary rat race, agricultural prices have lagged behind industrial ones because of Government attempts to control the cost of the urban "market basket"; worse still, these controls have been erratic, thus discouraging rational development.

While these economic considerations are important, it is the social aspects which most concern the Christian Democrats. They point out that one-third of the population lives on the land, 60 percent is illiterate, and the death rate of infants in rural areas is 129 per thousand, shocking figures for one of the most advanced countries in Latin America. The Government goal is not, thus, just an increase in production—which they will encourage by allowing food prices to rise faster this year than those of industry—but a profound agrarian reform.

Frei has promised to distribute land to 100,000 new farmers during his 6-year term, and to provide, through cooperatives, the necessary technical and financial assistance to make the venture efficient. In this respect, his government has a valuable heritage from his predecessor, conservative president Jorge Alessandri, who got a well-articulated if somewhat mild agrarian reform law through congress in 1962. Under this law 6,000 plots have already been distributed. The present government plans to amend the law, to speed up the process of expropriation, and to allow for deferred payment of indemnities instead of cash on the line.

THE URBAN SLUMS

The program for the urban slums, which have been rebaptized "marginal neighborhoods," goes under the name Popular Promotion, a hodgepodge package aimed at bringing them into the mainstream of national life. Here, too, the Alessandri heritage gives Frei a headstart, since Alessandri built more low-cost housing than any previous President. Frei hopes to build still more, and in the existing slums to install water systems, pave the streets, put in electricity,

with labor furnished largely by the inhabitants themselves.

He is most enthusiastic about the creation of neighborhood organizations: sewing circles, teams for various sports, parent-teacher associations, and local self-government councils, which are to have the right to federate with similar councils throughout the country in order to form effective pressure groups. Frei promises that none of these activities will be linked with politics, but some of his critics wonder how it is humanly possible to keep them separate.

In neighboring Peru, President Belaúnde's similar and successful Popular Cooperation has been accused of being primarily a device for building grassroots support for his party. In any case, only 10 percent of Chile's working class is organized, in unions largely Communist-controlled, at least at the top. Organizing people "where they live as well as where they work" is thus an interesting new approach to the problem of giving civic representation to the submerged proletariat.

A third area where Frei has already achieved dramatic social impact is education. It is a shocking fact that in this country of 8½ million people of largely European extraction there were approximately 200,000 children with no school to go to. In a crash program initiated immediately on taking office in November, at the beginning of the Chilean summer, Frei organized an intensive course to train new teachers, asked existing ones voluntarily to accept longer hours, and undertook the construction of thousands of schoolrooms, as well as lodgings for teachers in remote areas.

He mobilized the good will and enthusiasm of various groups: villagers gave land and their labor and sometimes local materials; the armed forces sent their troops and equipment; 1,500 university students spent their holidays mixing mortar and laying bricks. This year, for the first time, no Chilean child will be denied the pleasures of the three R's.

Agrarian reform, public housing, and education cost money, and Chile is already overextended in the matter of foreign credit; it has received more dollars per capita in Alliance for Progress aid than any other Latin-American country. However, Frei also inherited from Alessandri an economy which, while certainly not brilliant, is still in relatively good shape. The balance of payments in 1964 showed a slight credit, thanks largely to the high price of copper and restricted imports. The growth rate was 4 percent, not too far below the Alliance goal of 5 percent.

The budget is approximately in balance, owing to a tax reform that is just beginning to show its benefits—among which Chileans count not only increased collections but a jail sentence actually enforced for a tax evader, an unheard-of phenomenon in Latin America.

THE COST OF LIVING

However, on Chile's main problem, endemic inflation, the Alessandri government, after an encouraging start, made no headway. The cost of living rose 38 percent in 1964; since 1960 it has nearly tripled. Previous attempts to stop the runaway in its tracks having failed, Frei is proposing to apply the brakes slowly. He aims for a rise of only 25 percent in 1965, with lesser rises in succeeding years until stability is reached, hopefully by 1968. However, this year he is proposing that the rise be fully compensated by wage increases, with agricultural prices and wages to be overcompensated to redress previous injustices.

In order to maintain the overall increase within the 25-percent limit, he is, therefore, insisting that industrial prices rise no more than 19 percent. In this framework, only a sharp rise in production can maintain previous profit levels. Stringent controls, more

effective than any yet devised, will be necessary to hold the line.

Financing social programs in so tight an economy thus requires some maneuvering and a high level of competence, but Frei has attracted a team of young economists from the various universities—particularly the Institute of Economics, organized some years ago by Prof. Joseph Grunwald, of Columbia—and from the United Nations Economic Commission for Latin America (ECLA), whose headquarters are in Santiago. Chileans like to call them the Brain Trust.

Service on the foreign debt, which would have absorbed more than half the export returns of the next few years, has been successfully renegotiated to provide a breathing spell. The United States has extended loans of various types for \$120 million. And Chileans themselves have been asked to make a sacrifice: a capital levy on personal property of 1.5 to 3 percent annually for a period of 5 years.

This proposal has naturally aroused the ire of the propertied classes—and not only because of the money involved. Frei was careful to cite such precedents as France's similar levy just after the war and to point to its present glowing prosperity as the result. What really upsets many Chileans is the declaration of their possessions which is implied in the levy. Income tax evasion would thereby become much more difficult. (At present, in spite of tax reform, the salaried class bears most of the burden; only 11,000 people have declared a taxable income of over \$5,000 a year.)

NEW DEAL IN COPPER

Redressing social injustice, however admirable, is nevertheless no sure cure for inflation and economic stagnation. To get the country moving, Frei has tackled the problem at its very center—copper. This metal dominates the Chilean economy; it provides more than 50 percent of foreign exchange and \$85 million annually in taxes. But five-sixths of the copper is extracted by two American companies, Anaconda and Kennecott. Although these companies pay the highest wages in the country, and the highest mining taxes in the world, the presence of two foreign colossi at the heart of the economy is a constant irritant to national pride, particularly since a good deal of the copper is refined abroad and its marketing is beyond the control of Chile.

The Marxist left has been campaigning for some time in favor of outright expropriation. The American companies have hesitated to invest in the face of this threat and the concomitant one of confiscatory taxes. Kennecott even announced a few years ago that it was not planning any further expansion in Chile and would spend its money in developing its American properties.

Frei, for his part, proposed an intermediary solution which he called the Chileanization of copper. Immediately after the election, he sent a commission to the United States to see how the new word could be defined.

The definition has turned out to be not only dramatic but eminently satisfactory to everyone concerned—except, of course, Chile's diehard Marxists. What it amounts to is a business association between the Chilean Government and the mining companies, a new departure, on a scale like this, in the whole concept of "how to do business abroad."

In two cases, that of Anaconda and the Cerro Corp.—new to Chile but already operating in Peru—Chile has acquired a 25-percent equity in new companies formed to exploit new ore beds. In the most startling agreement, that with Kennecott, Chile has bought outright 51 percent of a new company to exploit the rich El Teniente mine whose production, with the aid of Kennecott, will be vastly expanded. The companies will benefit by tax reductions and guarantees.

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while Chile feels much more master of its fate.

Similar tax benefits and other stimuli have also been offered to the smaller companies to encourage them to expand too. All this implies a tremendous increase in production. Frei announced that by the end of his term in 1970 tonnage will have doubled—to 1,200,000 tons a year—and that Chile will then be the biggest copper producer in the world. More of this copper will be refined in Chile, and Chile, with seats on the boards of directors, will have some say on how the metal is to be marketed.

Chile will doubtless continue its flirtation with the Communist bloc—it has even shipped to Red China as a gesture of defiance. At the same time, Frei has said, it will "respect with all due dignity and independence the interests of our principal consumer and biggest investor."

Chile has not been able to lay much cash on the line for these tremendous acquisitions. Its chief contribution will be in housing for miners, access roads and other construction, and the supply of power, all elements in its development plan anyway. The emphasis on mining may withdraw resources from other areas, but new foreign investment will amount to \$400 million, some of which will, of course, be disbursed within Chile itself. However, the program will not bear its full fruit until Frei's term is nearly over. "I am governing for Chile," he says, "which was not born nor does it die in one presidential term."

The long-term prospects for a significant increase in government revenues and foreign exchange are thus excellent. The problem is to survive until this ship comes in, and meanwhile to encourage other exports: iron ore, of which Chile has rich deposits, cellulose products from the Andean forests, and fish meal, where a budding enterprise hopes to emulate the Peruvian bonanza. Further industrialization within so small a market is hardly viable except with the prospect of an effective Latin American Common Market. Frei is pushing hard for a summit meeting to cut away the petty nationalist haggling which has hampered negotiations for years.

Chileans, the most civic minded of all Latin Americans, are conscious of these problems, conscious too that with the new political alignment within their country the price of failure in this experiment of revolution with liberty may be revolution without liberty. "We must show Latin America," they constantly say, "that there is an alternative to Castro."

EXCELLENT STATEMENT BY SENATOR CASE FAVORING ONE-MAN, ONE-VOTE PRINCIPLE

MR. PROXMIER. Mr. President, on May 17 the distinguished senior Senator from New Jersey [Mr. CASE] submitted a concise but remarkably complete statement before the Subcommittee on Constitutional Amendments of the Senate Committee on the Judiciary in opposition to the Dirksen reapportionment amendment.

I would like to draw the Senate's attention to two points made by Senator CASE which I believe are generally overlooked in discussions of this rotten-borough amendment.

First, far too few of the people clamoring so loudly for the adoption of the Dirksen amendment realize the damage it could do to the Negro's drive toward equal voting rights. As Senator CASE says:

If the amendment were adopted, States could and some might apportion themselves on the basis of such factors as income level, religious belief, or—most probable—color. I am sure this is not the intent of the distinguished minority leader in proposing this amendment, but recent history suggests that it could very well be the outcome.

I hope that Senators who actively supported the voting rights legislation recently passed by the Senate will take Senator CASE's comments to heart.

Second, the passage of the "rotten borough" amendment would undoubtedly mean a continuing and increasing reliance on the Federal Government to do those jobs that can and should be done at the State level. Urban interests often are the first to suffer from malapportionment. When they are blocked by a malapportioned State legislature from receiving funds for sanitation facilities, transportation lines, urban redevelopment, and countless other needs, they are forced to turn to the Federal Government. Senator CASE puts it this way:

If we had set out to hobble the already stumbling institution of State government, we could not have found a better way.

Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent to have printed at this point in the RECORD the statement by Senator CASE before the Subcommittee on Constitutional Amendments of the Committee on the Judiciary.

There being no objection, the statement was ordered to be printed in the RECORD, as follows:

STATEMENT OF SENATOR CLIFFORD P. CASE ON REAPPORTIONMENT RESOLUTION (S.J. RES. 2) SUBMITTED TO THE SUBCOMMITTEE ON CONSTITUTIONAL AMENDMENTS OF THE SENATE COMMITTEE ON THE JUDICIARY

I appreciate this opportunity to present my views on Senate Joint Resolution 2, the proposed constitutional amendment on apportionment of State legislatures.

Despite the great attention given to distracting tangential issues, the intent of the amendment is clear: it is designed to reverse the Supreme Courts historic one-man, one-vote decisions of 1964.

I am opposed to this amendment. Apart from its basic philosophy, it contains two specific and fatal flaws.

The first might be called the deep freeze. In this connection, I call attention to the provision that "the right and power to determine the composition of the legislature of a State and apportionment of the membership thereof shall remain in the people of that State."

That sentence has been interpreted by eminent constitutional authorities to mean that the courts would be frozen completely out of the picture. They could not review any apportionment. They could not correct imbalances which exist or which could be expected to arise in the future.

If a State legislature were to apportion one house on the basis of race, for instance, where could the deprived Negro citizens of that State turn for help? Certainly not to the legislature responsible for the deprivation. To the courts? Not if this amendment is adopted.

Proponents of the amendment reply, "But we have provided that the people have the right and power to determine the reapportionment plan. Doesn't this protect the public interest?"

Unfortunately, it does not. The amendment's provision for a one-shot referendum on each State's reapportionment plan would actually freeze out even the people. Once

the original apportionment plan were approved, even the voters themselves could not correct it. The New York Times called this the most serious defect of the amendment, and continued:

"It permits apportionment on a nonpopulation basis in perpetuity if such a course has once been approved by referendum. But what if the majority in the future changes its mind on this issue? Any amendment on this subject should require the States to reapportion every 10 years and require a referendum each time, to make certain that a majority still favors apportioning one house on a basis other than population. Otherwise, the outrageous malapportionments that the Supreme Court finally intervened to correct could grow up all over again."

The amendment's second defect is the blank check given to the States to use any criteria in determining their reapportionment. The phrase, "upon the basis of factors other than population," gives States a completely free hand.

Recently I attended a dinner of legislative correspondents in New Jersey. They proposed a plan, drawn up to fit within the protection of this amendment, which suggests the range which the amendment would allow the New Jersey Legislature:

"Under the plan, counties would be credited with 200,000 residents for each boardwalk, 250,000 for each ferry mooring, 1.3 for each chicken, and 5.34 for each hundred-weight of milk produced. The plan gives Somerset an extra 150,000 residents for its population of foxhounds, as determined under the last census by local hunt clubs * * * The U.S. Supreme Court has said legislators represent people, not acres, trees, cows, or pastures. The Court was eloquently silent on the specific questions of boardwalks, ferries, chicken, butter, and foxhounds."

The plan was proposed in jest, but it illustrates an important point. If the amendment were adopted, States could and some might apportion themselves on the basis of such factors as income level, religious belief, or—most probable—color. I am sure this is not the intent of the distinguished minority leader in proposing this amendment, but recent history suggests that it could very well be the outcome. The lengths to which some Southern States have gone to prevent the Negro from voting indicate that they would not be reluctant to use this amendment as an additional weapon.

The proponents of Senate Joint Resolution 2 claim it is needed in order to "protect minority rights." The rights of minorities as well as majorities must be protected, but how this should be done is another question. The supporters of this amendment seem to think that the only way to provide adequate protection of the rights of any minority is to give that particular minority a hammerlock on the legislative process. They are usually thinking of citizens in rural or less populous areas. But if the premise is true, is not every minority entitled to the same kind of consideration? That is to say, why not give every minority a hammerlock on the legislative process? Why should one minority be more equal than any or all other minorities?

The fact is that the only reliable safeguards for any minority are to be found in the Constitution and the Bill of Rights and, even more basically, in the self-restraint and respect for others on the part of the public in general.

I find it surprising that many individuals and groups which traditionally have opposed extensions in the power of the Federal Government are working for adoption of this amendment. If we had set out to hobble the already stumbling institution of State government, we could not have found a better way. The story of many of our State legis-

latures is one of stall and stalemate, indecision and inaction in the face of urgent issues.

If this amendment should pass, many of the States, already stymied in their efforts to find modern solutions to problems of growth and urbanization, will inevitably look increasingly to the Federal Government.

My colleague from Wisconsin, Senator PROXMIER, has stated the issue clearly:

"This amendment is calculated to assure the country that State government—which has been too timid, too backward, too reluctant, and as a result has seen its power and initiative go to Washington—will be slowed down to a molasses pace indefinitely. It would do so by striking down the greatest opportunity in many years which the States have had for swift progress."

If this amendment should pass, we will have set the wheels of progress turning backward for State governments. In an age of increasing urbanization and urban problems, in a period when many citizens are lamenting the growth of the Federal Government, we cannot afford to take such shortsighted action.

CARDINAL MINDSZENTY: A HERO OF OUR TIME

Mr. PROXMIER. Mr. President, on June 12 of this year Cardinal Mindszenty of Hungary celebrates the 50th anniversary of his ordination into the priesthood of the Roman Catholic Church. For a man of God, whatever religion he professes, an anniversary of this longevity deserves the honor and tribute of all men of good will.

Cardinal Mindszenty is by every meaning of the term a hero of our time. In this era of oversophistication in which we live, the noble virtues of heroism are often regarded with detached indifference and cynical disregard of their real worth. It is well, therefore, Mr. President, that on this occasion we should call the attention of our American people to those values of heroism that have elevated Cardinal Mindszenty in the esteem of all free men; for it is in the life and works of such a man that our youth and even those not so young can find the example of a great and noble life well lived.

What are the attributes of Cardinal Mindszenty for which he deserves to be called a hero of our time?

Mr. President, first of all, I would single out the cardinal's unflinching fidelity to his God and to his church. This great Hungarian, this extraordinary man of God, absolutely refused to deny his interior religious commitments. And this he did under the most soul-shattering conditions of Communist imprisonment which are familiar to us all. Cardinal Mindszenty could not be broken. He was a rock that could not be shattered. Where other men may have surrendered to the temptations wrought by a sense of tragic futility, this great European held firm.

Mr. President, in this volatile era of shifting loyalties and of altering principles, in this time where practicality, expediency, and the pernicious adaptability of one's deepest values is a guiding norm for far too many people, it is a glorious experience to behold a man, who surrounded by his enemies would say, I will not submit, I will not break.

Such a man, Mr. President, is, indeed, a hero.

Such a man, Mr. President, is Cardinal Mindszenty.

There is still another quality that I would point to as indicating the virtue that is this man, and it is the cardinal's unflinching fidelity to his country and to the cause of freedom.

In every way Cardinal Mindszenty was a Hungarian patriot. Yes, Mr. President, he was a fighter against all oppression of his country, a fighter against the oppression of the spirit of man. He was a freedom fighter who has never lost faith in his country, in his people, and in man's inner desire to seek the good life in freedom.

What assures Cardinal Mindszenty a place in the hall of fame of all freemen, Mr. President, is not so much his fidelity to his God and church and his fidelity to his country and people—it is not so much this reality which is a quality commonly held by many men, as it is the fact that this man's values, his honor, his spirit, his whole being as a man had been tested by the enemy, and he did not falter. He did not take the easy way out. He held firmly to his most sacred values, values embodied in his love of God and country.

Mr. President, we do honor to ourselves when we pay tribute to this great Hungarian; for in honoring him we reassert those values that we Americans have always cherished as part of our own tradition.

And, Mr. President, when we honor this Hungarian patriot, we honor, too, the great and fearless people of Hungary; for to them Cardinal Mindszenty has come to symbolize the Hungarian spirit of freedom.

On this 50th anniversary of Cardinal Mindszenty's ordination to the priesthood, let us, therefore, extend our best wishes to this truly great and holy man, for his life has been and shall always be an inspiration to all men who seek freedom for the spirit of all men.

IMPROVEMENT OF OPERATION AND ADMINISTRATION OF ANTIDUMPING ACT OF 1921

Mr. HARTKE. Mr. President, on May 26, I introduced S. 2045, on behalf of myself, the distinguished Senator from Pennsylvania [Mr. SCOTT], and 21 other Senators, a bill aimed at improving the operation and administration of the Antidumping Act of 1921. An editorial in the Washington Post of June 1 displays an apparent misunderstanding about the intent and significance of this legislation.

The bill now has 29 Senate cosponsors, as well as 93 in the House of Representatives making a total of 122, and I am confident that they are just as disturbed as I am to be characterized, as the title of the editorial states, as "protectionists at work." I should like to add that the Senator from Pennsylvania [Mr. SCOTT] joins me in placing this statement before the Senate.

The editorial is devoted to criticism of both the Orderly Marketing Act of 1965 and the newly revised Antidumping Act amendment. Without attempting at this time to go into the merits

of the editorial's remarks about the former, of which Senator MUSKIE is the principal sponsor and I am a cosponsor, I would like—on behalf of myself, Senator SCOTT, and other cosponsors of the antidumping legislation, including the initial sponsor of the bill in the House of Representatives, A. SYDNEY HERLONG, JR.—to object to recurring Post editorial attempts to cloud the issues surrounding the unfair trade practice of dumping by raising the old and convenient cry of "protectionist" whenever a piece of legislation is introduced which would attempt to curb international price discrimination.

Anyone who takes the time to examine the 1921 Antidumping Act, and the amendment which I and a number of my colleagues are proposing, will readily discern that imports would not be denied entry or prevented from being sold in our markets; they merely would be placed on a fair, competitive price basis if their importation at a dumping price injures American producers. The amendment certainly is not protectionist in going along with the Treasury practice of allowing foreign producers to lower their home market prices in order to eliminate the margin of dumping on sales to the United States, and thereby terminate dumping cases at the Treasury level through an appropriate price adjustment. Where no such adjustment is made, and then only if the Tariff Commission finds the dumped imports to be injurious, a special dumping duty is calculated by Treasury to bring the price back up to the price level at which the product was sold in the country of export.

This is a far cry from the editorial's charge that proponents of this legislation "cling stubbornly to the belief that this country can continue to be the world's largest exporter while closing its gates to the products of other countries." Responsible journalism, it would seem, might not have resorted so readily to the old clichés, nor to misleading assumptions. I shall briefly explain what I have in mind.

Editorials in the Post along similar lines followed the introduction in 1963 of a predecessor bill proposed as an amendment to the U.S. Antidumping Act and prompted then Senator, now Vice President, HUBERT HUMPHREY, its principal sponsor, to speak up as I am doing today to set the record straight. I might add that I was a cosponsor of the 1963 bill, and I feel that his remarks, which appeared in the CONGRESSIONAL RECORD of May 27, 1963, are as pertinent today as they were 2 years ago.

I am, however, disturbed by the apparent lack of understanding displayed in these editorials toward the objectives of the Antidumping Act itself. In the editorial of May 13, the Post asserts that "any attempt to eliminate international competition by means of the inflexible Antidumping Act procedures will invite retaliations that can only work to the disadvantage of the free world." The April 23 editorial refers to the operation of the Antidumping Act as an example of the "discredited, protectionist policies which have inhibited international trade in the past."

Certainly my vigorous advocacy of expansionist trade policies is a matter of public

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[From the San Francisco (Calif.) Examiner,
May 27, 1965]

HIGHHANDED

An amazing combination of bureaucratic arrogance and highhanded procedure has developed in the wake of the U.S. appellate court ruling that certain Atomic Energy Commission powers are subject to the priority of local ordinances.

This was the decision that would prevent construction of AEC overhead powerlines contrary to the objections of the city of Woodside and San Mateo County.

A joint Senate-House subcommittee hearing today is the instrument of AEC retaliation. The measure before the subcommittee would give the AEC powers superior to those of the States and local communities in such matters. Only the alertness of Congressman J. ARTHUR YOUNGER kept the hearing from being closed to opponents. No time for preparation of objections was allowed.

The overriding AEC powers proposed would extend far beyond Woodside's esthetic concerns. President Johnson's call for a concerted national campaign to protect scenic values would be ignored, with the executive right hand seemingly not knowing what the left hand is doing.

These are the rawest sort of railroad tactics, contemptuous of orderly procedures. Amendment of the Atomic Energy Act for the purpose of elevating the AEC to virtually dictatorial position is full of danger. If undertaken at all, it should be in the full light of day, not as a deliberate short circuiting of a court decision that properly upheld the sovereignty of laws at the community level.

[From the Los Angeles (Calif.) Times, June 4, 1965]

POWER PLAY: WOODSIDE VERSUS THE AEC

Woodside, Calif., has a very small population but a very large sense of principle.

Residents of Woodside, for instance, believe that even the Atomic Energy Commission should obey the Federal statutes requiring compliance with local ordinances. Specifically, they insist that the Commission should not violate Woodside city laws by installing overhead powerlines to the AEC's linear accelerator project at Stanford University.

The second highest Federal court in the land agreed with Woodside. In a unanimous decision, the U.S. circuit court of appeals ruled that under the Atomic Energy Act of 1954 the Commission does not have the power to override local ordinances "with respect to the generation, sale or transmission of power."

AEC officials had protested that underground installation of the powerlines as required by Woodside (and other surrounding communities) would substantially increase the cost of the service. This is true, although the estimates vary. Pacific Gas & Electric said it would help make up some of the difference and the town of Woodside voted to contribute \$150,000 by quadrupling its municipal tax rate.

The Atomic Energy Commission, however, decided that instead of complying with the law, it would change it.

Bills were quickly introduced to amend the current statute to allow the AEC to ignore local regulations. This week the ex post facto legislation was heard by a Joint Atomic Energy subcommittee, where it received predictably strong support.

The arguments, however, smacked more of expediency than equity. In effect, the bills would set the pattern for any Federal agency to demand overhead powerlines whatever the local regulations. President Johnson's plea to preserve natural beauty had appar-

ently fallen on deaf ears—or on ears more sensitive to demands for an unnecessary expansion of AEC power.

Woodside may lose its fight, if the AEC bills can be pushed through Congress. But a lot of other cities, big and small, also will have lost.

[From the Palo Alto (Calif.) Times, May 21, 1965]

SAY "UNCLE" TO WOODSIDE, UNCLE

Cheers for the U.S. district court of appeals decision that the U.S. Atomic Energy Commission cannot ram its overhead powerlines down the throat of unwilling Woodside.

This victory of a rustic little community over the awesome Federal Government should hearten all those who believe right, not might, must prevail in our Republic.

But more than a David beating a Goliath is involved. The narrow issues of the case seem to rest on the facts that Woodside had an ordinance requiring powerlines to be placed underground, and that the AEC's chartering legislation forbids it to transmit electricity in violation of Federal, State, or local regulations.

More broadly, though, the issue is whether Woodside as a municipal corporation has the right to protect its scenery, and whether Uncle Sam, if he would come through Woodside with his tapline to supply power to the Stanford Linear Accelerator Center, must respect that right.

A view has measurable value in Woodside—ask any real estate salesman. It is up to the AEC like any good neighbor to obey local regulations and not to mar the landscape.

As we asserted more than a year ago, the contention that the AEC cannot afford to pay more to bury the lies is abusive nonsense. So is the idea that action must be stampeded because the \$114 million research tool is almost ready to operate. Delay would be no issue if the AEC had agreed to undergrounding 14 months ago.

In short, there is no basic problem here that money cannot solve. May the U.S. Supreme Court keep these points in mind if the AEC appeals—and may "remember Woodside" become a watchword reminding Washington to remain respectful of local interests.

[From the Washington (D.C.) Post, June 8, 1965]

BEAUTY AND THE AEC

The threats to the American landscape include, unfortunately, the Federal Government itself. While President Johnson is very emphatically a defender of the continent's natural beauty, the Government over which he presides is notoriously a house of many mansions. Its great regulatory powers, and its massive construction budgets, are most commonly controlled by agencies of specific and narrow interests that offer no very profound consideration to the esthetics of the countryside.

When a New York power company decided to build a massive generating complex at Storm King Mountain on the Hudson River, protesting citizens discovered that their only appeal lay with the Federal Power Commission. But that Commission is primarily responsible for guaranteeing sufficient generating capacity. Now the Atomic Energy Commission wants to string a high-voltage line, in violation of local laws, across a strikingly beautiful mountainside not far from San Francisco. The opponents, who are numerous, have discovered that their last appeal lies with the Joint Congressional Committee on Atomic Energy, which is preparing legislation to permit the Atomic Energy Commission to override the local

ordinances. The Joint Committee appears, not unnaturally, a great deal more concerned with hooking up the new high-energy accelerator at Stanford than with protecting the Pacific skyline.

The President cannot be expected personally to take up every intricate dispute between beauty and the builders. But he can devise an appeals procedure so that single-minded Federal agencies and congressional committees would no longer sit as the final judges of their own construction projects.

[From the New York (N.Y.) Times,
June 8, 1965]

HIGH POWER

Apparently word of President Johnson's concern for conserving the natural landscape has not reached the Atomic Energy Commission.

The AEC is determined to win its fight to string high-power transmission lines anywhere it pleases. For more than a year, the Commission has been engaged in a struggle over this issue with the residents of Woodside, Calif., a town 30 miles south of San Francisco. The agency wants to take possession of a strip of land 100 feet wide and 5.3 miles long, running through picturesque hills and heavy woods, and erect an overhead line on poles and towers ranging from 70 to 120 feet high. The line would carry electricity to a linear accelerator being built at Stanford University.

The residents of Woodside, pointing out that county zoning forbids overhead powerlines, urged the AEC to place the lines underground, rather than scar the countryside. Instead, the AEC went to court—and lost. On May 20, the Federal Court of Appeals upheld Woodside, basing its decision on a section of the 1954 Atomic Energy Act. Undaunted, the AEC turned to its friends in Congress. On May 25—the same day that the White House Conference on Natural Beauty opened—Senators PASTORE and HICKENLOOPER and Representative HOLIFIELD, the ranking members of the Joint Committee on Atomic Energy, introduced a bill to exempt the AEC from such local and State zoning regulations. Hearings were scheduled immediately with no advance notice.

Estimates of the cost of putting the lines underground range from \$2 to \$4 million, but either figure is small compared to the total cost of the linear accelerator. Moreover, Woodside, a wealthy town, has offered to quadruple its taxes for the next year to help pay part of the added costs for the underground line.

These local considerations, however, are less important than the principles involved. Even in the absence of a Presidential push for protecting the natural environment, Federal agencies should respect local conservation requirements. No committee of Congress should attempt to rush through a law with the imperiousness the Joint Committee on Atomic Energy is showing. The public looks to Congress to curb rather than to abet high-powered bureaucratic arrogance.

[From the Santa Barbara (Calif.) News-Press, June 3, 1965]

ATOMIC POWER PLAY AT WOODSIDE

There is a deplorable measure of Federal agency arrogance being displayed by the Atomic Energy Commission in its dispute with the tiny bay area community of Woodside.

Source of the controversy is the AEC's determination to send a grotesque army of powerline structures marching across Woodside's foothills, through town, and on to the Stanford linear accelerator.

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The community has battled this project for years. It incorporated in 1956 to preserve its hill and forest beauties; passed zoning laws to prohibit overhead powerlines of the size proposed; voted to quadruple its tax rate for a specified period to raise \$150,000 toward putting the lines underground—and it won an important court decision. On May 20, the U.S. circuit court of appeals ruled that the AEC cannot build its line overhead in disregard of local ordinances.

The AEC promptly ran to Congress, asking last week for legislation stating flatly that such a matter is not subject to local regulation. It got an immediate bill introduced and a rush hearing before the legislative subcommittee of the Joint Congressional Committee on Atomic Energy. The subcommittee heard opening statements last Thursday.

Talk about nuclear power.

Central arguments of the AEC relate to expense. It would cost \$668,000 to string the powerlines overhead, it said—\$2,640,000 to bury them. It emphasized that if the lines are not installed soon the staff at the accelerator will be standing around and doing little but collecting salaries and running up total costs of \$1,500,000 a month.

We submit that while all of this is deplorable, it is not the fault of a tiny but doughty community fighting to preserve itself and the very natural beauties so loudly heralded as desirable by the President of the United States. The fault might rather lie with a Federal agency's hard-nosed attempt to have its way if it has to run roughshod over the courts and have its own laws tailor-made.

The wishes and ordinance of local communities in which the AEC operates certainly deserve a lot more consideration than Woodside is getting.

Hearings resumed this week in this attempt to aim a Federal law directly at a community and its ordinances.

On the basis of information to date, the legislation should be scrapped.

Mr. KUCHEL. Mr. President, a few years ago, the late Senator Richard Neuberger, of Oregon, and I jointly sponsored an amendment to the interstate highway legislation, providing an incentive to the States to regulate outdoor advertising on portions of the new Interstate Highway System which the Federal Government was underwriting at a cost of 90 percent. In a debate in the Senate, against vigorous bipartisan opposition, the views of the late Senator Neuberger and myself, prevailed on a rollcall vote. It will be a sad day for anybody who enjoys what the great God above us gave us all across the country if the Senate were to approve this backward legislation, which, as I say, may be before us in the next few days or weeks.

I hope Senators may take occasion to read the newspaper comments that I have placed in the RECORD and will study the situation, for I earnestly hope the Senate may in its wisdom repudiate this attempt by a great Government agency to override local concern and our judicial system. I hope the Senate will reject the proposed legislation.

ESCALATION OF THE VIETNAM STRUGGLE

Mr. JAVITS. Mr. President, the State Department announced yesterday that Gen. William C. Westmoreland, who heads the U.S. military assistance command in South Vietnam, has been given authority to commit U.S. troops to combat in South Vietnam on request by

South Vietnamese commanders, provided only that U.S. troops are not to engage in combat strictly on their own, but are to fight alongside South Vietnamese forces.

To the American people this announcement is very reminiscent of Korea.

It is another escalation of U.S. participation in the struggle, yet it comes as no surprise. Not only has this decision been rumored for several days, but it has been apparent for weeks now that the United States was moving slowly toward a greatly increased ground combat role for U.S. forces in South Vietnam. This movement has not been imperceptible, but it has been gradual and undramatic enough to forestall any significant public reaction. Yet the stark facts are that there are more than 50,000 N.S. troops now in South Vietnam as against about 14,000 when President Johnson took office only 18 months ago. We now hear rumors that 100,000 or more troops will be in South Vietnam soon. Under present orders, our troops will still be on extended action within a country which wants us within its borders—South Vietnam. But will U.S. troops tomorrow be called on to follow on the ground the air bombardment of North Vietnam?

We have been moving in the direction of a massive, bogdown land struggle in Asia without any specific consent by Congress or the people for that kind of war. Although the President has the power, for all practical purposes, to commit the United States to such a struggle, I have said on many occasions over the last 2 months that it would be disastrous for this country if the President were to use that power without first asking Congress for a resolution—similar to the joint resolution of August 10, 1964—to authorize specifically an expansion of the U.S. military role in the Vietnamese struggle onto such a new and qualitatively different level. Without a mandate from the Congress and the people, a U.S. land struggle in Asia could engender criticism and division in the country that will make recent protests over our Vietnam policy look like a high school picnic.

News reports describe this new combat role for U.S. troops in Vietnam as a future one. It is still not too late. Once again, I request the President not to permit this new level of U.S. participation in the ground struggle to occur without obtaining the kind of mandate from Congress and from the people which, alone, can make such a policy feasible without grave divisions in the country. Once again I say the Congress will undoubtedly support the President. But just as he could not forgo the salutary announcement of U.S. willingness to negotiate—although he felt he had said it many times before—so he cannot forego the salutary effect of a congressional debate and action on this new and crucial U.S. policy in Vietnam.

Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent that an editorial entitled "Congress and Vietnam," which appeared in the New York Times of June 7, 1965, together with an article by John W. Finney

entitled "Johnson Permits U.S. Units To Fight If Saigon Asks Aid." And an editorial entitled "Ground War In Asia," both published in the New York Times today, be printed at this point in the RECORD.

There being no objection, the article and editorials ordered to be printed in the RECORD, as follows:

[From New York (N.Y.) Times, June 7, 1965]

CONGRESS AND VIETNAM

Signs are growing of congressional interest in ending the "leave it to Lyndon" era in American foreign policy.

There is Senator Fulbright's new proposal to give the OAS a major voice in channeling American military assistance to Latin America. There is the provision in the new foreign aid bill for a thorough-going congressional investigation and for terminating the aid program in its present form in 1967.

There is the trip to Europe, at their own expense, of four House Republicans to investigate the crisis in NATO. And there are the recent criticisms of administration policy in Vietnam and the Dominican Republic by Senator Robert F. Kennedy, plus his current charge that the United States is neither meeting its aid responsibilities to the underdeveloped countries nor identifying itself with the world revolution under way in those areas.

Factors that go beyond the President's limited experience in foreign affairs and the extraordinary vacillations in Dominican policy have set off the present questioning at home and abroad. The reluctance of Secretary of State Rusk to employ the full resources of his department and give independent advice, the meager use made by the President of non-official task forces in the foreign policy field, the overdependence on military and intelligence agencies and the divorce between the Administration and the Nation's intellectuals—all point to a need for more vigorous congressional interest.

Nowhere is this more vital than on Vietnam, where grave constitutional questions are raised by the official acknowledgment of an increasing combat role for American troops. During the 18 months of the Johnson administration, the number of American troops in Vietnam has been tripled to about 46,500; a further build-up to more than 60,000 appears imminent. American planes have entered into combat both in South and North Vietnam—in the latter case openly attacking a foreign country with no declaration of war. American warships have bombarded the North Vietnamese coast. And there are indications that American ground troops—first employed as advisers in South Vietnam, then deployed to defend American installations and now directly engaged in patrolling action—will soon take on a full combat role as a tactical reserve aiding South Vietnamese units in trouble.

Yet, at no point has there been significant congressional discussion, much less direct authorization of what amounts to a decision to wage war. That is why 28 Democratic Congressmen, on the initiative of Representative ROSENTHAL of Queens, now have wisely asked the chairman of the House Foreign Affairs Committee to hold public hearings on the administration's Vietnam policy.

American casualties in Vietnam, while still relatively minor, already exceed those of the Spanish-American War. The choices open to the President are exceedingly difficult ones; they should not be his alone, either as a matter of sound policy or of constitutional obligation. If he takes it upon himself to make an American war out of the Vietnamese tragedy—without seeking congressional and national consent—he may open the country to divisions even more dangerous than those that developed out of the Korean conflict.

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[From the New York (N.Y.) Times,
June 9, 1965]

JOHNSON PERMITS U.S. UNITS TO FIGHT IF SAIGON ASKS AID—PRESIDENT GIVES AMERICAN COMMANDER AUTHORITY TO COMMIT GI'S TO BATTLE—REQUEST IS LIKELY SOON—POLICY DECISION PROMPTED BY INCREASING CONCERN OVER BIG VIETCONG OFFENSIVE
(By John W. Finney)

WASHINGTON, June 8.—President Johnson has authorized his commanders in Vietnam to commit U.S. ground forces to combat if their assistance is requested by the South Vietnamese Army.

The State Department said today that the authority to order American ground forces into combat, under the policy decision made by President Johnson in recent weeks, had been delegated to Gen. William C. Westmoreland, who heads the U.S. military assistance command in South Vietnam.

Whether the United States implements this decision—and thus takes another major step in its deepening involvement in the Vietnamese war—depends largely upon South Vietnam's Government and upon the military circumstances.

SHIFT FROM PASSIVE ROLE

A request for U.S. combat troops is expected in the near future from the South Vietnamese if the Vietcong step up their current offensive.

In the last 3 months, U.S. ground troops in South Vietnam have been gradually moving from a passive to an active combat role.

Marines and army paratroops, originally sent in to provide "perimeter defense" for key installations, have undertaken active patrolling miles from the bases they are defending. In the course of this patrolling, they have frequently engaged in combat with Vietcong guerrillas.

Thus far, they have acted largely on their own, without the support of Vietnam forces.

CONFIRMATION BY McCLOSKEY

What is contemplated now is a significant step beyond the defense of American bases, with American troops participating in offensive or defensive actions by the South Vietnamese Army.

Official confirmation of the Johnson administration's decision came when Robert J. McCloskey, the State Department spokesman, was asked by reporters what the likely response would be to a South Vietnamese request for combat assistance.

He replied that U.S. military commanders in Saigon had made it clear to the South Vietnamese Government that "American forces would be available for combat support together with Vietnamese forces when and if necessary."

Thus far, according to the State Department, no request for American combat assistance has been received from the South Vietnamese Army. Such a request, however, is viewed as inevitable, particularly since the United States has now virtually invited it by openly offering combat assistance.

At least for the present, the administration is not contemplating a general offensive by U.S. forces operating on their own. Instead, American troops are to serve as a reserve force, coming to the assistance of Vietnamese forces if they are overwhelmed or pinned down by the Communist guerrillas.

Mr. McCloskey said the "coordination" arrangements between American and Vietnamese commanders were "still being worked out." While fighting "shoulder to shoulder" with Vietnamese troops, the American forces would fight as a unit under an American officer.

"BEST MILITARY JUDGMENT"

Mr. McCloskey said the decision to embark upon the expanded combat role was the "result of the best military judgment as to what is required in the situation ahead." From its timing, it was apparent that the decision was

prompted by a mounting concern over the current Communist offensive.

The offensive had been expected during the current monsoon season, when the mobility of the South Vietnamese Army and American airpower would be restricted by rainy weather. What has surprised and disturbed officials, however, is the force, sometimes in reinforced battalion strength, that the Vietcong have been able to throw into the offensive.

It has become increasingly evident to officials, as they analyze the strength of the Vietcong forces, that the American bombing raids in North Vietnam and Laos have failed in their principal military objective of curtailing the strength of the guerrilla forces by interdicting the flow of supplies and men from the north.

MORE U.S. TROOPS HELD NEEDED

In view of the possibility that the Vietcong may force a military showdown this summer, administration officials were driven to the conclusion that American combat support was required to stiffen the South Vietnamese Army and to prevent its possible psychological collapse in the face of the Communist offensive.

These officials recognize that the decision, carries with it some risk of a corresponding stepup on the Communist side. But their appraisal is that the expansion of an already existing combat role would not provoke a Communist escalation of the war.

Officials indicated that the expanded combat role would necessitate the assignment of additional American troops to South Vietnam. There now are about 52,000 American troops there, but the combat forces are limited to 12,000 marines and 3,600 paratroops of the 173d Airborne Brigade.

Officials are now talking of a buildup to about 70,000 men in the immediate months ahead. Many of the reinforcements, however, will be logistical rather than combat troops.

Mr. McCloskey said the authority to commit the American forces to combat rested upon the President's constitutional powers as Commander in Chief of the Armed Forces.

Additional authority, he said, was provided by the congressional resolution, approved last August, which authorized the President to take all necessary steps, including the use of armed force to assist South Vietnam in defense of its freedom.

[From the New York (N.Y.) Times, June 9, 1965]

GROUND WAR IN ASIA

The American people were told by a minor State Department official yesterday that, in effect, they were in a land war on the continent of Asia. This is only one of the extraordinary aspects of the first formal announcement that a decision has been made to commit American ground forces to open combat in South Vietnam: The Nation is informed about it not by the President, not by a Cabinet member, not even by a sub-Cabinet official, but by a public relations officer.

There is still no official explanation offered for a move that fundamentally alters the character of the American involvement in Vietnam. A program of weapons supply, training, and combat advice to South Vietnamese, initiated by Presidents Eisenhower and Kennedy, has now been transformed by President Johnson into an American war against Asians.

It was the bombing of North Vietnam that led, in turn, to the use of American jet aircraft in South Vietnam and the emplacement of American marines and paratroops to defend American airbases. Now, with American air support hampered by the monsoon rains, American ground troops are to be made available as a tactical reserve to help South Vietnamese units in trouble.

It can all be made to sound like a gradual

and inevitable outgrowth of earlier commitments. Yet the whole development has occurred in a 4-month span, just after an election in which the administration campaigned on the issue of its responsibility and restraint in foreign military involvements.

Since March, American forces in Vietnam have been more than doubled to 52,000, as compared with 14,000 when President Johnson took office. Additional troops are moving in and a buildup to 70,000 is indicated. There has been neither confirmation nor denial for reports that a force exceeding 100,000 is planned including three full Army and Marine divisions. Nor is there any clarification on whether the so-called "combat support" role now authorized—combat in support of South Vietnamese units—is to be transformed later into offensive "clear and hold" operations of a kind hitherto carried out only by South Vietnamese forces. Apart from the obvious difficulty American troops would have in distinguishing guerrillas from the surrounding population, such a war ultimately might absorb as many American troops as were employed in Korea.

A major factor in the original escalation decision—the decision to bomb North Vietnam—was the political crisis in Saigon after eight changes of government in little more than a year. The bombing was urged upon President Johnson as the only way to shore up morale, halt the factional feuding, and prevent a complete political collapse in South Vietnam.

Is it only a coincidence that the decision to enter the ground war has come during another political crisis in Saigon? There may be a need to prop up the government of Premier Phan Huy Quat against the Catholic and southern factions which made a constitutional issue out of his recent Cabinet reshuffle and still seek to bring him down. But is it not more likely that political irresponsibility in Saigon will grow, rather than decline, as the main military responsibility for defending South Vietnam is transferred increasingly to American hands?

The country deserves answers to this and many other questions. It has been taken into a ground war by Presidential decision when there is no emergency that would seem to rule out congressional debate. The duty now is for reassurance from the White House that the Nation will be informed on where it is being led and that Congress will be consulted before another furious upward whirl is taken on the escalation spiral.

Mr. AIKEN. Mr. President, will the Senator yield for a question?

Mr. JAVITS. I yield.

Mr. AIKEN. Does the Senator think that Congress should declare war?

Mr. JAVITS. I do not.

Mr. AIKEN. Does the Senator think the Congress should declare war to relieve the President of all responsibility for what has been done and what it is planned to do? Congress would do so if it were asked to declare war.

Mr. JAVITS. I believe that is true. However, I hope that Congress will not do it.

Mr. AIKEN. Congress would do it if it were asked to do so by the President. If that were to happen, the President would be relieved of responsibility. It would take him off the hook. It would be exactly what he wants. I am sure of that and I cannot say that I blame him.

Mr. JAVITS. I agree with the Senator from Vermont that if the President were to ask Congress to declare war, it would probably do so. But I think that would be most unwise.

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The PRESIDING OFFICER. The time of the Senator from New York has expired.

Mr. JAVITS. Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent that I be permitted to continue for an additional 3 minutes.

The PRESIDING OFFICER. Without objection, the Senator from New York is recognized for an additional 3 minutes.

Mr. JAVITS. Mr. President, I hope that will not be done. I believe that modern techniques are so subtle that we are better off not having a formal declaration of war. I do believe, however, that what is tantamount to that—in terms of tying the Congress and the people in with the President—is for the President to come to us for an expression of opinion now, when it seems rather clear that the situation is about to escalate into a major ground struggle.

I have served in the military. I understand what is meant by offensive patrol. I also understand what is meant by offensive action to protect the peace—which is what we are about to engage in. It seems that we are headed in the direction of the board scale use of ground forces which would be tantamount to war.

I believe that under the present situation, the President ought to come to us so that we may have a voice in the decision, along with him, without a declaration of war, which is unnecessary, and which, in my judgment, is too primitive for the times.

I hold to the line of thought between the two schools—on the one hand, those who are ready to "go get them wherever they are," and, on the other hand, those who want us to pull out.

I believe that the best thing to do would be to have Congress join with the President in a solemn, national determination and debate to decide on the proper course of action. I believe that, just as the President erred for a long time, until he made his speech at Johns Hopkins, in not being willing to express fully our policy in Vietnam—at which point, the country backed him to the hilt—I think he is erring now in not giving Congress a chance to debate this issue—as I am trying to encourage my colleagues to do—with a view to coming to a vote on the question of whether we approve the line of policy that is being pursued. We followed that course in respect to Lebanon. We followed that course last August in respect to what we had been doing in Vietnam. We must follow that course now if we are to move to a new plateau in the struggle in Vietnam.

That is what I urge the President to do. I have little doubt that if the President were to do so, we would back him. However, if the President does not follow such a course, the country will, of necessity, in the course of time, face a situation which could be damaging to our whole effort.

If Congress were to back the President, it would temper the policy and make it a policy of both the President and the people.

Mr. GRUENING. Mr. President, will the Senator yield?

Mr. JAVITS. I yield.

Mr. McGEE. Mr. President, a parliamentary inquiry.

Mr. GRUENING. The Senator from New York has yielded to me for a question.

I should like to ask the distinguished Senator from New York if he does not think that the President received the consent of Congress when he got the resolution last August, with only two Senators voting against it, which resolution gave the President the unlimited authority to use the Armed Forces of the United States anywhere he saw fit in southeast Asia. I voted against that resolution, but it was enacted.

The PRESIDING OFFICER. The time of the Senator has expired.

Mr. JAVITS. Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent that I may be permitted to continue for 1 additional minute.

The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Senator from New York is recognized for 1 additional minute.

Mr. JAVITS. Mr. President, the President did not need authority last August. He does not need authority now. He has authority as Commander in Chief. He sought the advice of Congress last August, and, in my judgment, in the interest of our national policy, he should again seek the advice of Congress. That is what I ask him to do.

The PRESIDING OFFICER. The time of the Senator from New York has expired.

Mr. GRUENING. Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent that I may be permitted to speak for 3 minutes.

The PRESIDING OFFICER. Without objection, it is so ordered.

Mr. GRUENING. Mr. President, the senior Senator from New York has expressed his view that the President had the authority, without the resolution, to wage the kind of war that we have been waging, including the bombing of another country from the air without any specific authorization from Congress. I disagree most emphatically with that statement. Without that resolution he could not have sent our planes to bomb North Vietnam.

We are now waging an undeclared war in southeast Asia. However, the President takes the position, and understandably so, that when Congress approved the resolution, it gave him the power to wage war anywhere in southeast Asia with the use of armed forces as he saw fit. He did get that authorization. Therefore, it would seem to me that the suggestion of the senior Senator from New York that we now need a further declaration of war or a further declaration of some kind by Congress is superfluous. He voted to give the President all the authority the President needs.

The PRESIDING OFFICER. The time of the Senator from Alaska has expired.

Mr. GRUENING. Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent that I may be permitted to continue for an additional 3 minutes.

The PRESIDING OFFICER. Without objection, it is so ordered.

Mr. GRUENING. Mr. President, I

was one of the two in the Congress who voted against that resolution. I feared precisely what is happening now in southeast Asia. I feared that the war would escalate, as it is steadily doing. We are actually engaged in an undeclared war with steady mounting casualties. While the President has a perfect right to feel quite justified in assuming that he has the consent of Congress because of the overwhelming vote on that resolution, I still share the view that the action was unconstitutional and that we are waging war without a specific declaration of war.

I am not prepared to urge that Congress declare war. However, I think that the situation is getting to be very much more dangerous than my colleagues who voted for the resolution expected. If my colleagues had read the resolution, they would have seen that the authorization for the President to use the Armed Forces as he saw fit was clearly spelled out, and they might have anticipated what is happening and what will happen in the future. That is one of the reasons that I voted against the resolution. I have had no reason to regret it.

I deeply feel that what we are getting into is tragic. We are going to lose thousands of American lives in a war that we are not going to win ultimately, that is going to have to be settled at the conference table, as was the Korean war. I think we ought to get to it before we lose far more lives and get into a greater tragedy.

Mr. McGEE. Mr. President, will the Senator yield?

Mr. GRUENING. I yield.

Mr. McGEE. I do not think the times afford us the luxury of a semantic debate over the meaning of "war" and "waging of war." Because of the nature of modern warfare and the changing times of which we are a part, a rigid constitutional definition of whether we are in war or not seems to me to be, from the practical viewpoint, irrelevant.

I think we must remember that we are living in times when it is possible to conduct warfare without an old-fashioned declaration of war. As the senior Senator from New York said, there are certain ramifications involved in having a formal declaration of war. I think the Senator from Alaska will agree that we do not want a formal declaration of war at the present time. This is an entirely different area of political contest, and if it can be resolved without the formality of a declaration of war, I think we agree this would be the better course.

Likewise, what has been transpired in Vietnam has been in accordance with the resolution of last August, and there was the support of Congress for new appropriations needed for this struggle. In view of the President's repeated declaration of these matters, I would think that no other declaration in particular from Congress is in order at this time, though I appreciate the question the Senator from New York raises because of what changing demands in Vietnam may require.

Mr. JAVITS. To me there is no juridical issue. The President, as Commander in Chief, has the right to dispatch troops

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to protect the interests of the United States anywhere in the world. That fact is acknowledged completely. Under the doctrine of protecting that interest, the President definitely has the right to reach out wherever it is necessary. When our ships were attacked in Tonkin Bay, we responded by attacking back. The President has that right because he is Commander in Chief. But we understand that present events can lead to major international war, and the President should have the advice and consent of Congress, joining its will and that of the American people to his, in order to keep pace—

The PRESIDING OFFICER. The time of the Senator has expired.

Mr. JAVITS. I ask unanimous consent for 1 additional minute.

The PRESIDING OFFICER. Without objection, it is so ordered.

Mr. JAVITS. In order to keep pace with such problems as may arise. The resolution process is new, but it is a good one, because it enables Congress and the people to express themselves as being in agreement, and then the President can proceed together with the whole country. I urge that it be done on the highest policy level. This will make the President's position stronger and that of Congress stronger, and the whole country will be stronger and in a better position in South Vietnam.

Mr. McGEE. Mr. President, before the time runs out, I ask unanimous consent that I may have 1 additional minute.

The PRESIDING OFFICER. Without objection, it is so ordered.

Mr. McGEE. It seems to me, if I may say so to the Senator from New York, the issues have been so clearly drawn in the Vietnamese struggle, the reasons, in the President's judgment, and the judgment of many of us, have been defined time and time again that for us to request a kind of succession of congressional reaffirmations of faith in itself would not have the salutary effect that the Senator from New York has envisioned.

The PRESIDING OFFICER. The time of the Senator has expired.

Mr. McGEE. I ask unanimous consent to have 1 additional minute.

The PRESIDING OFFICER. Without objection, it is so ordered.

Mr. McGEE. If we were to go the route which has been suggested, perhaps we would still try to define the dimensions of it. I think the dimensions have been clearly drawn, and we know it is going to take time, and a long time, before we have run the course of testing the President's solemn declarations short of what we all hope to avoid—namely, a major war. For that reason, I think the Senator from New York's suggestion would not necessarily have the impact he suggests.

Mr. JAVITS. The Senator and I are not arguing the issue on the basis of time or cost. I am suggesting that we are getting onto a new plateau of activity, in which we could possibly move troops on the ground outside of South Vietnam in the proximate future, which would be a new situation vis-a-vis all of Asia, including Communist China. I think such

an event includes a decision of such profundity that the Congress and the people ought to have an opportunity to consider it and have an opportunity to follow the traditional course which we have acted on in a number of cases, and which I regard as necessary when we contemplate a different kind of danger. Let us not make such a decision except in the most considered way in which it is possible for us to do it.

Mr. McGEE. Where I fail to see the need of the Senator's proposal in view of the incident at Tonkin Bay—

The PRESIDING OFFICER. The time of the Senator has expired.

Mr. McGEE. Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent to have 1 additional minute.

The PRESIDING OFFICER. Without objection, it is so ordered.

Mr. McGEE. In view of the incident at Tonkin Bay and the bombardments of North Vietnam, where we have already crossed the 17th parallel, I ask whether any dispatch of whatever limited movement may be needed along the 17th parallel, or beyond that parallel, would change the dimensions of the conflict.

Mr. JAVITS. We must remember the Yalu incident. There was a point when the Red Chinese felt they had to come into the Korean conflict. I do not know whether they will or not come into this situation, but the national purpose in this regard will be have to be considered. When we look at the matter and consider the danger we may face, I say that the people and the Congress should be joined with the President in whatever implementation of the national will may be necessary. That is the complete theme of my argument.

Mr. McGEE. Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent to proceed for 1 additional minute.

The PRESIDING OFFICER. Without objection, it is so ordered.

Mr. McGEE. With all due respect, again we are talking about the Hanoi government, and not about China. The Yalu decision was a decision of the Chinese. I would agree with the Senator that if we were to reach the point of crossing Chinese borders, it would be quite another matter; but I believe the distinction here is that what the Senator suggests will not increase the pressure on China to change its posture, nor will the movement of whatever group of men we may need to be headed toward the 17th parallel. It has not happened. It may not happen. But even if it did, it would still be no more of a threat than our air raids, and I think the Chinese would be far more concerned with air raids, so far as their national purpose is concerned, than with any movement of ground troops that might be made, because we know that on the ground China has an overwhelming and understandable advantage, whereas in airpower she faces a direct threat to her security and is in a vulnerable position.

Mr. JAVITS. Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent that I may proceed for 2 additional minutes.

The PRESIDING OFFICER (Mr. Russell of South Carolina in the chair). Without objection, it is so ordered.

Mr. JAVITS. First, the Yalu situation arose when we moved into North Korea and there was a danger of our crossing the Yalu into China. The Chinese Communists reacted when we moved into North Korea.

Second. What I am talking about is our willingness to undertake a Korean type of struggle in Asia.

Big nations cannot bluff. Therefore, when we move so many ground combat troops into South Vietnam we should be prepared to carry through. It is at the moment when we first commit ourselves in this way—which is now—that I feel Congress should be asked to join the President in making this national decision.

Mr. McGEE. If I am in error, I should like to be corrected, but it is my understanding that geographically the decision to bomb across the Yalu involved the decision to bomb Chinese territory in order to get to their bases of supply, and at places they were hoping to use as bases for aircraft which they were hoping to use in assistance of the North Koreans, that this was a specific, immediate, and dangerous pressure on China proper, and that this is, therefore, in a slightly different context. I believe that the parallel is well taken. However, there is nothing new in the commitment of any extra manpower in South Vietnam, or in speculating on the prospect that some of those men may go across the 17th parallel.

Mr. JAVITS. Let me give the Senator from Wyoming my best understanding of the situation with respect to the reaction of the Communist Chinese when we moved our ground troops north of the 38th parallel. The talk of bombing across the Yalu was the result of a feeling on the part of General MacArthur that we should take on the Communist Chinese—

Mr. McGEE. In China.

Mr. JAVITS. And beat them, this time.

Mr. McGEE. In China.

Mr. JAVITS. But the Chinese reaction came as a result of our moving ground troops across the 38th parallel. I do not say that the Vietnam situation is so close as to be like a template upon the Korean. We may engage in ground action without Communist Chinese reaction. But history dictates that we must be prepared for any eventuality once we take on a ground war in Asia. As I have just said, a big nation cannot bluff. Congress and the President should be joined at this crucial moment in this kind of decision, in order to avoid to the maximum extent any division in our country.

Mr. GRUENING. Mr. President, I repeat my view that the resolution which was approved by the Congress in response to the presidential request of last August gives him ample authority to do what he is doing, that he needs no further authority. That is one reason why I voted against the resolution.

I rather suspect that the efforts of the Senator from New York [Mr. JAVITS]—and I should like to have his attention if I could—may be an expression of the embarrassment that he and some of his

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colleagues feel, that they have got themselves into this mess and would therefore like to have further reassurance by an additional testing of the sentiment of Congress.

I have no doubt that the Senator from New York is receiving a great deal of mail critical of his support of the position which the administration is taking and that, therefore, he would like a further reassurance from Congress. I can understand his desire for such comfort.

However, I repeat my view, that when the President sent down his resolution last August it gave him the power to use American troops wherever he saw fit, and that gave him ample authority to do what he is now doing. The resolution was approved by Congress, and the Senator from New York voted for it. I voted against it, for reasons that I have amply set forth on the floor of the Senate. I can understand, however, why those who voted against it want to bring up the matter again.

Mr. McGEE. Mr. President, on my own time, I ask unanimous consent for time to mention two factors in this situation, which has been brought up by my friend, the Senator from Alaska. The two comments he made—in regard to which I believe that I should share an observation—dealt with the suggestion of the Senator from Alaska that, after all, those of us who have supported administration policy in Vietnam have now discovered what a mess we have got ourselves into, and that we do not know why we are in this kind of dilemma at the present time.

I believe it should be stated for the Record that no one person got us into this mess. If we had not moved, the kind of mess we would have would be the very same kind of mess that the Senator from Alaska and other great Americans like him would have been protesting with even greater vigor.

This kind of mess stems from the kind of war which our opponents on the other side of the line in southeast Asia have invented as a means of continuing the terrible, steady, pressure for penetration and erosion of those nations which would like to stay outside the orbit of influence of mainland China.

How else are we going to combat guerrilla warfare? How else are we going to combat terrorism, if we do not take a stand now?

Therefore, I challenge the use of the phrase that we are in some kind of mess that somehow we got ourselves into.

We did not wish to become involved, in the first place. History thrust it upon us. We accepted it as one of the commandments that went with victory in World War II, that we could take the lead in helping to rebuild the world, that we could help to reconstruct it ourselves with the kind of profile that we believed offered a better opportunity for peace in the future.

It is this principle, it seems to me, which is really behind the so-called mess in South Vietnam which my friend the Senator from Alaska says we are in, namely, a war which we cannot win.

Mr. President, we do not win wars any more. We are all sophisticated enough

to know that in the nuclear age we do not accumulate points as in a basketball game. What we are trying to do, if not to win a war, is to win the opportunity to make a lasting peace. That is what we have in mind even when we cannot win a war.

We can lose the world. We can lose Vietnam. We can lose the opportunity for which World War II was waged, to try to reconstitute a balanced world, with a more peaceful image than heretofore has been the case.

That is really the context in which we should view the way in which the conflict is going, to and fro, in Vietnam.

I beseech my colleague not to use simple clichés about "the mess we are already in," and that "we cannot win the war in Vietnam." It seems to me to be an oversimplification of the complexities of a problem which the President and the Nation have to face in deciding the policy that must govern the United States in any part of the world.

Mr. GRUENING. Mr. President, will the Senator from Wyoming yield?

Mr. McGEE. Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent that my time may be extended for 3 minutes, in order that I may yield to the Senator from Alaska.

The PRESIDING OFFICER. Without objection, it is so ordered.

Mr. GRUENING. I congratulate my distinguished colleague from Wyoming for creating a new villain in the world. Coming from him, as a professor of history, it has considerable significance. He has made the statement that history thrust us into this situation. This is the first time I ever knew that history had that kind of motive power. But as my colleague has been a teacher of history, a university professor in this field, he may be presumed to speak with substantial authority on the role of history. He has declared that history thrust us into the war in southeast Asia. But I do not think the responsibility for our being there can thus be assigned. Human beings in high places got us into that war.

Mr. McGEE. History probably has thrust more than one man into the front ranks of decisionmaking in the world. History creates events that even Republicans and Democrats, or the Senator from Alaska, sometimes cannot control.

ESSAYS BY WYOMING STUDENTS

Mr. McGEE. Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent that I may return to morning business and take my 3 minutes in order to bring a matter to the attention of the Congress.

The PRESIDING OFFICER. Without objection, it is so ordered.

Mr. McGEE. Mr. President, in Washington with me this week are two outstanding young students from Wyoming.

Each year I conduct a competition in the State of Wyoming for every graduating high school senior. They submit studied essays on one proposition: How to make democracy work better.

The winners of that statewide contest were one young man and one young woman who have now come to Washington and are spending the week in my office and around the Capitol studying

democracy in the living laboratory of our day-to-day procedure.

These two outstanding students are Miss Joan Magagna, of Rock Springs High School, Rock Springs, Wyo., and Craig Fansler, of Fremont County Vocational High School at Lander, Wyo.

Their accomplishments are many. They are both outstanding students, keenly interested in the policies of the world. One of them is an outstanding Democrat and the other comes from an outstanding Republican family. This contest has nothing to do with partisanship. It has everything to do with public responsibility to try to raise the political conduct of our country to ever higher levels.

The essays which they have submitted in this contest are of such quality that I should like to share them with all Senators. Therefore, Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent to have them printed in the Record.

There being no objection, the essays were ordered to be printed in the Record, as follows:

MAKING DEMOCRACY WORK

(By Joan Magagna, Rock Springs, Wyo.)

Nineteen hundred and sixty-five is a troubled, anxious time. Every citizen of 1965's world pursues his daily tasks ever aware of the threatening "facts of life" of this, our 20th century. Frightening shadows of aggressive communism, racial crises, and nuclear weapons menace every waking moment. Each of these heavy problems rests especially heavily upon our shoulders as Americans. We have taken up a mammoth task in this year of strife. We Americans since the birth of our Nation have acclaimed to the world that our country is that promised land of milk and honey and freedom and justice for all. The duty falls to us to make America's promises of life and hope more than just empty words to the downtrodden peoples of earth. For the freedom-loving and freedom-seeking peoples of the world, for ourselves, and for generations to come after 1965, we must find a way to make democracy work.

The American democracy was best defined by Abraham Lincoln in his Gettysburg Address as "a government of the people, by the people, and for the people." His pointed reference to "the people" indicates the prominent role every citizen plays on the stage of democracy. Since our large population and enormous landmass prohibits pure or absolute democracy, the U.S. Government is a function of representative democracy. But Lincoln's words "of the people" imply that the masses must still be the government. Making our democracy work necessitates every individual's making his own influence felt through his representatives. If one citizen's voice is hushed or fails to be heard, then democracy fails to work. If a government voices the opinions of only some of the people, it cannot be a genuine democracy.

By constitutional provision, the opinions of the people of our Nation are expressed through the polls. It is tragic to realize that nearly 40 percent of our voting population did not vote in the last general election, when peoples in other parts of the world are still fighting to obtain such rights. In one Latin American country a few years ago, the population was warned under pain of death to stay away from the polls on election day. Ninety-nine percent of the population cast their votes that day. In America, where we have no fears of punishment, only 60 percent of the population turn out at the polls.

Obviously, we Americans cannot be genuinely aware that the right to vote is the lifeblood of democracy. However, the trite

record. I was a strong and outspoken supporter of President Kennedy's Trade Expansion Act of 1962 and I view a mutual reduction of tariffs among the Western nations as absolutely essential to the long-run economic prosperity and political solidarity of the free world. But I also believe it is essential that every nation be willing to abide by basic ground rules of international trade. One of these rules is not to sell large quantities of surplus merchandise in a country at prices below those charged in home markets if such sales will injure domestic producers.

Senator HUMPHREY summarized his views in words that I feel are equally appropriate with respect to the June 1, 1965, editorial:

It appears to me that the editorials were primarily theoretical rather than being based upon an actual observation of the laws and the facts that relate to these laws * * *. In short, whether by official statute or decree or by unofficial agreement, other nations of the free world sanction procedures to protect their domestic industries and markets from dumping of surplus products. To the extent that the Post editorials conveyed the impression that the U.S. Antidumping Act represented a unique trade practice unknown to our Western partners, they were grossly misleading. In fact, dumping is an internationally recognized unfair trade practice and action taken against dumping should be and is taken without regard to attempts to encourage and expand fair international trade.

Furthermore, the June 1 editorial misses the point that it is the apparent lack of consensus among the Commissioners since mid-1963 as to what constitutes injury, which underscores the fallacy of referring to the Commission's collective "judgment," when in fact, differing judgments exist among the Commissioners as to some of the basic concepts to be applied. In the absence of standards established by the Congress, there will continue to be confusion and uncertainty in both the domestic and importing communities as to the interpretation of basic concepts in the act.

Once the applicable standards are made known, there is a reasonable expectation that cases will not be brought by domestic industry in which no injury is likely to be found, but which previously might have been worth a try. Also, where injury is likely to be found because of the clearer standards, there will be less reluctance to bring a valid case. Both of these situations would result in a higher percentage of findings of injury, and for solid reasons. I believe it therefore inappropriate that the Post editorial remarks that:

The Hartke-Scott bill would foist upon the Commission rules that would make findings of injury far more likely.

Next, I should like to say a word about the continuing reference in Post editorials to retaliation against U.S. exports. In the June 1 editorial a series of retaliations from European countries is prophesied. I will not deny that some European countries have the capability of reassessing their own antidumping laws, but I do object to the use of the retaliation argument, just as then-Senator HUMPHREY did in his response to earlier Post editorials, as an attempt to stifle any discussion of needed changes in our foreign trade laws.

It is clear that the most effective way

to influence antidumping developments in the countries of our trading partners would be to provide a model in the U.S. experience. In a sense this has been accomplished inasmuch as the U.S. law and the GATT provision on dumping are very similar. However, it is equally evident that our U.S. Antidumping Act requires improvement. A model law must be clear in its terms, and it must be effective and efficient in its application. Once such a law is in being, we can hold it out to our trading partners as a measure by which their laws can be tested, and we can be more certain that our export trade will not be unfairly treated.

We need not be ashamed of the U.S. Antidumping Act of 1921, as amended, with its two stage investigation, which does not make dumping alone actionable, but only when injury is also shown. U.S. exports which may be dumped but do not cause injury abroad are not likely to be complained of by foreign governments. Furthermore, since the U.S. antidumping law, and the proposed amendment as well, would apply to products of all countries equally (with certain special provisions for dealing effectively with Communist products), it does not discriminate against European countries, and retaliatory measures aimed at only U.S. exports would be in violation of the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade—GATT—which provides the framework for the Kennedy round of tariff-cutting negotiations now in progress, and from which the European countries, as well as all others, hope to benefit. Thus, it should be kept in perspective that the foreign countries have been asking for many changes in U.S. law in addition to the Antidumping Act, and that recent Treasury changes in its regulations, many of which would be ratified by the 1965 amendment, have already acceded in substantial part to the major foreign requests.

The third point which needs clarification is the editorial's misleading implication that only the steel and cement industries would benefit from this bill. This is put in the form of a statement that the bill would strengthen the market position of steel and cement, when in fact many of the principal beneficiaries will be small domestic industries and their labor force which have the most difficulty in withstanding dumping. In a survey made last year covering the previous 10-year period it was found that 141 different product types were involved in 319 dumping cases, broken down into the following categories:

	Product types	Cases
Agricultural products.....	17	22
Aluminum products.....	3	26
Automobiles.....	1	8
Baking products.....	3	7
Chemical products.....	24	50
Fish products.....	6	7
Glass products.....	2	3
Metal products.....	28	64
Portland cement products.....	2	18
Rayon staple fiber products.....	2	33
Textile products.....	12	16
Wood products.....	13	23
Miscellaneous products.....	28	42
Total.....	141	319

Thus, it is understandable that the predecessor antidumping amendment was endorsed by a number of organizations representing substantial segments of their industries including, in alphabetical order: Automotive parts, supplies, and equipment, braided rug, cast iron soil pipe, cement, cheese, copper and brass, electrical and electronics, fine and specialty wire, fish, glove, hardwood plywood, hat, musical instrument, scientific apparatus, shoe and leather, tool and stainless steel, vegetable and melon, and wire and cable. Backing has been provided also by such national organizations as the American Mining Congress and several labor unions.

I believe that the foregoing should make it clear that this is not special interest legislation. Moreover, it now appears that the newly revised 1965 amendment is likely to receive even stronger and more widespread industry, labor, and congressional support than did the 1964 bill.

There is no doubt that injurious dumping will be easier to curtail if our bill is passed. This is an important objective of S. 2045. It is clear, also, that the market positions of steel, cement, and many other industries—as well as the well-being of employees who work in these industries—will be strengthened insofar as American companies, which are already in tough competition with each other and nondumped imports, will have a better chance to combat unfair competition from dumped imports.

Market disruption by hit-and-run tactics, leaving to U.S. producers the slow task of rebuilding to earlier price levels, is clearly an irresponsible international trade practice. The broad generalization of the editorial that import competition makes an important contribution to price stability and the welfare of the consumer, is misused when overextended to a dumping situation. In this "highly interdependent world," as the editorial calls it, I believe it becomes increasingly essential that imports compete fairly.

On this point I should like to quote once again from then, Senator HUMPHREY's remarks of May 27, 1963, and from those of Senator HUGH SCOTT, the principal cosponsor in the Senate of the 1965 bill, as he was of the 1963 bill. Both men stressed a significant facet of this problem, one which I heartily endorse. The HUMPHREY observation was:

I have always maintained that American manufacturers were fully capable of meeting legitimate foreign competition, but no domestic producer should be expected to withstand the long-term effects of irresponsible dumping actions by foreign competitors.

Senator SCOTT stated in his introductory remarks on May 26, 1965:

Manufacturers in this country have never feared legitimate competition. Drawing upon principles evolved by the courts under U.S. antitrust laws, my amendment would ask foreign suppliers selling in the United States to comply with the same type of ground rules that guide U.S. domestic industries. The unfair double standard where our companies are bound to obey certain laws that do not apply to foreign suppliers would be eliminated. The great majority of our industries ask only the opportunity to compete fairly. They cannot do this when

confronted with the artificially low pricing which characterizes dumping.

Finally, it is time to bring some perspective on the last-ditch argument which the editorial evokes, that lower prices are for the welfare of the consumer. Now everybody knows that the ultimate consumer, or any buyer, will have a benefit if he pays less for something. We are all for this—who could be against it? But in a dumping situation, when a short-term benefit to the consumer is at the cost of injury to U.S. industry and labor, we are forced to look at the consumer benefit argument not in a vacuum, but as part of our whole economic theory—that the reasonable expectation of a profit is the stimulus to business venture in the first place. It is competition in our private enterprise system which brings lower prices to the consumer—not the destruction of competition by dumping.

Mr. President, in responding to the recent Post editorial and clarifying some of the inaccurate assessments it made, I also should like to take this opportunity to remind those of my colleagues who have not yet signed up as cosponsors of the 1965 Antidumping Act Amendment that S. 2045 remains at the desk today. I urge all Senators who feel as we do, on both sides of the aisle, to add their support by signing as cosponsors of the bill now.

UNSEEN ALLIES OF THE VIETCONG

Mr. LONG of Louisiana. Mr. President, there appeared in yesterday's Washington Post an article written by the syndicated columnists Rowland Evans and Robert Novak. In this article the authors discuss the "unseen allies" of the Vietcong in the war in Vietnam. As one of these "allies" they name the critics of President Johnson's firm policy of resisting aggression in southeast Asia.

I am sure that these critics do not wish to advance the Moscow line, as they are described in this article as doing, by giving assistance to the active enemy of the United States in the Vietnam war. The authors make it plain that the assistance is unwitting. The fact that it is unintentional, however, does not make it less damaging, and I urge the critics to give serious consideration to the effect which their statements are having.

All of us, and especially President Johnson, are hoping for and looking forward to the day when we can end the fighting in Vietnam and sit down at the negotiating table to find the basis for a stable and peaceful South Vietnam. In order for this hope to be realized, however, the Vietcong must come to accept the fact, and it is a fact, that we are not going to be driven out of South Vietnam—we are not going to abandon the Vietnamese people. It is clear that the criticisms of the President's policy and actions are delaying the time when the Vietcong will come to accept this fact.

The authors acknowledge that the damaging effect of the statements of these critics is in part due to the exaggerated attention given to them by the Vietcong and their allies, Moscow and

Peking. To acknowledge this does not alter the situation. It only makes it more clear that those who are making the statements should take this factor into account. I urge them to do so. It seems to me that their criticisms could at least be tempered even if they are unwilling to give the President the support I think he deserves for his courageous and forthright policy of resisting the open and violent aggression against the people of South Vietnam.

Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent that this very well conceived and written article be printed at this point in the Record.

There being no objection, the article was ordered to be printed in the Record, as follows:

SUMMER IN VIETNAM

(By Rowland Evans and Robert Novak)

In the dangerous rainy season offensive, the Communist Vietcong guerrillas have two unseen allies—one an intentional ally, the other an unwitting ally.

The intentional ally is Moscow. By its statements of new support and weapons, the Soviet Union shows how far it has allowed itself to be pushed into North Vietnam's corner. And this in turn provides a crucial boost in Hanoi's will to win. Hanoi is the Vietcong's sponsor and supplier.

The unwitting ally in this dangerous summer are the U.S. critics of President Johnson's firm policy in southeast Asia. Every critical statement is puffed up far out of proportion as proof that in the end the United States really won't stick it out in the jungles of southeast Asia.

These factors assume special importance in the critical new phase of the war. With arrival of the summer monsoons the less mobile United States-South Vietnam forces are slowed, their air operations are impeded, and the light-traveling Red guerrillas gain a new advantage. Each year the Vietcong conduct intensive probing operations in June, then move into a major offensive in July.

Nobody believes the success or failure of the Vietcong summer offensive will settle the war once and for all. But if the Communists score anything like their summer successes of 1963 and 1964, the entire gain in morale in South Vietnam generated by the U.S. bombing in the north (a gain already being dissipated) could be erased altogether.

A repeat of Vietcong successes of 1963 and 1964 might even lead to a coalition government in Saigon, a disastrous mixture of Vietcong leaders and non-Communists.

But if the Vietcong are stopped for the first time, it could be a turning point of the war. Among other things, it would much enhance the new amnesty campaign aimed at the Vietcong (duplicating the campaign used so well in combating Communist guerrillas in Malaya a decade ago).

In guerrilla war, morale is nearly as important as military tactics. That's why the strong statements now coming from Moscow backing the Vietcong are so important. Moreover, the expected early arrival in North Vietnam of sophisticated Soviet antiaircraft weaponry is considered significant more for psychological than military reasons.

Soon after Khrushchev's fall, the new Soviet leaders laid plans to give Hanoi more help—mainly to counteract Red Chinese influence. This help was accelerated by the U.S. bombings in the north. One negative feature of the bombings is that it has pushed Moscow into taking a stronger stand in Vietnam in order to maintain its position in the Communist world.

But as we have reported previously, the unwitting aid from the United States can be just as dangerous as the intentional aid

from Moscow. This explains why Assistant Secretary of State William Bundy often leaves his desk in Washington to debate critics of President Johnson's Vietnam policy.

The reason these critics have an influence out of proportion to their numbers is the dangerous tendency of the Communist intelligence community (a tendency not peculiar to Communist nations) to believe what it wants to believe.

For instance, there is good reason to believe that Communist China really thought India would fall apart when invaded 3 years ago.

By the same token, both Peking and Hanoi are known to overemphasize the importance of domestic criticism here.

Of course, more is involved than psychological warfare. The continuing growth of U.S. ground forces has freed Vietnamese troops for field duty. Moreover, U.S. officials hope that new battle techniques will enable the Vietnamese to do better against the Vietcong's hit-and-run guerrilla tactics than the last two summers.

A guerrilla war is beyond prediction. One thing certain, however, is that Hanoi is adamant against negotiations. This, together with the growing moral and physical aid from Moscow, has reinforced Hanoi's determination to go all out on another summer offensive. If peace is to come to Vietnam, that offensive must be stopped cold.

SENATE SHOULD REJECT NOMINATION OF GEN. WILLIAM F. MCKEE

Mr. YOUNG of Ohio. Mr. President, I am opposed to S. 1900, now on the Senate Calendar, to appoint Gen. William F. McKee as the Administrator of the Federal Aviation Agency.

The Founding Fathers provided that in the United States, civilian authority must always be supreme over military authority. They specifically included in the Constitution the provision that the President of the United States shall be Commander in Chief of the Armed Forces. This has been a basic principle of our democracy.

They were mindful of the inevitable conflict between civilian and military leaders. Apparently, from what has taken place in the executive branch of our Government during recent months, they were justified in being fearful of military domination in our Republic. These 18th century fears on the part of those patriots who won the Revolutionary War and later wrote the Constitution and Bill of Rights are equally valid in the 20th century. It is suggested that top officials in the executive branch of our Government would do well to reread some of the debates in the Federal Convention and refresh their minds that James Madison and other architects of our Constitution were determined that "the military shall always be subordinate to civilian power."

The Congress has specifically provided that numerous high Federal offices shall always be filled by civilians, including the posts of Secretary of Defense, Secretary of the Air Force, and many others. Among them is the position of Administrator of the Federal Aviation Agency.

At this time, Mr. President, 94 retired and active officers of our Armed Forces, many of them generals, enjoy executive assignments in the Federal Aviation Agency alone. Major General Grant is Deputy Administrator. The Federal Air